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Abstract
The Effects of Medicaid and Maternal Depression 
on Prenatal Care and Infant Health 
by 
Lisa C. DeFelice 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1999
While in recent years, the infant health production function literature has expanded to 
incorporate behavioral inputs into the production of infant health current research fails to 
incorporate the Medicaid-private insurance choice into the mother's decision making 
process. This dissertation seeks to address this by treating private insurance and 
Medicaid as endogenous while considering the effects that the Medicaid eligibility rules 
have on both kinds of coverage. Medicaid and private insurance are entered directly into 
the health production function so that quality effects may be captured. In addition, a 
woman's state of mental health is also incorporated into the health production process. 
Depression may have direct and indirect effects on infant health, as it is a potential 
negative input into the production process but also a factor that may influence the choice 
and productivity of other inputs (such as prenatal care).
A traditional infant health production model is extended to include the Medicaid-private 
insurance choice and guides the formulation of the two-stage empirical model. Two 
reduced form, univariate probits are estimated in the first stage on the Medicaid-private 
insurance choice. Then, a treatment effects model simultaneously estimates the 
interaction between prenatal care and birth weight as well as the effects of depression, 
Medicaid, and private insurance. Finally, utilizing the parameters estimated with my 
original (1988) data, the effects of expanding Medicaid eligibility according to the 1997 
rules are simulated. Additionally, a similar simulation predicts the effect of mechanically 
"treating" depressed women or reducing their depressive symptoms (by lowering their 
CES-D depression score) on the key variables.
Results indicate that both depression and Medicaid participation lead to a reduction in 
birth weight. Prenatal care has no significant effect on birth weight but both smoking and 
anthropometry do. Simulations reveal that expanding Medicaid eligibility is predicted to 
improve health outcomes particularly for low-income women and black women.
Treating depressed women is also predicted to increase birth weights.
x
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
General framework, central issues, and contribution
Understanding the correlates of infant health has become an issue of great 
importance in the U.S. since we have learned that it has tremendous implications for 
childhood and adolescent health and well being. Some aspects of infant health have 
improved over the past decade. Infant mortality rates for white children have fallen from 
8.4 deaths per thousand in 1988 to 6.3 deaths per thousand in 1995. For black children, 
the rate has also fallen from 18.5 to 15.1 deaths over the same time period. However, not 
every infant health indicator is showing favorable trends. The incidence of low birth 
weight infants (birth weights of less than 2500 grams or 5.5 pounds) is on the rise for 
white infants from 5.7% of all white births in 1988 to 6.3% in 1995. For blacks, 
however, the rate has fallen from 13.3% of all black births to 13.0%1. These statistics 
suggest two paths of important research that need to be addressed. The first is to better 
understand the correlates of birth weight and low birth weight, as these are two important 
indicators of infant health. The second is to determine how these correlates differ by race 
and why the incidence o f low birth weight is rising for whites. The statistics shown 
above yield evidence that the incidence of low birth weight, although falling, is higher for 
blacks than it is for whites.
1 Statistics available from  http://www.childstats.gov
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2The analytical tools used in economics are useful and appropriate to evaluate the 
factors that are correlated with infant health outcomes. In fact, Rosenzweig and Schultz's 
1982 paper "The Behavior of Mothers as Inputs to Child Health: The Determinants of 
Birth Weight, Gestation, and Rate of Fetal Growth" has inspired a branch of literature on 
the infant health production function. This literature takes the approach that infant health 
or birth weight is the outcome of a production process called pregnancy. In recent years, 
the importance of incorporating behavioral inputs, primarily maternal behavior such as 
smoking and prenatal care, has been recognized by this literature. Many studies 
(including Rosenzweig and Schultz) have found that these inputs significantly affect birth 
weight.
At the same time, several studies have investigated the decision to participate in 
Medicaid and how that decision affects private insurance coverage. Crowding out rates 
have been estimated as high as 50% in some studies. In addition, other studies have 
evaluated the effects of Medicaid and private insurance on infant health outcomes. 
However, current research fails to incorporate the Medicaid-private insurance choice into 
the mother’s decisions regarding the health of her infant. That is, insurance choice has not 
been explicitly modeled as a choice input into the production of infant health. This leaves 
open the question of how Medicaid versus private insurance influences the mother’s 
decision to seek prenatal care and, ultimately, the health of her infant.
Studies devoted toward understanding the effects of depression have also been on 
the forefront of health economics research. Studies such as Broadhead et al. (1990) 
indicate that depressed individuals function poorer on a daily basis, missing more days of
1 Statistics available from http://www.childstats.gov
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3work and school, than non-depressed individuals. In addition, other research (such as 
Dawson et al., 1997a) indicates that depressed mothers pass on their "depressed state" to 
their infants in the form of reduced brain activity. The infant health production literature 
has neglected to incorporate a woman's state of mental health as an input that enters into 
the infant health production process. Depression may have direct and indirect effects on 
infant health, as it is a potential negative input into the production process but also a 
factor that may influence the choice of other inputs (such as prenatal care) and the 
productivity of those inputs.
This dissertation seeks to answer these questions and, in so doing, expands upon 
these bodies of literature in a number of important ways. First, private insurance and 
Medicaid are treated as endogenous or choice inputs in the production of infant health. I 
assume that a woman chooses the type of insurance coverage that maximizes her own 
utility, which is a function of infant health. In addition, the effects of the Medicaid 
eligibility rules on both kinds of coverage are considered. It is expected that the Medicaid 
income eligibility rules influence the type of insurance coverage demanded. Second, 
Medicaid income eligibility has expanded tremendously during the past decade. Many 
women and children who were not eligible to receive Medicaid in the mid-1980s are now 
eligible. This provides the opportunity to simulate how these expansions affect the 
choice to participate in Medicaid and purchase private insurance. More importantly, it 
can be determined how these expansions affect the demand for prenatal care, and 
ultimately, how they affect infant health. Finally, I incorporate a woman's state of mental 
health or severity of depression into the health production process. In light of the 
depression literature, it is expected that a depressed woman may demand a sub-optimal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
quantity of prenatal care, affecting the health of her infant. Additionally, whether 
depression directly affects infant health in the form of birth weight can also be 
determined. The direct and indirect effects of treating (or curing) depression in a sample 
of pregnant women through the use of a policy simulation can shed light on whether it is 
an effective tool in improving outcomes.
Disentangling these issues requires that I first extend the traditional infant health 
production model to include the Medicaid-private insurance choice. This theoretical 
framework guides the formulation of my two-stage empirical model. The first stage 
estimates a reduced-form, Medicaid-private insurance choice with two univariate probits. 
I then use a treatment effects model to recursively estimate the interaction between 
prenatal care (an input into the production process) and birth weight (the health outcome), 
as well as the effects of depression, Medicaid and private insurance. My model reveals 
the complex effects that expanding Medicaid eligibility may have on infant health. In 
addition, the entire model is stratified by race, specifically, by black and white women. 
Stratification allows both the intercept and all of the parameters to vary according to 
whether the mother is black or white. Utilizing the parameters estimated with the original 
(1988) data, I simulate the effects of expanding Medicaid eligibility according to the 1997 
rules and the effects of reducing depressive symptoms in a sample of depressed women.
Structure of following chapters
The health production function literature is well established and is reviewed in 
greater detail in Chapter II. A number of extensions have been made to the infant health 
production framework developed by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982). One extension
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5made by Warner (1995,1998) is the inclusion of anthropometric characteristics or 
characteristics that define the mother's physical structure such as height and hex own birth 
weight, into the health production function. It is believed that these characteristics are 
linked to birth weight. Another extension made by Grossman and Joyce (1990) is the 
development of a correction statistic that controls for the self-selection that occurs when 
evaluating a subset of the pregnant population, specifically, pregnancies that result in a 
live birth. The premise behind this correction is that women who continue a pregnancy to 
term are more likely healthier and care more for their pregnancy than women whose 
pregnancy ends in miscarriage or abortion, thus biasing parameter estimates. If the latter 
group of women had continued their pregnancy to full term, they likely would have 
demanded less than adequate prenatal care in addition to bearing a child of lower birth 
weight. Another class of extensions incorporates health insurance coverage as a choice or 
endogenous variable. Moffitt (1983), Cutler and Gruber (1996), Currie and Gruber 
(1996), and Joyce (1997) all to some extent recognize that insurance and Medicaid are 
endogenous and model it that way. Since the "quality" effect of Medicaid is at question 
here in terms of its effect on birth weight, a brief discussion entailing the overwhelming 
shift toward Medicaid managed care is discussed. While Medicaid managed care may 
have significant implications for the outcomes of the model the transition to managed 
care it is not directly modeled here. The data are not rich enough to support such an 
analysis since the data are collected in 1988, before the rise in managed care. Finally, the 
epidemiological literature pertaining to depression and prenatal care is also discussed.
This literature indicates a link between depression, infant health, and individual 
functioning.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The theoretical and empirical models are derived in Chapter III. These models 
jointly estimate the interaction between depression, prenatal care (the primary input into 
the production of infant health), and birth weight (a commonly used indicator o f infant 
health), highlighting the effect that insurance coverage has on the system. The basic 
theoretical framework comes from Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982). They utilize a utility 
maximizing approach to develop a model of infant health production. The incorporation 
of a Medicaid or welfare stigma into the framework comes from Moffitt (1983). This 
insurance "choice" is embedded with the budget constraint associated with the utility 
function. The theoretical model predicts the type of insurance coverage (Medicaid, 
private insurance, or no insurance) that maximizes the woman's utility.
The empirical model is an extension of many of the papers discussed in the 
literature review. The primary data set used is quite rich and includes data on a sample of 
roughly 26,000 women who experienced a live birth, fetal death, or infant death in 1988. 
Once outliers and fetal and infant deaths were removed and the data was stratified by 
race, the sample used in the analysis includes 2562 white women and 2106 black women. 
Several statistical, sample-selection issues are addressed prior to the model estimation. 
The first issue addresses "live birth" sample selection where only pregnancies that ended 
in a live birth are included in the overall analysis. Another discusses endogenizing 
insurance choice.
The primary model estimated is a two-stage, recursive treatment effects model. 
Medicaid and insurance are estimated in the first stage in order to produce inverse Mills 
ratios that control for sample selection. The final stage simultaneously estimates prenatal 
care demand and birth weight. The onset of prenatal care and the number of visits
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
adjusted for gestation are two alternative prenatal care measures defined. Birth weight is 
defined in four different ways. The first is the actual birth weight in grams. The second 
is the actual birth weight in grams only if gestation is greater than 37 weeks. That is, only 
full-term births are included. This measure is important since it standardizes gestation for 
the sample of women, eliminates any pre-term births, and is a better reflection of fetal 
growth. The third measure is a dummy variable indicating the incidence of low birth 
weight. Finally, the last measure is the same as the third but limited to term births. 
Included in the final stage equations are the actual Medicaid and insurance variables plus 
their associated Mills ratios. These are the "treatment effects". The model evaluates the 
"treatment effect" of Medicaid and insurance on prenatal care and birth weight. 
Additionally, depression is also included in both the prenatal care and birth weight 
equations. Since other studies more commonly use an instrumental variables model to 
jointly estimate prenatal care and birth weight, this model is also estimated. Finally, for 
comparison, a birth weight equation that treats all variables as exogenous as well as a 
reduced-form birth weight equation are estimated.
Chapter IV develops two policy simulations that evaluate a) the impact of 
expanding Medicaid income eligibility and b) the impact of treating depression in 
depressed individuals, on the probability of having Medicaid and insurance, prenatal care, 
and birth weight. The Medicaid income eligibility simulation only evaluates a gross 
change in the dollar amount threshold (which varies by household size and state). 
Confounding effects such as the transition from the AFDC program to TANF and 
Medicaid managed care are not modeled. While they are also important policy shifts that 
have occurred in the Medicaid program during the past decade, the 1988 NMIHS data
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8used cannot appropriately capture these effects. Using the Center for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression scale (CES-D scale) which rates depressive symptoms on a  scale of 0 
- 60 (60 reflecting the most severe symptoms), the depression simulation evaluates the 
impact of reducing a woman's score that is greater than 16 (the "depression threshold") to 
a score of 16. Essentially, censoring the score to 16 is considered "treating depression".
A simulation is an improvement over other studies in the literature since it takes 
into account both the direct and indirect effects of a policy change. For example, the 
effect of eligibility is likely to be non-linear in prenatal care and birth weight. Therefore, 
including eligibility directly in these equations may lead to poor results. One important 
element to note is that expanding Medicaid eligibility to a new group of women does not 
directly translate into participation by these women. Several studies have shown that the 
Medicaid take-up rate, the percentage of Medicaid eligible women who actually 
participate in Medicaid, is far less than 100%. An important feature of the policy 
simulation (and a contribution to the literature) is that it does not impose participation on 
an individual. The simulation only estimates the probability that a woman will participate 
once she becomes eligible. Using the parameter estimates already obtained from previous 
estimations, the model uses a woman's characteristics to predict whether she will 
participate if eligibility rules change. These effects are then simulated on prenatal care 
and birth weight. A similar process is used in the depression simulation.
Chapter V concludes.




Infant health is not homogeneous across all births in the US each year. Some 
infants are bom too soon, while others are bom too small. Some will live a full life while 
others may die within the first month or first year of life. The primary goal of the papers 
in the first major section of this literature review is to try to explain what factors 
contribute to the variation in infant health. If the variation in infant health is solely due to 
genetic and immeasurable factors or factors unknown to the researcher then an economic 
analysis of the problem is not appropriate. However, a considerable amount of economic 
and epidemiological literature suggests that many other factors contribute to the variation 
in infant health. Factors such as the onset and amount of prenatal care and the presence 
of smoking during pregnancy are factors that can be appropriately measured by the 
researcher in an economic model.
The model that is well established in the literature for evaluating this type of 
problem is the health production function. The focus of this model is to recognize 
parental behavior as a primary input into the health production function. Parental 
behavior can mean anything from fertility behavior (choosing the optimal number and 
spacing of births) to maternal behaviors such as smoking, substance abuse, and 
demanding prenatal care. This is not to say that other inputs such as anthropometric
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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characteristics (such as the mother's height, weight, own birth weight, and race) and other 
socioeconomic characteristics and demographics are not included. While the existing 
literature has incorporated a variety of these inputs, in a variety of ways, into the model, 
there are still essential inputs that have been neglected or that have not been entered into 
the model appropriately.
This dissertation contributes to the economics literature by extending the existing 
health production function literature in a number of ways, and at the same time 
connecting several different bodies of literature. The first contribution is that the 
Medicaid and welfare literature is used to modify the infant health production model. To 
date, the household production function literature has not fully incorporated the 
endogeneity of participating in public programs such as Medicaid on infant health. That 
is, this dissertation models insurance coverage as a choice where a woman chooses the 
type of coverage that maximizes her utility. However, Medicaid eligibility rules are 
measured as an exogenous shock. The second contribution applies this concept to the 
empirical treatment effects model, disentangling the direct and indirect (through prenatal 
care) effects of Medicaid on infant health. The empirical section more completely 
discusses the techniques available to control for these complex relationships. The third 
contribution is that the epidemiological literature is used to inform the formulation of the 
health production function by expanding the scope of behavioral inputs to include 
maternal depression. Epidemiological research has shown that a significant link exists 
between depression and infant health. Depression may have both direct and indirect 
effects on infant health, as it is a potential negative input into the production process but 
also a factor that may influence the choice of other inputs (such as prenatal care) and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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productivity of those inputs. The final contribution is that a policy simulation captures 
both the direct and indirect effects of the Medicaid eligibility expansions that occurred 
during the past decade as well as an alternative policy of treating maternal depression.
Health Production Function
Origins of the health production function
The health production function provides the foundation for the framework 
developed in this dissertation. Grossman (1972) developed the first theoretical 
formulation of this model. Prior to his contribution, similar models of household 
production (developed by Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), and others) focused on time 
allocation in non-market activities within the household. The primary difference between 
these earlier models and Grossman's model is that the latter focuses on the total amount 
o f time devoted toward market and non-market activities whereas the former focuses on 
the allocation of that time. Put another way, an individual’s stock of knowledge or 
human capital affects her productivity and efficiency in market and non-market activities, 
thus affecting how she allocates her time. An individual’s stock of health affects the total 
amount of time devoted toward market and non-market activities since poor health 
reduces the total amount of time available. Assuming that an individual wishes to 
maximize the amount of time she devotes toward these activities and minimize sick time, 
the stock of health capital enters directly into the utility function.
According to Grossman, an individual is said to inherit an initial stock of health at 
birth. This stock depreciates throughout life until the stock reaches a minimum, Hmin, at 
which time death occurs. Therefore, throughout one’s life, an individual must continually
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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invest in health capital, via a health production function, in order to delay the inevitable, 
Hmm- One primary way to invest in health is to demand medical services. Grossman 
argues that “what consumers demand when they purchase medical services are not these 
services, per se but, rather ‘good health’ (Grossman p. 224). Therefore, the demand for 
medical services is said to be a derived demand2. By demanding medical services one 
can invest in good health.
The general model proposed is an intertemporal model of utility maximization 
subject to budget and time constraints. While Grossman’s model makes a significant 
contribution to the health economics literature, two more recent papers by Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1982, 1983) provide a more elegant and suitable model of health production. 
This is one of the models that my dissertation draws heavily upon. A summary of the 
models from key papers discussed in the literature review can be found in Table 1.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the measures of birth weight and prenatal care found in the 
following articles.
Health production function: Initial specification of model
The model developed in their papers utilizes a similar approach to Grossman 
(1972) by embedding a health production function into a utility maximizing framework. 
Their primary contribution is the recognition that maternal behavior plays a large role in 
determining child health and thus should be incorporated as inputs into the health 
production function. Maternal behavior can mean anything from fertility behavior
2 The story of derived demand is as follows: The demand for an input, medical services, is derived from the 
demand for the product itself, health or health capital. Thus, if the demand for the product (health) is zero, 
then the demand for the input (medical services) is also zero. As long as an individual invests in health 
capital (the product), the demand for medical services (the input) will be positive. At death, when the 
demand for health is zero, the demand for medical services is also zero.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(choosing the optimal number and spacing of births) to other behaviors such as smoking, 
substance abuse, and demanding prenatal care. Furthermore, a woman selects the inputs 
(that enter into the health production function) that maximize her family's utility in 
addition to ones that reflect her unobserved health endowment. For instance, i f  a woman 
believes that she has a poor health endowment, she may demand more healthy inputs to 
neutralize the effect that her poor health endowment will have on her fetus' health.
Clearly, the inclusion of such inputs is significant.
In light of this, the family utility function3 is defined as the following:
1. U = U ( X ,Y ,H )
where H  represents the health of each of the family's children, Y  reflects consumer goods 
that affect health (such as smoking) and, X  indicates health-neutral consumer goods. In 
addition, the health of the infant can be represented by the following health production 
function:
2. H = f ( Y , Z , f i )
such that Y again reflects the consumer goods that affect health, Z represents infant health 
enhancement goods that do not directly enhance family utility but do directly enhance 
infant health (such as medical care), and ji is the health "endowment" passed along to the 
infant. This endowment may be passed via genetics or may simply indicate 
environmental conditions that are uninfluenced by the parental unit.
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The family maximizes utility given the infant health production function and 
subject to the budget constraint:
3. I  =  XPx + YPy + ZPz
where /  is income and Px, P y ,  and Pz are the prices of those goods, respectively. This 
budget constraint indicates an important feature of the model. Since only the prices of X, 
Y, and Z appear in the constraint, only these three goods can be purchased directly. Infant 
health (H) (or birth) cannot be purchased directly. This is consistent with Grossman 
(1972). Rather, infant health is included since it is a utility augmenting good for which 
other goods must be sacrificed. That is, in order to increase investment in infant health, 
one must decrease investment in X  and possibly Y.
The Lagrangian formed from this model is the following:4
maxL = U ( .X ,Y , f (Y ,Z , t i ) )  + U l  - X P Y - Y P y -  ZPz )
X . Y . Z
from which the following first-order conditions can be derived:
. dL dU . dU4 .  --------- = -—----------APy = 0 = >  ----------= APy
d x  d x  x dX x
_ dL dU dU df  dU dU df
3 . ------ =    -i--------•  —----- APy = 0  => ------  “I------- ^ =  APy
dY dY dH dY dY dH dY Y
,  dL dU df ,n A dU df6.  —  =  - — • — — AP7 = 0  = >  --------•-^L- = AP7
d z  dH d z  d H d Z
The first-order conditions reveal which variables affect utility directly and which ones
affect it indirectly through health. Equation 4 shows that X  only affects utility directly
and is therefore health-neutral. Equation 5 illustrates that Y  not only affects utility
3 The theoretical is model taken from the 1982 paper.
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directly but also affects utility through health. Equation 6 shows that Z only affects utility 
through its' effect on health but does not directly affect uulity. Finally, the authors derive 
input demand equations for AT, Y, and Z that are a function of all of the exogenous 
variables in the system:
7. X  = Dx (Px ,P y ,P z , I , i i )
8. Y = DY(Px , PY,Pz , r , l i )
9. Z = D z (Px ,Py , Pz , I , n)
In addition to providing a sound theoretical framework to evaluate the production 
of infant health, Rosenzweig and Schultz recognize the endogeneity bias created by one 
of the key inputs, Z. That authors state that if this model were empirically estimated
d fusing ordinary least-squares (OLS), the estimate o f  would be upwardly biased. The
dZ
reason for this, the authors indicate, is that parents who expect to have healthier babies or 
live in a clean environment (represented by /j>0) may be observed to demand less of the 
variable Z yet have healthier children3. However, despite fj. affecting parental behavior 
through their demand for Z, fi is not correlated with any input demand prices. Therefore, 
Rosenzweig and Schultz indicate that it is possible to estimate the model unbiasedly by 
purging the variation in {l from the variation in Z and Y. Empirically, this requires a two- 
stage model. The reduced-form input demand equations would be unbiasedly estimated 
in the first stage. From this, the predicted values of these variables would be included in 
the structural-form of the infant health production function in the second stage.
4 This equation was not explicitly taken from this paper although it was alluded to. Therefore, this equation 
is not numbered.
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The four input demand equations estimated in the first stage (since they are 
considered endogenous in the second stage infant health production function) are the 
following: AGE (mother's age at delivery), SMOKING (number of cigarettes smoked per 
day during pregnancy), and BIRTHS  (number of live births the mother experienced 
including this birth) representing Y  - health related goods that provide direct utility to the 
mother but also affect child health, and DELAY  (number of months into the pregnancy 
that woman sought medical care) representing Z - goods that only affect child health. 
These four dependent variables are estimated as reduced-from equations and are 
regressed on the explanatory variables in the system. These include the mother’s 
education, husband's income, several per capita variables that indicate the local hospital 
and physician environment, state unemployment characteristics, price of cigarettes, 
population density, mother's race, and year indicators. Neither insurance status nor any 
additional genetic factors are included as regressors.
Results from the first-stage reduced-form models reveal the following things. 
White women, with higher family incomes, more education, who live in a metropolitan 
area, in counties with more public health facilities or with greater government 
expenditures on health facilities begin the onset of prenatal care (DELAY) earlier.
Findings also show that white women, with higher family incomes, less education, who 
live in areas where female unemployment rates are low (1982), and in areas where the per 
capita number of physicians and availability of family planning services is higher (1982), 
who live in a metropolitan area (1983), and where the sales tax on cigarettes is lower
5 Ceteris paribus, healthy women that demand less visits will have healthier children than unhealthy women 
that demand less visits. Therefore, birth weight (a measure of infant health) will be higher than it should be.
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(1983) smoke more cigarettes (SMOKING) during pregnancy. In addition, women with 
little education and many years of education (i.e. non-linear U-shaped), who live in 
regions with less female unemployment, near hospitals, with lower family incomes 
(1983), and in a metropolitan area (1983) tend to have children later {AGE). Women that 
are less educated, with higher family incomes, are black, who live in more rural areas, far 
from family planning clinics, near more hospitals, and far from areas where industries 
employ women (1983) are likely to have more children {BIRTH).
In the second stage, a structural-form infant health production function is 
estimated:
10. H  = f { A G E , D E LA Y , SMOKING, BIRTHS, POPDENSITY,1967,1968, BLACK ; u)
where health is defined as birth weight and birth weight adjusted for gestation7. Health is 
regressed across Y  - health related goods that provide direct utility to the mother but also 
affect child health {AGE, SMOKING, BIRTHS), Z  - goods that only affect child health 
{DELAY), and jj. - race (indicating genetics) and environmental endowments.
The results in the 1982 and 1983 papers are similar with a few exceptions.
However, note that the 1983 paper does not include gestation as a dependent variable.
Delay in seeking prenatal care is associated with lower birth weight and shorter gestation, 
but has no effect on the standardized birth weight while smoking is found to lower birth 
weight, increase the length of gestation, but lower the standardized birth weight. These
6 If no year is indicated, then both the 1982 & 1983 papers showed those results. Otherwise, if a year is 
listed then results hold true only for that paper.
7 Specifically, this measure is the infant's actual birth weight divided by the expected birth weight 
conditional on gestation (in weeks). This as well as other measures found in the literature are described in 
Table 1.
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results are not too surprising. Age is found to increase birth weight in the 1982 paper, but 
non-linearly (in the form of an inverted-U) increase birth weight in the 1983 paper. The 
latter result here is more consistent with expectations. Young women and older women8 
have lower birth weight infants while an average age woman (which is 24 years old in 
this paper) is expected to have the heaviest infant. Age also increases gestation but has 
no effect on standardized birth weight. Finally, fertility (or the number of previous births) 
is found to decrease birth weight in the 1982 paper and in the translog specification of the 
1983 paper, but increase birth weight in the 1983 paper (Leontief specification). In 
addition, greater fertility decreases the length of gestation and as a result, decreases the 
standardized birth weight.
A few last results were reported when some of the key variables were interacted 
with one another. When age and smoking were interacted in the translog model, this was 
found to decrease birth weight (1983). The authors explain this result by suggesting that 
older mothers have more likely smoked for a greater number of years than younger 
mothers have. Their poorer health endowment exacerbates the effect of smoking. Also, 
the translog results indicate that older women that have more births tend to have higher 
birth weight infants than young mothers who have given birth several times (1983). In 
this case, older women have greater success. In addition, the delay in seeking prenatal 
care is more critical for younger mothers and high-fertility mothers (1982).
Rosenzweig and Schultz remark that despite their efforts to accurately model the 
production of infant health by endogenizing a woman's behavioral inputs, their model still
8 The age distribution is shaped like a parabola where young and older women have lower birth weight 
infants and an average age women (appearing at the top of the parabola) have higher birth weight infants.
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suffers from omitted variable bias. This is the bias that exists due to the unknown 
heterogeneity among health endowments.
Empirical extensions of the basic health production function
Grossman and Joyce (1990)9 build upon the model in Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982, 1983) in an interesting, and informative way. They develop an advanced 
econometric technique that guides the first stage of the empirical model in this 
dissertation. They explain that a woman's desire to become pregnant or her "wantedness" 
affects her decision to either continue or terminate the pregnancy. If only women that 
wanted to become pregnant ultimately give birth, then these women are not a 
representative sample of all pregnant women. Consequently, they treat estimation of an 
infant health production function as a problem in self-selection. Specifically, they 
propose the hypothesis "that the unobserved factors that affect the decision to give birth 
not only affect pregnancy outcomes but also condition the behavior of women who 
choose to give birth during pregnancy as well" (p. 985). That is, not only do parental 
expectations impact birth weight but their expectations about the fetus' health endowment 
(in addition to their desire for the pregnancy) guide their decision about whether to 
continue the pregnancy. For example, they hypothesize that women who have healthily 
endowed fetuses and who are willing to make substantial investments in their fetuses are 
more likely to continue the pregnancy and experience a live birth. If this hypothesis is not 
controlled for, estimates obtained from the health production function will be inflated. 
That is, if only healthy, responsible women give birth then estimates of prenatal care use 
and birth weight may be upwardly biased. In light of this, the authors utilize Heckman's
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two-step procedure in order to create a self-selection correction statistic. Once: the 
statistic is obtained, it is included in the infant health production function.
Since this econometric procedure is used in the first stage of the empirical model 
in this dissertation, I illustrate the model that they derive below, using their notation. The 
three equation model is comprised of probability of birth, prenatal care and birth weight 
equations as seen below:
1. 7ti = a xz t u u = a 2ci + a 3ai + a 4e{
where 7T represents the probability of birth, z represents the optimal number and spacing 
of children, u is the disturbance term, c is the cost (both monetary and psychic) of 
contraception, a is the cost (both monetary and psychic) of abortion, and e is the health 
endowment of the fetus. The birth weight equation is defined as:
2- *>i =  /?,*« +  P z m i +  «2£ > U Zi  = + P*e t
where b represents birth weight, x  is the sex of the infant and the number of prior fetal 
deaths experienced by the mother, m is prenatal care, and q reflects healthy behaviors 
such as diet and exercise. The prenatal care equations is defined as:
3* m. = y ,y (. + u 3t, u 3i = y 1c i + y3a i+y4ei
where y indicates the price of prenatal care including the presence of health insurance and 
also represents physician accessibility.
When 7Tt > 0 or uu > -CLxz t the expected values of birth weight and prenatal care 
are the following:
7. E{bi \ x i ,m l,7ii >0) = P1x i + fi2m i + E (u2i I uu >-a^Zi)
9 A paper by Joyce and Grossman (1990) utilizes a similar procedure and estimates a similar model.
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8. E {m [ \ y i ,izi > 0 ) = y1y i + E (u3i Iuu > - a tz t )
Grossman and Joyce explicitly state "[a]s emphasized by Heckman, if uu and u2i are
correlated, the conditional mean of u2[in equation 2 is not zero, and the regressors in the
equations are correlated with the disturbance term" (p. 991). They state that the same 
holds true for equation 3. Therefore, the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates without 
any correction are biased.
The empirical solution is to employ Heckman's two-step procedure. The 
probability of birth equation is estimated as a probit. From this, an inverse Mills ratio can 
be computed using the following equation:
/ ( — )9. x. = - 1
F ( S 5 l)
where/  is the density function and F  is the distribution function of a standard normal 
variable. The inverse Mills ratio, X, is included as a regressor in the prenatal care and 
birth weight equations and reflects unobserved heterogeneity in health endowment and 
the costs of contraception and abortion.
Grossman and Joyce estimate a two-stage least-squares model where the delay in 
seeking prenatal care is estimated in the first stage and a structural birth weight equation 
is estimated in the second stage. The authors utilize an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach in order to obtain a predicted value of prenatal care (an endogenous input) that 
enters into the birth weight equation, in addition to the inverse Mills ratio. Excluding 
measures of income and the availability of care from the birth weight equation but 
including them in the prenatal care equation, identify birth weight. The authors
Therefore, only Grossman and Joyce (1990) is discussed.
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acknowledge that other variables within the model could be considered endogenous. 
Specifically, they recognize that Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) consider the mother's 
age, smoking, and parity as endogenous variables. The authors state that since separate 
estimation of these other variables is not necessary to explain reproductive outcomes, 
they alternatively treat these variables as exogenous but consider prenatal care 
endogenous. Additional exogenous regressors include education, age, and alcohol use, 
among others. In addition, a Medicaid participation dummy variable is included as a 
regressor in the prenatal care equation.
Results indicate that selectivity bias is found for blacks but not for whites. The 
authors attribute this to the fact that the cost of contraception may be higher for blacks. In 
addition, the potential (meaning if she had given birth rather than aborted) mean birth 
weight for women who aborted is 140 grams less than the observed mean birth weight. 
This illustrates a selectivity effect. For blacks, the greater the delay in seeking prenatal 
care, the lighter the infant. Although prenatal care is endogenous in the model, a Wu test 
indicates that prenatal care may not be endogenous. Finally, Medicaid had no significant 
effect.
Warner (1995, 1998)10 are the first papers that fully include genetic factors or 
anthropometric11 variables such as mother's height, prepregnancy weight, pregnancy 
weight gain (adjusted for gestation) and the mother's own birth weight. These variables 
are included to capture some of the unknown health endowment and genetic traits that are 
otherwise immeasurable. In addition, he develops unique measures of prenatal care: the
10 Both papers use the same model.
11 the study of human body measurements especially on a comparative basis. "Anthropometric," Merriam- 
Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary. 1997.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
number of days between conception and the first prenatal visit {DELAY), the 
standardized number of prenatal visits (VISITS), and an interaction term of these two 
measures {INTERACTION). While the DELAY  variable is a common way to measure 
prenatal care, the VISITS  variable takes a more innovative approach by controlling for 
gestational age. VISITS is computed by multiplying 15 (a conservative estimate of the 
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) recommended number of 
prenatal visits for a full-term (40 week) pregnancy) times the ratio of the actual number of 
prenatal visits made by the woman to the ACOG recommended number of prenatal visits 
adjusted for gestation. This measure presumes that a shorter gestation requires fewer 
visits. INTERACTION  combines the first two measures by dividing VISITS by 
DELAY. This variable is included in the model to account for the substitutability or 
complementarity between the onset of prenatal care and the number of prenatal visits.
That is, Warner includes this variable in order to assess whether for example, subsequent 
frequent visits can compensate for extended delay in prenatal care or whether early 
initiation of care requires frequent follow-up visits (Warner 1998, p. 44). Warner 
interprets a positive coefficient on INTERACTION  to suggest complementarity such that 
early prenatal care is more beneficial when more visits are sought. He argues that a 
negative coefficient indicates substitution such that early prenatal care is more beneficial 
when fewer prenatal visits are sought.
Both the 1995 and 1998 papers estimate similar two-stage least-squares models of 
birth weight and prenatal care. All three measures of prenatal care are jointly estimated in 
the 1st stage. Variables included in the prenatal care equation that identify birth weight 
are measures of income and care availability including how care is financed. Self­
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payment and Medicaid are included exogenously. Included in the birth weight equation 
are parity, whether the pregnancy was wanted, education, smoking, age, and 
anthropometric characteristics. While the 1995 paper only utilizes data on non.-Hispanic 
black women, separate regressions for black and white women are estimated in the 1998 
paper. The data set used in the 1995 paper contains certificates on all births from 1980 to 
1990, taken from the New York City Vital Statistics Bureau. Results from the 1995 
paper indicate that black women who participate in Medicaid begin prenatal care earlier 
and make fewer visits compared to those that pay for prenatal care out-of-pocket.
Warner's explanation for this result is that many Medicaid participants seek care at public 
health clinics that cannot afford to offer the recommended number of visits due to high 
volume. In addition, while black women that seek care earlier deliver higher birth weight 
infants, more prenatal visits do not yield any significant result. Although not significant, 
there is evidence that the onset of care and the number of visits are substitutes for one 
another.
The model estimated in his 1998 paper uses data from the National Maternal and 
Infant Health Survey (NMIHS), 1988. Results indicate that the degree of pregnancy 
wantedness does not significantly affect birth weight. This means that despite the 
woman's feelings for whether or not she wanted to be pregnant, it did not affect infant 
health. On the other hand, smoking both before and during the pregnancy, the mother's 
age, and a first birth all have a significant and negative effect on birth weight. All of the 
anthropometric characteristics are significant and positive in the birth weight equation. 
While prenatal care delay has no significant effect on fetal growth, prenatal visits do.
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But, there is little evidence to support either substitutability or complementarity between 
delay and visits.
Other results indicate that black women experience decreasing marginal returns to 
visits and increasing marginal returns to delaying the onset of prenatal care. But, white 
women experience the opposite. In summary, the only real significant results he finds is 
that while delaying prenatal care has little effect on birth weight, women with lower 
health endowments compensate by seeking more prenatal visits and this does affect birth 
weight. He indicates that this result is consistent with the results found in Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1982).
Although Warner's use of all three prenatal care measures is somewhat unique, he 
finds that severe multicollinearity exists among these variables. Therefore, to some 
extent, many of the results are distorted. He acknowledges that the strongest findings in 
the paper are with respect to the woman's physical characteristics. This implies that long­
term intervention of nutrition and diet may have a more significant impact on infant 
health than anything else.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1991) utilize a different econometric approach than 
many of these other papers to get at the variation in infant health. Specifically, they 
utilize a fixed effects (within-mother) estimation technique that evaluates differences 
between siblings. This estimation technique allows all of the characteristics inherent to 
the mother to remain fixed. They estimate birth weight and gestation equations where the 
delay in seeking prenatal care, smoking, age, weight gain, the child’s sex, parity, race, and 
birth order are included as exogenous regressors. Insurance status is not included.
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Results indicate that health endowment, rather than observed maternal “behaviors, 
explains 90% of the variation in infant health or birth weight, net error measurement.
The authors stress these results. These results are in contrast with Rosenzweig and 
Schultz’ premise that observed maternal behavior are significant contributors to 
explaining the variation in infant health.
Joyce (1994) further expands upon the literature by estimating an endogenous 
switching regression model that sorts women based on their level of prenatal care, as 
measured by a modified Kessner Index (see Table 3). In the first stage, a reduced-form 
ordered probit estimates whether women received inadequate (0), intermediate (1), or 
adequate (2) prenatal care. The first stage is estimated in order to construct correction 
statistics to include as regressors in the birth weight equations. Medicaid and insurance 
participation are among the regressors. In the second or primary stage, separate birth 
weight equations are estimated for women who received inadequate, intermediate, and 
adequate prenatal care as well as for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, yielding nine 
equations in all. Among the regressors are education, age, the infant's sex, birth order, 
parity, and a correction statistic.
Results indicate that many of the coefficients across the three specifications of 
prenatal care differed. Regardless of race, greater gains in birth weight were realized for 
women who went from inadequate to intermediate care versus those who moved from 
intermediate to adequate care. This suggests diminishing returns to more care or a non­
linear effect. In addition, a statistically significant coefficient on the correction factor for 
an intermediate level of care (all races) suggest that the effect of prenatal care is 
underestimated when these are not included. All of these results suggest that unobserved
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heterogeneity exist among women who demand different levels of prenatal care. Those 
that expect pregnancy complications utilize more prenatal care. Finally, when additional 
variables such as age, marital status, smoking, and first birth are endogenized within the 
framework, the model yields inconsistent and strange results. Joyce attributes these poor 
results to a lack of effective instruments.
Endogenizing the insurance choice and the impact of Medicaid12
Several of the papers discussed above (Warner, 1995; Joyce, 1994; Grossman & 
Joyce, 1990) recognize that insurance participation may affect prenatal care demand. 
While these studies include insurance and/or Medicaid participation as an exogenous 
dummy variable, they neglect to recognize that insurance participation is a choice. The 
theoretical framework in Moffitt13 (1983) and Cutler and Gruber (1996) model program 
participation as a choice where a woman chooses the type of coverage that maximizes her 
utility. Empirical models in Cutler and Gruber (1996), Currie and Gruber (1996a,
1996b), and Joyce (1997) also include insurance and Medicaid as endogenous variables. 
Empirical evidence such as the Medicaid take-up rate, the percentage of women who are 
Medicaid eligible and participate, illustrates that Medicaid participation is a choice. In 
addition, many states have invested in Medicaid outreach programs in order to inform and 
attract women who are Medicaid eligible to participate. Several studies (see Table 4) 
have shown that the take-up rate for public assistance programs including Medicaid is far 
less than 100% or on average around 50%. Furthermore, other studies have shown that 
one-third (Cutler & Gruber, 1996) to one-half (Dubay & Kenney, 1997a) of privately
12 Janet Currie, Jon Gruber, and David Cutler conduct a number o f studies pertaining to this topic that are 
summarized in Gruber, J. (1996). Health insurance for poor women and children in the U.S.: Lessons from 
the past decade. NBER Working Paper Series. 5831. 1-53.
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insured women drop their private insurance in lieu of Medicaid upon becoming eligible. 
This phenomenon, called crowding-out, further illustrates that insurance coverage is a 
"choice". The papers that follow treat Medicaid and/or private insurance participation 
endogenously in their theoretical and empirical models.
Moffitt (1983) incorporates a welfare stigma into a utility maximization 
framework that reconciles the lack of participation by eligible individuals. This measure 
of stigma represents the disutility that an individual faces by participating in a welfare 
program. There are four commonly documented reasons why welfare participation 
suggests disutility. The first is this notion of welfare stigma14. Welfare recipients have 
been known to suffer from feelings of low self-esteem while participating in welfare.
This is particularly true if welfare is viewed as a long-term "handout".13 The second 
reason is the high transactions costs of applying and enrolling in welfare programs.
These programs often require lengthy application and approval processes that diminish 
the value of the benefit. Third, eligible individuals may not be aware of their eligibility. 
This is particularly relevant anytime the eligibility requirements are expanded in a 
program. Table 5 reflects state outreach efforts intended to increase awareness about 
eligibility. Finally, but only relevant to Medicaid, is that the provider network associated 
with the Medicaid program is often inadequate to serve the Medicaid population. This 
means that despite having insurance, Medicaid participants are often turned away by a
13 Note that Moffitt actually models welfare participation not insurance or Medicaid participation.
14 Bassi, L.J. (1990). Employment and welfare participation among women. Economic Inquiry. 33. 222-238 
also provides a model o f  welfare stigma.
15 Today’s TANF programs are designed to reduce the stigma that has been long associated with welfare. 
Today's programs provide assistance to families on a more temporary basis - to get families out of a rut - 
rather than provide a lifetime handout. Obviously, one of the primary goals o f TANF is to reduce welfare 
caseloads.
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growing population of non-participating physicians. This issue is changing and is 
discussed later. Moffitt incorporates stigma into the model in two different ways. The 
first way does not take into account the amount of benefit received by the participant.
This means that some fixed amount of stigma exists regardless of how much benefit is 
received. The utility function is written as:
U(Y +PB)-<i)P, 0 > 0  
where Y is income, B  is the welfare benefit, P indicates whether the individual 
participates, and (j) reflects the stigma associated with participation. An individual will 
participate in a welfare program only if the utility from the welfare benefit outweighs the 
disutility from participation:
U(Y + B)-<f> > U(Y)  or U(Y + B ) - U ( Y )  > <p .
Therefore, Moffitt suggests that anything that increases the size of the benefit will 
increase the likeliness of participation. The second formulation of the model takes into 
account a variable component of stigma, % that varies with the amount of the benefit:
U(Y + yPB) - <pP, 0 >0, 0 < y < l .
In essence, this says that the utility derived from a dollar of welfare benefit is less than the 
utility derived from a dollar of non-welfare income.
When put to the empirical test, results indicate that a generic welfare stigma does 
exist and that a dollar of welfare income is as good as a dollar of non-welfare income, but 
that an individual derives even more utility from the former16. Moffitt offers two possible 
explanations for this surprising result. The first is that AFDC income may also imply 
receipt of Medicaid and Food Stamps benefits. These are not explicitly controlled for in
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the model. The second explanation is that the non-welfare wage imperfectly measures the 
return to work since there are fixed costs associated with returning to work. In. a sense, 
the value of a dollar of welfare income is overestimated while the value of a dollar of 
wages is underestimated. This paper not only informs the model in this dissertation but 
also offers some insight into the interpretation of results.
Cutler and Gruber (1996) provide an excellent discussion of the factors that enter 
into a woman's decision making process when she decides to either purchase private 
insurance or participate in Medicaid. The following paragraphs are taken directly from 
their paper.
Consider a woman of childbearing age or a child, deciding on their 
insurance choice.. ,[M]ore generous plans offer a greater range of 
providers or cover a wider set of medical services. People choose between 
more generous insurance and other goods [shown in Figure 1]. People 
valuing insurance highly (i.e. those demanding the highest quality 
providers) will choose a policy such as D, while those valuing insurance 
less highly will choose a point such as E.
Now the government introduces free public insurance with generosity M.
On paper, Medicaid is a very valuable policy: almost everything is 
covered, and there is little or no cost sharing. For many reasons, however, 
the value of Medicaid is below that of private policies. Because of low 
Medicaid reimbursement rates, providers are often reluctant to treat 
Medicaid patients (Currie, Gruber, and Fischer, 1995), thus reducing the 
value of coverage. In addition, individuals may not want to be enrolled in 
public programs, because of the stigma associated with public programs or 
the difficulty in enrolling. Finally, the value of Medicaid may be low 
because individuals may have difficulty shifting from Medicaid back into 
private coverage if  they have preexisting medical conditions. We thus 
show the value of the Medicaid package as below the value of most 
private policies.
Individuals cannot purchase a supplement to Medicaid...[therefore] must 
consume insurance exactly in the amount of M. If they want any higher 
quality insurance, they return to the original budget constraint. The budget
16 This suggests that t>1.
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constraint with Medicaid is therefore ABMC  [see Figure 1]. In response 
to this public coverage, people with low values of private insurance (su ch 
as E) will choose to enroll in the public sector, while individuals with a 
high valuation of insurance (such as D ) will choose to retain their private 
insurance. (Cutler and Gruber, 1996, pps. 393-394.)
Cutler and Gruber estimate an empirical model of crowd out. Specifically, they 
estimate three separate probits for Medicaid, private insurance, and no insurance:
COVi = /3j E U G  + X ifi + a  ^ state; + ^ j a [timei + e .
where E U G  is a measure of the Medicaid eligibility status for the individual. They find 
that it is problematic to impute the actual Medicaid eligibility for each individual since 
the rules are too complex. Therefore, they use an exogenous measure of state Medicaid 
generosity that takes into account household size and weights it according to national 
population data. A similar approach is used in this dissertation, except that it is not 
weighted. They estimate Medicaid, private insurance, and no insurance as three 
univariate probits rather than as a bivariate probit. This modeling specification also 
guides the empirical model of this dissertation. The primary inclusion of Cutler and 
Gruber's (1996) paper here is to guide the modeling of my empirical section. Using 
aggregate data, their model evaluates the extent to which individuals drop their private 
insurance in lieu of Medicaid. While their model allows for the direct effect of eligibility 
on health outcomes to be captured, their model does not reveal the effect that Medicaid 
has on outcomes. The results obtained are not as relevant to this dissertation, except for 
their estimate of crowding out. This is discussed later in the policy simulation chapter.
Currie and Gruber (1996b) use aggregate data to estimate low birth weight and 
infant mortality production functions. Low birth weight is measured as the number of
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infants bom under 2500 grams per 1000 births, while infant mortality is measured by the 
number of deaths per 1000 births. Along similar lines to Cutler and Gruber (1996), the 
authors evaluate the impact of Medicaid eligibility rather than Medicaid participation on 
infant health. They construct simulated eligibility in three different ways. The first 
method simulates eligibility for ail women in the sample in 1979, in the same way as 
Cutler and Gruber (1996). The second way links eligibility to cash assistance Csuch as 
participation in the AFDC program) which typically has more strict eligibility 
requirements than Medicaid alone. The third way includes women who meet only the 
medical assistance (Medicaid) eligibility criteria.
The authors estimate these models twice, once as reduced-form models where 
eligibility is entered directly into the model, and a second time using an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach (where eligibility is instrumented). Results indicate that an 
increase in eligibility reduces the incidence of low birth weight. The effect that is 
reported to be the strongest uses the second measure of eligibility. The authors attribute 
this result to a few things. The first is that the Medicaid take-up rate is much higher 
among women who become eligible for cash assistance, thus greater gains are earned 
from participation. Secondly, these women are more needy (in general) than women in 
the other two groups and are more aware of public assistance programs.
Joyce (1997) extends the analysis of Medicaid participation one step further and 
analyzes the effect of New York's Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP), a program 
offering enriched prenatal services to Medicaid women, on birth weight. All of the 
women in the sample are Medicaid participants, but only some of them are enrolled in the 
PCAP program. The author's objective is to determine whether PCAP participants
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receive more prenatal care than non-PCAP participants do and whether PCAP
participation increases birth weight. He uses four different measures of birth weight
including the actual birth weight and three dichotomous measures of low birth weight
fless than 2500 grams), very low birth weight (less than 1500 grams), and term, low birth
weight (less than 2500 grams and greater than 37 weeks gestation). These measures are
summarized in Table 2.
Joyce estimates several models, stratifying by the type of eligibility (whether the
woman is eligible for cash assistance or only medical assistance). Age, race, education,
marital status, parity, and the infant's sex are among the exogenous regressors in the
«
health production functions. He estimates the model once, including PCAP exogenously, 
and a second time using an IV approach where a set of health districts by year and the 
number of PCAP provider sites by health area are the instruments.
Results from the OLS model indicate that PCAP women have infants weighing 50 
grams more and have a lower incidence of low birth weight than non-participants. When 
preterm infants are excluded, the results are smaller but remain statistically significant. 
However, results from the 2SLS model indicate that PCAP participation has no effect on 
birth weight or the incidence of low birth weight. Furthermore, a Wu-Hausman test 
reveals that OLS and 2SLS estimates differ and that the OLS estimates are biased.
The next set of articles differs from the previous ones by evaluating the effect of 
Medicaid participation and the Medicaid expansions on children's use (rather than 
pregnant women's use) of medical care and on child health outcomes. While the results 
obtained are not very useful in providing guidance to the model in this dissertation, these
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papers are useful in the sense that they provide some insight on how to empirically model 
the relationship between Medicaid use, health care utilization, and outcomes.
Currie and Thomas (1995) evaluate the impact of having Medicaid and private 
insurance on the utilization of routine health checkups. They estimate a series of 
reduced-form equations on whether the child had a routine health checkup in the past 
month, three months, six months, one year, and two years. Exogenous variables include 
income, parent's education, and urban, in addition to Medicaid and private insurance 
dummy variables, where the excluded category is no insurance. All explanatory 
variables were interacted with race in order to distinguish the effects between white and 
black children. The authors believe that white and black children differ substantially by 
the type and generosity of their household resources, to the extent that white children are 
far more likely to have private insurance and black children are more likely to participate 
in Medicaid. Results confirm differences by race.
In a similar paper, Currie and Gruber (1996a) evaluate the effect of Medicaid 
eligibility on child health care utilization and child mortality. In this paper, Medicaid 
eligibility (not participation) is treated both exogenously and endogenously. That is. the 
models (with different measures of utilization and mortality) are estimated once as 
reduced-from equations and then again using a simulated instrumental variables 
approach.
In their reduced-form model, imputed Medicaid eligibility17 (based on household 
income) for each child is included as a regressor along with other variables such as race, 
parent's education, income, and rural. While the direct effect of eligibility on utilization
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can be captured in this model, the authors point out that this model suffers from bias in 
several ways. The first way is that a sick child may cause a parent to work less, reducing 
income, and thus affecting eligibility. This is an endogeneity bias since eligibility is 
determined within the model. The second way is that this imputed measure suffers from 
measurement error. The authors suggest using a simulated instrument of eligibility as an 
alternative to imputing eligibility in order to eliminate the endogeneity and measurement 
biases. The instrument is constructed by selecting a national random sample o f children, 
ages zero to fourteen, in each year, and calculating the fraction that would be eligible for 
Medicaid given the rules in each state in that year. This measure is correlated with the 
state's legislative environment, but not with individual specific economic or demographic 
characteristics (p. 446). The reduced-form empirical model in this dissertation follows 
from this model.
Recent trends in Medicaid
In some way all of the articles that appear above inform either the theoretical or 
empirical model (or both) in this dissertation. Several of the articles illustrate how 
Medicaid participation and eligibility are modeled into the health production function 
framework. While these articles provide some guidance as to how Medicaid may affect 
medical care demand and health outcomes, a few important aspects are overlooked. Only 
Currie and Gmber (1996a) show how changes in the Medicaid program over time affect 
the key variables of interest, although their analysis using several data sources with 
aggregate data. This dissertation uses one source of individual data making my model 
more cohesive. The policy simulation that I conduct in Chapter IV illustrates the effect
17 This is a similar measure to the one used in Cutler and Gruber (1996).
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of a change in Medicaid eligibility on prenatal care and birth weight. However, many 
other aspects of the Medicaid program have changed considerably over the past decade. 
One of the most important changes is the move to Medicaid managed care. A number of 
articles (including Felt-Lisk & St. Peter, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1997: Welch & Wade, 1995) 
that are discussed in Chapter IV illustrate the ways in which Medicaid managed care has 
changed the health care environment.
Epidemiological insight in defining inputs
Prenatal care
In many of the studies discussed above as well as in my empirical model, prenatal 
care plays a dominant role in both the theoretical and empirical models. This is not 
without reason. Many studies in the epidemiological and health literature have shown 
that adequate prenatal care is an essential input into the production of a healthy infant. 
This substantiates that there is some correlation between prenatal care and infant health or 
birth weight. In 1989, the U.S. Public Health Service Expert Panel on the Content of 
Prenatal Care reported that women who begin seeking prenatal care during their first 
trimester have better pregnancy outcomes than those with less or no prenatal care 
(Witwer, 1990). However, despite this research, some studies have found that women 
with no prenatal care bear healthy infants (Higgins & Burton 1996). When incorporating 
prenatal care into a model, there are several things that one must take into account. The 
first is to determine the appropriate measurement of prenatal care whether it is the onset 
of prenatal care, the number of visits, or some combination of both that also accounts for 
gestation. Table 3 illustrates a variety of prenatal care measures used in the economics
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and epidemiological literature. A more detailed discussion of these measures as well as a 
discussion of prenatal care indices (Alexander and Kotelchuck, 1996) appears in  the 
Descriptive statistics discussion section. In addition, when prenatal care is included as 
an endogenous variable in the model, appropriate instruments that explain the 'variation in 
prenatal care must be found. This is where the epidemiological and health literature can 
provide some insight.
Two of the most important elements to consider when "measuring" prenatal care 
are the onset of prenatal care and the frequency of visits. Traditionally, an accepted 
standard set by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
recommends that pregnant women seek approximately 13 prenatal visits during the 
course of a full-term pregnancy. These visits should begin during the first six weeks of 
pregnancy, occur monthly for the first six months, bimonthly during months seven and 
eight, then weekly until delivery. However, a survey article written by Witwer (1990) 
discusses an alternative schedule recommended in the 1989 report by the U.S. Public 
Health Service Expert Panel on the Content of Prenatal Care. This report strays from the 
ACOG recommendations and suggests that proportionately more visits should occur at 
the beginning of pregnancy but less overall visits (nine for nulliparous women and seven 
for parous18 women) are sufficient if a woman is not considered at high risk for 
pregnancy and/or birth complications. More specifically, the report suggests that a 
continuous risk assessment should occur throughout pregnancy such that the ultimate 
number of visits is determined based on this assessment.
18 NuIIiparious indicates that a woman had not previously had a  pregnancy while parous suggests that she 
has had a previous pregnancy.
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While there remains some debate regarding the sufficient number of prenatal 
visits, it is generally accepted that prenatal care should begin as early as possible. The 
Public Health Service even suggests that a preconception visit, within a year o f 
conception, is ideal. This type of visit can identify any medical conditions, personal 
behaviors and environmental hazards that are typically associated with poor pregnancy 
outcomes. Once identified, these conditions can be altered and corrected prior to 
conception. Essentially, these are the same reasons used to justify the necessity of the 
early onset of prenatal care.
Witwer (1990) discusses a wealth of data published in a 1989 Alan Guttmacher 
Institute (AGI) in-depth report regarding prenatal care utilization and birth outcomes in 
the U.S. from 1984-1986. The first section of the report focuses on prenatal care use by 
different sub-groups of women and across different regions of the U.S. Overall, the 
report finds that two-thirds of American women receive adequate prenatal care, defined 
as beginning in the first four months of pregnancy and consisting of at least 80% (10.4 
visits) of the ACOG recommended number of visits (13 visits). 18% of women receive 
intermediate prenatal care, also defined as beginning during the first four months of 
pregnancy but including between 50% and 79% (6.5-10.3 visits) of the recommended 
number of total visits. Finally, the report finds that the remainder (16%) receives 
inadequate care. These women began prenatal care after the first four months of 
pregnancy or received less than half (6.5 visits) of the recommended number of prenatal 
care visits.
To shed some light on the specific sub-groups of women receiving inadequate 
prenatal care, the authors find that of women with less than a high school education,
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unmarried or teenage that 30%-33% received inadequate prenatal care. Across ethnic 
lines, 13% of whites, 27% of blacks, 30% of Hispanics and 32% of Native Americans 
receive inadequate care. Finally, women in the South are the most likely to receive 
inadequate prenatal care. Broken down by sub-group, black women in the Northeast and 
teenagers, older women, unmarried women and Hispanic women in the South are at 
highest risk.
Finally, the authors discuss statistics on those that received delayed (beginning in 
the second trimester) and late (beginning in the third trimester) prenatal care. This 
accounts for 24% of all American women, 21% of whites, 39% of blacks, 39% of 
Hispanics and 42% of native Americans. Other studies such as Pettiti, Coleman,
Binsacca, and Allen (1990) find that white women are more likely to begin prenatal care 
in the first trimester than black women are.
Barriers to prenatal care
The economic studies surveyed earlier stress the importance of identifying good 
instruments when endogenizing prenatal care. While many of these studies attributed 
differences in prenatal care utilization to unobserved heterogeneity in health endowments, 
where women with poorer endowments seek more care, epidemiological studies have 
identified several barriers that may prevent women from seeking adequate prenatal care.
Piper, Mitchel & Ray (1996b) focus their study on the relationship between the 
density of obstetric providers and the onset of prenatal care. They find that there is no 
significant relationship, specifically that the availability of obstetric care does not affect 
the onset of prenatal care. However, they did find that the following factors contributed
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to a delay in the onset of prenatal care: age less than 16, lack of high school education, 
three or more previous pregnancies or being unmarried.
Taggart and Mattson (1996) use a sample of 502 pregnant women from California 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and other public health clinics to determine the 
incidence of battering and whether battering is correlated with a delay in seeking prenatal 
care. The authors find that while the onset of prenatal care did not differ across ethnic 
groups of African American, Caucasian American and Hispanic women, prenatal care 
was delayed an average of 6.5 weeks due to battering. On average, battered African 
American women began prenatal care at 29.7 weeks, Hispanic women at 33 weeks and 
Caucasians at 31.7 weeks. While an average of 13.7% of these women reported that the 
onset of prenatal care was delayed due to battering, 20% were physically abused during 
pregnancy and 43.8% had faced some type of physical abuse during their lifetime. Not 
only were physical signs of battering, such as bruises among the reasons described as 
attributing to the delay in seeking prenatal care but as important were social 
circumstances such as fear of the controlling abuser and isolationism. In addition, women 
also reported "involuntary/forced sex" as a reason that caused the delay.
Maternal depression and infant health
Many of the studies discussed in the first section are extensions of the health 
production function developed by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982). Their model stresses 
the importance of including parental behavioral inputs in the production process. Since 
the development of their model, the literature has recognized several factors including 
prenatal care, anthropometric measures, fertility decisions, and smoking as significant 
inputs in the production function. However, to date, the economics literature has
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neglected to acknowledge maternal depression as an important input that not only may 
affect infant health but may also affect the choice and productivity of the other inputs.
The epidemiological literature has evaluated the relationship between maternal 
depression and infant health. In fact, several recent studies (Field, 1998; Jones, Field, 
Fox, Lundy, & Davalos, 1997; Dawson, Frey, Panagiotides, Osterling, & Hessl, 1997a; 
Dawson, Panagiotides, Klinger, & Spieker, 1997b; Locke, Baumgart, Locke, Goodstein, 
Thies, & Greenspan, 1997) have shown that infants of depressed mothers show signs of 
poorer health as measured by dysregulation19 and reduced left frontal (responsible for 
positive emotions) or increased right frontal (responsible for negative emotions) 
activation in the brain.
Specifically, Field (1998) characterizes dysregulation in infants in the neonatal 
period by " limited responsivity on the Brazelton test, excessive indeterminate sleep 
[shown to be negatively associated with IQ scores at age 12], and elevated norepinephrine 
and cortisol levels" (p. 200). That is, newborns of depressed mothers showed inferior 
scores on recognizing inanimate objects and on depression and robustness factors. They 
also demonstrated more stressed behaviors and had elevated levels of stress hormones 
than newborns of non-depressed mothers.
Many studies including Dawson et al. (1997b) have used electrical activity in the 
brain as a measure of depression in women and infants. In order to discuss this, here is a 
quick epidemiological lesson on brain activity. The left frontal region of the brain is 
responsible for the expression of emotions associated with the external environment such
19 Impairment of regulatory mechanisms such as those governing concentration of a substance in the blood 
or the function o f an organ. "Dysregulation," Merriam-Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary. 1997.
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as happiness, interest, and anger. The right frontal region reveals the expression of 
mostly negative emotions associated with withdrawal including disgust and sadness (p. 
650). It has been found that depressed individuals exhibit reduced left frontal region 
activity, even during periods of remission from showing depressive symptoms. Dawson 
and his co-authors measured the electrical brain activity in the left and right frontal 
regions in a group of infants of both depressed and non-depressed mothers. The Center 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)20 was used to assess whether or 
not a mother was depressed. A score of 16 or greater (out of a possible 60) indicates 
depression. Results indicate that increased right frontal brain activation, the region 
responsible for mostly negative emotions, was found in infants of depressed mothers.
The authors explain that this may reflect these infants' greater propensity to reveal 
negative emotions or that negative emotions are expressed more intensely than in infants 
of non-depressed mothers. In a similar study, Dawson et al. (1997a) found that infants of 
depressed mothers do exhibit reduced left frontal brain activity.
Finally, Locke et al. (1997) conducted a study of preterm births (less than 34 
weeks gestation) of depressed and non-depressed mothers, as assessed by CES-D. 
Neonatal infant health status measures include bronchopulmonary dysplacia (BPD) and 
intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH), among others. While birth weight and gestation did 
not differ between infants of depressed and non-depressed mothers, infants of depressed 
mothers had significantly worse outcomes in the measures described above.
While the epidemiological literature has shown a significant link between 
maternal depression and infant health, there is always room for more research to be
20 This measure is discussed in greater detail in the empirical section as it is the same measure used in this
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conducted. For instance, there have been no studies to date that evaluate the specific 
relationship between maternal depression and birth weight. The health production 
function framework would be an appropriate model to evaluate such a relationship. In 
addition, an empirical analysis using modem econometric techniques could accurately 
determine whether any "true" relationship exists between the two while controlling for 
any confounding factors.
Depression and individual functioning
Several studies in recent years have shown that people with depressive symptoms 
and depressive disorders often suffer from significant impairment of social and 
interpersonal functioning including the capacity to work, relate to friends and family and 
even enjoy leisure time. In light of this research, it is reasonable to infer that depression 
may affect a woman's choice of prenatal care as well as other behaviors during pregnancy. 
In fact, in a study of women who had minimal prenatal care, Joyce, Diffenbacher, Greene, 
and Sorokin find depression and denial were higher in that group; albeit, this is not a 
causal study. To date, there is little research that investigates the link between 
depression, the demand for prenatal care and other healthy behaviors.
Table 6 illustrates two of these studies that reveal the extent to which depressed 
individuals function both physically and emotionally poorer than groups of individuals 
who suffer from either no illness or a chronic illness. Specifically, Wells et al. (1989) 
find that in six different categories of physical and emotional functioning that individuals 
with no chronic condition function better than those with either a depressive disorder or 
depressive symptoms. In a similar study, Hays et al. (1995) find that only individuals
dissertation.
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afflicted with congestive heart failure function poorer than those with a depressive 
condition. Furthermore, other studies such as Broadhead et al. (1990) indicate that 
individuals with major depression are 4.78 times more likely to miss work than 
individuals who show no sign of depressive symptoms. These studies impart significant 
implications since depression afflicts anywhere from 10% to 39% of the general 
population (see Table 7). Women in particular suffer from even higher rates of 
depression (on average) as well as suffer from greater impairment than men.
Conclusion
This dissertation seeks to join the health and epidemiological literature with the 
economics literature while at the same time closing a few important gaps. First, the 
health production function literature in general does not recognize the endogeneity of 
Medicaid nor the quality effect that is has on birth weight. Both the empirical and 
theoretical models in this dissertation include Medicaid and private insurance as choice 
variables. Specifically, the welfare stigma discussed in Moffitt (1983) is entered into the 
theoretical model in order to influence one’s choice of health insurance. In a related 
strain, a private insurance “safety net” quality effect, assumed to be positive, is also 
included. Additionally, Medicaid and private insurance are included in the infant health 
production function as it is expected to have a quality effect on birth weight. Second, the 
health literature provides some evidence on the effects of depression and on the behavior 
of depressed individuals. Using the information learned here depression is incorporated 
into my theoretical and empirical models. While the economics and health literature
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provide a solid foundation for the models developed in this dissertation, my dissertation 
takes the literature a few steps further by addressing a few of its shortcomings.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL OF MEDICAID, DEPRESSION, PRENATAL CARE AND BIRTH
WEIGHT
Introduction
This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical models of Medicaid, 
depression, prenatal care, and birth weight. The models developed here draw upon 
several papers in the economics literature. The health production function framework 
proposed by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) guides the development of the theoretical 
model. One extension of this model is the incorporation of a welfare stigma proposed by 
Moffitt (1983). The second extension is that Medicaid participation and private 
insurance coverage are treated as a choice. The empirical model utilizes the sample 
selection correction statistic from Joyce and Grossman (1990) and the endogeneity of 
Medicaid and insurance from Cutler and Gruber (1996). The empirical model is also 
similar to Warner (1998) particularly because it uses the same data set. However, three 
additional components make the models in this dissertation unique and a contribution to 
the literature. The first is the incorporation of depression into both the theoretical and 
empirical models. The complexity of this extension is discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraph. The second is that the endogenization of Medicaid and insurance 
coverage (taking into account Medicaid eligibility) is highlighted in both the theoretical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
and empirical models. Finally, a treatment effects model is used to evaluate the impact of 
depression, Medicaid and insurance coverage on prenatal care and birth weight. This 
allows for the direct effect of depression, Medicaid and insurance (on the key variables) 
to be captured unbiasedly.
Throughout the theoretical and empirical models, maternal depression is difficult 
to incorporate since it is composed of two distinct components: a long-term chronic 
component and a transitory component- The literature indicates that depression may be 
caused or instigated by underlying genetic factors or a chemical imbalance in the brain 
(that are out of the individual's control) and by life events (that may be within our 
control). In economist terminology, this means that factors that induce depression are 
both exogenous and endogenous, respectively. One component of depression is 
unavoidable and the other component is brought on by the actions of the afflicted. It is 
assumed that the long-term component is exogenous while the transitory component, 
most likely brought on by a life event, is more endogenous. In the context of this 
dissertation, post-partum depression following childbirth is considered to be the 
predominant transitory component. Despite this distinction, it remains difficult to 
separate out these two components of depression, particularly in the empirical model.
The empirical measure of depression, the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D Scale) does not distinguish among these two components of depression. 
This issue is discussed in greater detail in the theoretical and empirical models as an 
attempt is made to appropriately incorporate both components of depression.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical 
model. This is followed by general and detailed descriptions of the data used. The
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remainder of the chapter illustrates the empirical model and any statistical issues that 
arise in its estimation. Sample selection correction statistics are discussed, folLowed by 
the development of the structural model. Included in this section is a description of the 
variables that appear in each equation. Since the structural-form of the empirical model 
is somewhat restrictive, reduced-form models are also estimated. The development of the 
structural and reduced-form models is followed by a discussion of the results. Finally, I 
conduct a poor health outcome or low birth weight study to evaluate the factors that effect 
this important population.
Theoretical Model of Infant Health Production, Medicaid, and Depression
The theoretical model in this dissertation extends the health production 
function/utility maximization framework developed in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) 
and the incorporation of a welfare stigma found in Moffitt (1983). In addition to the 
usual factors that affect utility, it is assumed that the woman’s type of health insurance 
coverage also affects her overall utility, indirectly through the budget constraint and 
directly through welfare stigma. Since three different types of insurance coverage are 
considered here, no insurance/self-pay, Medicaid, and private insurance, three utility 
maximization problems are derived. It is important to emphasize again that insurance 
coverage is a choice variable. That is, I assume that a woman can choose to be privately 
insured, participate in Medicaid, or be uninsured. However, in the empirical model, 
Medicaid dollar income eligibility is considered exogenous. While I assume that women 
can adjust their income to become Medicaid eligible or seek a job that provides private 
insurance, women cannot affect state level Medicaid eligibility. For simplicity, in the
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theoretical model, all women are assumed to be Medicaid eligible. The following models 
determine utility under each of the three types of insurance coverage. The three utility 
levels are then compared in order to determine the type of coverage that yields the highest 
level of utility. That is, a woman chooses the type of coverage that maximizes her utility.
It is important to add that risk preferences are not incorporated into the theoretical 
model. Risk preferences are often incorporated into an individual's insurance decision 
when the individual does not have clear expectations about her future health care needs. 
Pregnant women, the sample of interest in this dissertation, have a well-defined 
knowledge of at least some of their future health care needs (at least for nine months). 
They understand that they will need to seek prenatal care and other medical services on a 
regular basis during the pregnancy and at delivery. It certainly may be argued that some 
pregnant women (for example, women at higher risk of poorer health outcomes) may 
have or at least perceive themselves as having different health care needs as other 
pregnant women. (In an HMO study, Welch and Wade (1995) believe that Medicaid 
participants use medical services at a greater volume and intensity than privately insured 
individuals.) Nonetheless, it remains likely that these women have a better-defined 
knowledge of their health care needs, at least in the more immediate future, than the 
average population. Therefore, the theoretical model assumes no risk preferences.
Self-pay case
This first scenario assumes that a woman chooses to demand no health insurance
*) I
coverage" . Given that there are millions of uninsured individuals in the U.S.. this is a 
likely scenario. There are several reasons why a woman may choose to be uninsured
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rather than participate in Medicaid or purchase private insurance. The welfare stigma 
associated with Medicaid participation may be high enough to discourage participation. 
Alternatively, a woman may choose not to become eligible to receive Medicaid (by 
maintaining too high an income) or choose not to obtain employment with private 
insurance as a benefit. [In addition, not all women know that they are Medicaid eligible. 
However, Medicaid outreach programs are hoping to alleviate this likely scenario.]
Finally, the price of private insurance premiums may exceed a woman's willingness-to- 
pay for health insurance.
If an uninsured woman demands medical care, she pays a price of for each 
visit and obtains a level of quality that is inferior to both Medicaid and private insurance 
quality. Often, physicians view uninsured patients as "bad debt". Physicians face the risk 
of not receiving payment for their services. Unlike insurance or even Medicaid, there is 
no guarantee of any payment. As a consequence, uninsured patients likely receive 
substantially lower quality care than insured patients.
Her utility function is defined as:
1. maxiVf U ( H , D LT , D T, X )  utility function  
where H  reflects her infant's health, depression is composed of Dcr, a parameter that 
represents her long-term mental state, and Dr, a transitory component that reflects shorter 
episodes of depression such as post-partum, and AT is a composite commodity. Both 
components of depression are included in the utility function since they both affect utility.
21 Recall that I am allowing insurance coverage, including no coverage, to be a choice.
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This point is elaborated on later. This maximization process is subject to the production 
of infant health,
2. H — H (M , D LT ,Z H ) health production function
the production of transitory depression,
3. Dt = Dt(M , H , Z ° , D LT) transitory depression production function 
and a budget constraint,
4. P so M + X  = I  => X  -  I - P NO M budget constraint,
where the price of the commodity is normalized to one.
Referring to equation 2., prenatal care, M, is expected to enhance infant health, H, 
while long-term or chronic depression, DLT, is expected to adversely affect infant health, 
as has been shown in the literature by Dawson et al. (1997b) and others. In addition, 
other variables such as a woman’s anthropometric characteristics including a mother's 
own birth weight and her height (as suggested by Warner, 1995 & 1998), genetic 
endowment, and other maternal behaviors, ZH, are expected to directly affect (either 
enhance or detract from) infant health.
Equation 3. illustrates the production of the transitory (or post-partum) component 
of depression that is considered endogenous in the model. This means that D is an 
outcome of the production process. However, it is assumed that long-term depression, 
Dlt is predetermined or exogenous in nature and its presence increases the chance that a 
woman suffers from post-partum depression. Prenatal care, M, is included since it may 
lead to the detection and treatment of depression (or the assurance that one is not 
depressed). That is, a prenatal care provider may take action during the pregnancy to
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alleviate any depressive symptoms that may occur following pregnancy. Seeki ng prenatal 
care may not only affect the health of the fetus but may also alleviate any health 
problems, including mental health issues, faced by the woman. An unhealthy infant, 
measured by H, may increase the chance that a woman will suffer from post-partum 
depression. That is, a "poor" life event such as bearing an unhealthy child may' trigger 
depression. Finally, other characteristics, ZD, such as social support, are expected to also 
directly affect (either enhance or retract from) the onset and severity of depression.
Equation 4. represents the budget constraint where P wo is the self-pay price per 
visit of prenatal care, Af, /  is income, and AT is a composite commodity. It is assumed that 
the budget constraint under the self-pay/uninsurance case is quite different from that of 
the Medicaid and private insurance cases. These differences are highlighted later.
If prices are greater than zero and the utility function is continuous, then the utility 
maximization problem has a solution22. The quasi-concave utility function illustrated in
1. is maximized by choosing the optimal quantity of M. Substituting the constraints 2.,
3., and 4. into the utility function yields:
5. U ( H ( M , D LT, Z h ) ,Dlt, D t ( M , H ( M , D lt, Z h ) , Z d) , I - p som ).
An interior solution requires that a consumer's marginal rate of substitution 
between any two goods must be equal to their price ratio. If this was not the case, then a
22 Ifp » 0 ,  then the budget set BPf = [X e  Pv : P * X  < /}  is a compact set because it is both bounded for 
all X  e  BPj  and closed. The result follows from the fact that a continuous function always has a maximum 
value on any compact set.
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consumer could do better by marginally changing her consumption. The first order 
condition (FOC) is the following23:
6.  UM = U hH m +  Udt D tm +UDrD T„ H M —U XP N0 =0  
0 0 6 0
The first order condition illustrates all of the benefits from getting prenatal care (M). The 
first two effects are of the second order meaning that prenatal care directly affects other 
variables (infant health and depression) that directly enhance utility. O It is expected that 
prenatal care enhances infant health (Hm > 0). Since the woman derives utility from 
having a healthy infant (Uh > 0), prenatal care indirectly enhances utility (UhHm > 0).
© Prenatal care also reduces the likeliness of post-partum depression ( D TM < 0) which is 
important since a woman’s utility is diminished if she suffers from post-partum 
depression ( UDt < 0). Therefore, prenatal care also indirectly enhances utility through its
effect on depression ( UDt D tm > O'). © Prenatal care also has a positive third order effect 
on utility ( UdT Dth H m > 0) through similar channels described above. That is, prenatal 
care enhances infant health (Hm > 0), that in turn alleviates depression ( D TH < 0), which in 
turn enhances utility (UDj < 0). © Finally, as prenatal care increases, more dollars must
be devoted toward prenatal care (and taken from the consumption of X) in order to 
maintain the same level of care. As a result, utility is lost from having to forgo some 
quantity of X.
23  t t  dUSubscript denotes partial derivative; eg. U M =  ——
oM
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The rule that assigns the set of optimal consumption vectors in the utility 
maximization problem to each price-income situation is known as a Walrasian ox ordinary 
demand function. Suppose that the utility function is a continuous function representing a 
locally nonsatiated preference relation defined on the consumption set .X=1RA+. Then the 
Walrasian demand function (given that X  is single valued for all prices and income) 
possesses the properties of homogeneity of degree zero and Walras' law. If  the preference 
relation is strictly convex so that the utility function is strictly quasiconcave, then the 
demand function consists of a single element. In this model, optimal prenatal care demand 
is the following and is a function of all the exogenous variables in the system:
7. M * ( D lt , Z " , Z d , P " ° , I ) .
For each price and income vector greater than zero, the utility value of the utility 
maximization problem is denoted by V(P,I) e®. This indirect utility function is equal to 
U(X*) for any X*<=X(P,I). In other words, DT*(), H*(),  and X*()  are solved residuaily 
and substituted into the utility function, thus maximizing utility, U*(M*()). Since the 
optimal level o f utility depends on M *(), utility is an indirect function of income and all of 
the exogenous variables in the system. The indirect utility function can be written as:
8. V no{Dlt , Z h , Z d , P m  , / )
where V()  is the indirect utility function. The indirect utility function illustrates how 
utility is related to exogenous variables in the problem. This level of indirect utility will be 
compared to the indirect utility functions under Medicaid and private insurance.
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Medicaid case
The Medicaid program has provided a safety net to millions of American s who 
would otherwise have no access to any health insurance coverage. However, research 
suggests that upwards o f 50% of Medicaid eligible women choose not to or simply do not 
participate in the program. Not all women who are Medicaid eligible have the knowledge 
that they are eligible. As  mentioned, states are employing outreach efforts to reduce this 
imperfect knowledge24. An explanation offered by Moffitt (1983) and others is that there 
are high transaction costs to participating in welfare programs. These include a "stigma" 
that reflect low self-esteem in taking a handout from the government and bureaucratic 
paperwork. Often, women enroll in welfare programs in order to become eligible to 
receive Medicaid. With the transition from Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996, stringent25 TANF 
work requirements and the five-year national time limit m?y discourage participants from 
welfare, and thus, Medicaid26. However, the model developed here uses data that 
occurred before the transition to TANF. Finally, Cutler and Gruber (1996) add that 
Medicaid recipients have less access to quality care since many providers will not serve 
this population, making Medicaid a less attractive option. I f  these transactions costs are 
non-zero, then some disutility is borne by participating in Medicaid.
Recent trends in Medicaid have shifted toward Medicaid managed care. For 
example, section 1115 waivers allow states to direct their Medicaid population into 
HMOs. In some cases,'Medicaid participants are enrolled in commercial HMOs along
24 See Table 5 for a summary of state outreach efforts.
25 I choose not to say "mandatory" work requirements since there are m any exceptions to the work 
requirem ent
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with privately insured patients (Welch & Wade, 1995). In addition, the Quality 
Assurance Reform Initiative (QARI) system, developed in 1991, helps to ensure that 
Medicaid recipients in managed care systems receive an improving quality of care (Felt- 
Lisk & St. Peter, 1997). Increasingly, there may be less disutility derived from 
participating in Medicaid. Throughout this analysis, the effect of a stigma and other 
transactions costs still apply.
Following Moffitt (1983), a woman's utility function, under Medicaid, is defined 
as the following:
9. maxM U (H , D LT , D T, X)  -  (pMCP utility function
where H  reflects her infant's health, DLT represents her long-term mental state. DT reflects 
shorter episodes of depression, X  is a composite commodity, <p reflects the stigma (and all 
transactions costs) associated with participation in a public program, MCP  reflects 
Medicaid participation, and M is prenatal care. MCP equals one if the woman 
participates, and zero otherwise.
The health production function and production of depression are modified by the 
inclusion of Medicaid participation, MCP:
10. H  = H ( M , D lt , Z h , MCP)  health production function
11. D T = D t(M , H , Z d , Dl t , MCP) transitory depression production function 
I assume that Medicaid participants receive lower quality medical care than privately 
insured individuals but perhaps higher quality care than the self-insured. This, however, 
should be left to an empirical question. Lower quality care may take many forms. For 
instance the high volume of patients that Medicaid providers treat may prevent them from
26 However, some women are Medicaid eligible while they are not TANF eligible.
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spending adequate time with each patient during a visit. As Welch and Wade (1995) 
illustrate, if Medicaid participants are less healthy than other individuals, then they may 
select into Medicaid since each of the frequent visits that they make is free (monetarily, at 
least). If a Medicaid provider is distracted by other health problems during these frequent 
visits made during the pregnancy, an extreme consequence of this may be that pregnancy 
complications go undiagnosed. Along the same lines, maternal depressive symptoms 
could also go undiagnosed, increasing the chances of post-partum depression. In addition, 
the provider pool of Medicaid providers is limited, restricting access to quality health care 
providers. Therefore, it is expected that Medicaid participation would lead to poorer
■7*7infant health, ceteris paribus" . This is the first model that includes insurance or 
Medicaid participation into the infant health production function. As a result, this quality 
effect may be captured.
The budget constraint also changes to account for the price of Medicaid:
12 p MC M  + X — I => X = l - P ‘vtcM  budget constraint 
where PMC is the price of Medicaid prenatal care visit. I assume that this price is non­
zero but minimal.28
Substituting in the constraints, the utility function becomes:
13. u{ff(M, DLT, Z H, MCP), DLT, Dt (M, H(M, Dl t , Z H, MCP), Z D, MCP), I - PMCM)-<pMCP 
The first order condition is:
14. UM = U h H m + UdTD tm +U dTD th H m —U xP mc = 0
2/ However, as previously discussed, there is less of a distinction between a Medicaid provider and another 
provider as Medicaid participants move into commercial managed care. Under these circumstances,
Medicaid may not lead to poorer infant health and mental health outcomes.
28 If the price were zero, then an infinite amount of prenatal care could be demanded.
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This condition is almost identical to the first order condition in the self-pay case, except 
for the price. An increase in the price of a Medicaid prenatal visit would have the same 
effect as an increase in the price of a self-paid visit. But if the price of a Medicaid visit is 
minimal (i.e. while there may be no dollar cost, there are transactions costs), then a 
woman would only need to forgo a small amount of her consumption of X,  and face a 
minimal loss in utility, in order to maintain the same level of M.
The input demand equation or prenatal care can be written as a function of all of 
the exogenous variables in the system:
15. M * ( D lt , Z h , Z d , P mc ,I,MCP,<p)
Notice that in addition to price, income, and other exogenous variables, Medicaid 
participation affects the optimal level of prenatal care. The utility function is maximized 
by substituting in the optimized input demand equation. M*(.) and DT% ), H*(.), and 
X*(.). The indirect utility function then becomes the following:
16. V MC(DLT, Z H , Z D, P irc,I,MCP,<f>)
Private insurance case
The welfare stigma (and MCP) disappears in this model since it does not affect 
the utility of a woman that receives private insurance. However a safety net quality effect 
(y) and private insurance participation variable (PI) are included in the model. Women 
with private insurance are likely to experience positive quality gains and the assurance of 
good health care. Additional terms are entered into the budget constraint to account for 
the premium paid on an insurance plan and in the utility function to account for the safety 
net that private insurance provides. In the private insurance case the price of prenatal care 
is the yearly premium, prem, plus the copayment, PPI, paid at each visit. While the
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copayment or PPI is usually small (eg. $5), I assume that the premium is substantial. If it 
was not, more individuals would choose private insurance over Medicaid since it offers 
higher quality health care, better access to care, and there is no stigma attached.
However, there would remain individuals who would not choose private insurance since 
private insurance is usually obtained through an employer. Not everyone would choose 
employment as a means to health insurance.
As substantial as they may be, premiums do vary across individual insurance 
plans. Individuals with employer-sponsored private insurance coverage are likely to pay 
smaller premiums than individuals without group coverage, yielding gains to 
employment. In addition, perhaps individuals who are associated with certain professions 
or unions may be offered less expensive and more comprehensive insurance plans than 
other workers29. Individuals that obtain that own health insurance are likely to pay 
exorbitant premiums.
Over time, it is expected that a closer relationship will form between certain 
aspects of private insurance and Medicaid. As Medicaid moves into commercial 
managed care, the entrance of less healthy Medicaid participants may place upward 
pressure on private insurance premiums. [Since my analysis is conducted with the 1988 
“state of the world” in mind, HMOs, particularly Medicaid managed care is not relevant.] 
Welch and Wade (1995) find in their HMO study that controlling for age and sex, 
Medicaid participants are 23% more costly than privately insured participants are.
Without controlling for these factors, Medicaid clients still cost 13% more. If the 
government does not reimburse HMOs at a higher rate (or a rate equal to at least 13%)
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then other payers, HMOs will be forced to raise premiums to their other payers. Rising 
premiums have implications for both the private insurance and Medicaid populations.
One substantial effect of higher premiums is that upon becoming eligible for Medicaid, 
some women may switch from private insurance to Medicaid. This is the crowding out 
phenomenon discussed by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and others.
The utility maximization problem in this case becomes:
17.maxxfU(H,DLT,D r ,X ) + yPI utility function 
and is subject to the production of infant health,
18. H  = H ( M , D lt, Z h,PI)  health production function 
the production of transitory depression,
19. D t = Dt( M, H , Z d, Dlt,PI)  transitory depression production function 
and a budget constraint,
20. P pi M  + prem + X  = /  => X = I  — P PIM  — prem budget constraint , 
where the price of the commodity is normalized to one. The modeling differences 
between this case and the case of self-pay are that the price per visit changes (or 
copayment), Ppi, a yearly premium,prem, is added to the budget constraint, and a quality 
effect (eg. safety net) effect, y, and private insurance participation, PI, are included in the 
model. PI is assumed to have a quality effect on both the production of health and the 
production of depression. It is expected that higher quality care may be provided to 
women with private insurance coverage, thus providing a higher quality effect.
When the constraints are substituted in, the utility function becomes:
29 Later, in the empirical section, this is the justification for including the mother and father's industry and
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21. U(H(M,Dlt, Z h,PI),Dlt,D t(M,H(M,Dlt, Z h ,P I),Z d,P I),I - PPlM  - prem) + yPI.
The first order condition is:
22. U„ — U h H m +U dTD tm +U dtD „ H m - UXP ”  = 0
This condition is also similar to the others except for the price.
Prenatal care can be written as a function of all of the exogenous variables in the
system:
23. M *  (Dlt, Z h, Z d, P pi, I ,PI,y,prem)
The utility function is maximized by substituting in the optimized input demand equation, 
M*(.), and the residually solved equations DT*(.), H*(.), and X*(.). The indirect utility 
function becomes:
24. V pr ( D LT, Z "  , Z D, P pl, I , P I , y l )
Now that the indirect utility functions have been derived, the utility that each yields can 
be compared.
Comparison of Cases
There are several differences among the three models, the most important being 
the monetary price per visit. I assume that:
25. P so > P PI > P uc; p pl, p MC = 0 .
Holding the premium constant (equation 25), the price of a self-paid visit greatly exceeds 
the price of a visit under private insurance or Medicaid. Without health insurance, some
occupations as variables in the insurance, and therefore Medicaid, equations.
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Americans cannot afford to seek appropriate medical care. However, in order to purchase 
private insurance a yearly premium, PI, must be paid. When the premium is accounted 
for, private insurance becomes more expensive, though not necessarily more expensive 
than having no insurance. When private insurance is not employer-based, then, privately 
insured prenatal care may become more expensive than uninsured care. This is why 
many Americans choose not to have private insurance - the opportunity cost is too high. 
According to price, prenatal care is most accessible to Medicaid participants.
Now consider the quality of care received under the three cases. I assume that:
26. Q n  > Q MC »  Qno ; 0 > 0 
The quality of care provided under private insurance is greater than that of Medicaid. 
(These two, however, are becoming increasingly closer in quality, particularly in the 
managed care population.) But for the reasons stated earlier in my analysis, the quality of 
care under Medicaid is expected to be inferior30. In addition, a non-zero stigma, <p, is 
associated with Medicaid participation, reducing the attractiveness of Medicaid. The 
quality of care received by a woman who is not insured is likely to be of much less quality 
than the other two. Recall that physicians regard these individuals as "bad debt”. It is 
not worth their time to provide quality care to a potentially non-paying patient. In 
addition, it is unlikely that these patients even have access to higher quality providers. In 
terms of quality, a woman is more likely to choose private insurance, or secondly, 
Medicaid.
A woman ultimately chooses her health insurance coverage by the type that 
maximizes her utility. A comparison of indirect utility functions illustrates these choices.
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Pair-wise comparisons o f the three insurance cases are made here in order to illustrate why 
one type of coverage is preferred to another. However, I assume that a woman chooses 
only one of the three possible insurance types yielding:
27. V* = max{VN0 , V PI , V ifC]
The first set of choices to consider is whether having no insurance or participating 
in Medicaid yields a higher level of utility:
28. V m {DLT, Z H , Z D, P NO ,1)  v. V MC( D LT, Z H , Z D , P MC,I,MCP,<f>).
Four of the primary factors that affect this choice are the quality and frequency o f care, the 
welfare stigma ($), and knowledge about Medicaid eligibility. I assume women who are 
uninsured obtain fewer, lower quality visits while Medicaid participants receive many, 
higher (but not necessarily high) quality visits. That is, since the price of an uninsured visit 
greatly exceeds the price o f a Medicaid visit (P%,0» P ilc) to the extent that the price of a 
Medicaid visit is free (holding aside transportation and other transactions costs) uninsured 
women are likely to demand fewer prenatal visits. If the frequency of visits is highly 
valued (where more is better), a woman may choose to participate in Medicaid ( Vuc > 
y v0). In addition, Medicaid provides higher quality visits. In this case, women may desire 
Medicaid (VXfC > Vm ).
On the other hand, particularly with the Medicaid expansions that occurred over 
the past decade, many women do not have knowledge o f their Medicaid eligibility.
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Therefore, imperfect information may encourage a woman to believe that she i s better off 
paying for her own prenatal care (Vvo > V,v/C). Additionally, the perception of a welfare 
stigma (<j>) may reduce the likelihood of Medicaid participation. The welfare stigma acts 
as a fixed cost to Medicaid participation. A woman must face or accept this stigma prior 
to participation. If a woman perceives this fixed cost to be too high, then she may choose 
to go uninsured (Vvo > Vv,c).
The second set of choices to consider is whether having no insurance or 
purchasing private insurance yields a higher level of utility:
29. V so(DLT , Z H , Z D,PNO ,1) v. V pl(DLT, Z H, Z D, P p' , I , P I , y , p r e m ) .
The three primary factors that affect this choice are the price of a private insurance 
premium (PI), the price of a prenatal visit (i>p/ and P<vo), and the quality of care provided. 
While private insurance provides frequent, high quality prenatal care, private insurance 
premiums are usually substantial in price. If a woman is not willing to pay this fixed cost, 
she may forgo insurance (Vvo > V^ 7). Additionally, gainful employment is often a means 
of obtaining private health insurance. If a woman feels the opportunity cost of working is 
too high, she would likely choose not to be insured (V^° > Ve!). However, not all 
premiums are the same. Typically, employer-sponsored or group insurance premiums are 
less than individual premiums, reducing the price a woman faces. In this case, a woman 
may be willing to pay for private insurance (VPl>VNO). In addition, the price of a prenatal 
visit is lower for insured women than for uninsured women (PPl This suggests
that insured women obtain more prenatal visits than uninsured women do. If frequency 
of visits is desired, a woman may choose to be insured (V ^V ^0). Finally, the quality of 
care provided to insured individuals is assumed to be substantially higher than the quality
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provided to the uninsured. Clearly, if quality is desired, a woman chooses to be insured 
(vw>v*0)
The third set of choices to consider is whether participating in Medicaid or 
purchasing private insurance yield a higher level of utility:
30. V uc(DLT, Z H, Z D, P MC,I,<p,MCP) v. V ” (DLT, Z h , Z d ,Ppi,1 ,P I , j , p r e m ) . 
The four primary factors that affect this choice are the level of health care quality desired 
(MCPJPI), the welfare stigma and safety net (<p, y), the relative prices (Ppi and F yfC), and 
the fixed cost of a private insurance premium (PI). In both cases, a woman is likely to 
obtain a frequent schedule of visits, although the price of a Medicaid visit is less than an 
insured visit. If she values high quality care and is willing to pay expensive insurance 
premiums, she chooses to be privately insured (V7*7 > V ^c). If she is willing to forgo the 
higher quality care provided under private insurance and accepts a reasonable quality of 
care and the welfare stigma, then she chooses to participate in Medicaid (V<V7C > VeI).
Recall that this case provides an interesting policy implication. Several studies 
discussed earlier find that when Medicaid income eligibility is expanded, some women 
drop their private insurance in lieu of Medicaid. That is, Medicaid crowds out private 
insurance. However, crowding out presumes that either not all women are eligible for 
Medicaid from the start or that they have no knowledge of their eligibility. The 
theoretical framework does address crowding out to the extent that it assumes all women 
are Medicaid eligible. The empirical model takes into account that eligibility is 
exogenous, while still allowing women to freely select into Medicaid. The policy
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simulations reveal that expanding Medicaid eligibility may increase the probability that a 
woman participates in Medicaid and nowhere is Medicaid forced upon an individual. 
Additionally, the policy simulations make a gross estimation of crowding out.
On one iast note, the framework implies that all three cases (private insurance, 
Medicaid, and no insurance) are viable options for all women. Despite the Medicaid 
income eligibility expansions during the past decade, millions of American women have 
family incomes that lie above the eligibility threshold, making them ineligible for 
Medicaid, but making it difficult to purchase private insurance. It is perhaps a moral 
question whether it is right to assume that any woman has the free choice to reduce her 
income in order to become eligible for Medicaid or to secure employment with benefits. 
This moral question will not be answered here.
General Description of Data
The primary data set used in this dissertation, National Maternal and Infant Health 
Survey, 1988 (NMIHS), is publicly accessible data published by the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS). This data set has been used in a number of similar studies that 
evaluate the correlates of prenatal care, substance abuse, and birth weight (for example, 
Warner, 1998; Hanna, Faden, & Dufour, 1994). NMIHS contains information on 26,355 
women who were pregnant in 1988 and experienced a live birth, infant death or fetal 
death. Only data on the sample of women that experienced a live birth are used in the 
estimation process (except the first stage - see sample selection discussion). Additional 
outliers (discussed later) are also eliminated and the data are stratified to reflect the 
differences between black and white mothers. Questions asked during the interview
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concerned prenatal care and health habits, delivery o f the baby, insurance and Medicaid 
coverage, previous and subsequent pregnancies, socioeconomic characteristics of the 
mother and father, and infant health. In order to ensure confidentiality of the women in 
the NMIHS, NCHS “has removed identifiers and characteristics that might lead to 
identification of data subjects”.
While the NMIHS sample generally reflects pregnancies throughout the U.S. there 
are a few caveats. The NMIHS is divided into three cohorts: the infant death cohort, the 
fetal death cohort, and the live birth cohort. In the analysis, I only use the live birth 
cohort31. In the live birth cohort, both blacks and poor birth outcomes are oversampled. 
This may create a potential bias since the data more likely reflects the characteristics of 
blacks (proportionally) and poor birth outcomes. Since all of the empirical models are 
stratified by race, black oversampling no longer presents an issue. Oversampling of poor 
outcomes may provide more insight as to the correlates of low birth weight - one focus of 
this dissertation. This suggests that weighted regressions may not be appropriate here. 
However when weighted means for the key variables are computed, they are almost 
identical to the unweighted means. Therefore, none of the empirical procedures use 
weighted data.
For certain estimation procedures and variables, several other data sets are used. 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is sponsored by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of Labor and contains information on 12,686 women 
and men on a wide range of topics. This data source is used to correct for the sample
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selection issue in the first stage of estimation. BLS requires a statement ensuring that I 
protect the confidentiality of the subjects in the data set. The NMIHS 1991 Follow-up is 
used to collect a second observation on depression in order to create a long-term 
depression measure. The American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association 
Cost of Living Index (ACCRA) includes price data from 256 U.S. cities on health care, 
grocery items, housing, utilities, transportation and other goods and services. This data is 
used to capture environmental characteristics. Since only a woman's state of residence 
(not city) is identified in the NMIHS, I aggregate the city data into state data by averaging 
the city data. Additional state level information is taken from the Statistical Abstracts of 
the United States and the US Census Bureau Web Site. Finally, in order to perform 
policy simulations, several other variables are used. These include state-level Medicaid 
eligibility guidelines for several years in the 1980s and 1990s and the federal poverty 
guidelines from 1988-1999. These data elements are taken from several sources 
including U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Annual update of the HHS 
poverty guidelines.
Data Description
This section provides a detailed description of the key variables (prenatal care, 
depression, and birth weight) in the empirical model as well as some simple descriptive 
statistics. A general description of all of the variables used in the analysis appears in 
Table 8. Simple descriptive statistics on all of the variables, stratified by race, and
31 Both the fetal and infant death cohorts oversample blacks and Hispanics. In addition, the fetal death 
cohort does not include any terminations less than 28 weeks. This means that only miscarriages are 
included but no abortions are included. As a result, the NLSY is used as an alternative sample for the initial
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broken down by the full sample (all births) and the sample of term births appear in 
Tables 9 and 10.
Discussion of outliers
The National Maternal and Infant Health Survey, 1988 (NMIHS) surveys more 
than 26,000 women on a variety of topics. Initially removed from the data are infant and 
fetal deaths and multiple births, reducing the sample to 9146 women. Infant and fetal 
deaths are removed (leaving only live births) since the analysis primarily focuses on 
infant health. Live multiple births (twins, etc.) are eliminated since these infants tend be 
bom at shorter gestation and of lower birth weight, thus biasing the data.
In addition, as one would expect with survey data, there is missing data and 
anomalies in the data in several of the data fields. The following categories of outliers are 
removed from the 9146 observations of the NMIHS data:
■ Missing or invalid data
■ Women with no prenatal care32 (N=284)
■ 119 women are recorded as having both private insurance and Medicaid. This 
overlap is likely due to the way in which the insurance questions are asked. Since I 
cannot accurately categorize these women, I eliminate them from the sample.
■ Birth weights below 400 grams (.88 lbs.) or above 6000 grams (13.23 lbs.). This 
follows Warner (1998) who also used the NMIHS.
■ Gestation less than 20 weeks or more than 45 weeks. This also follows Warner 
(1998).
stage of esu'mation since abortions are included in that sample.
32 It is not entirely clear how the literature addresses this issue. However, since the percentage of women 
with no prenatal care is small, these are eliminated from the analysis.
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The final sample of all births is 5121 observations. The full sample of all white births 
is 2562 observations while the full sample of all black births is 2106 observations^. 
Observations on women with no prenatal care do not appear in the final sample. Prior to 
removing the outliers discussed above, when the sample was 9146 observations, 284 
women or 3.1 % of that sample had used no prenatal care. However, once the additional 
outliers were removed and the total sample became 5121 observations, all women that 
remained had at least one prenatal visit. Therefore, women with no prenatal care were 
not actually removed from the sample but did not appear in the final sample.
Part of the analysis requires that the sample be controlled for gestation (where only 
births that were of full gestation or greater than 37 weeks are included). The full term 
sample of white births includes 2084 observations while the full term sample of black 
births includes 1677 observations.
Discussion of prenatal care measures
The difficulty in choosing the "best" prenatal care measure to use in this 
dissertation is that there is no accepted "standard" for measuring prenatal care (Alexander 
and Kotelchuck, 1996). Table 3 illustrates a number of different ways that prenatal care 
is measured in the literature. These include straightforward measures such as the onset 
(or delay) of prenatal care and the number of prenatal visits to a variety of indices that 
account for gestation and adequacy of care. Of all the measures, the onset (or delay) of 
prenatal care is the most widely used (see Table 3) and the least criticized, since the 
majority (if not all) of health care providers believe that early prenatal care is the key to a
33 5121 (full sample) - 2562 (white sample) - 2106 (black sample) =  453 women of other races that are 
excluded from the analysis.
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healthy pregnancy34. On the other hand, the number of prenatal visits obtained, some 
argue, does not accurately reflect the healthiness of a pregnancy. The Public Health 
Service maintains that women with little risk of pregnancy complications do not require 
as many prenatal visits as women who are at higher risk (B instock & Wolde-Tsadik,
1995; Witwer, 1990). They find that infants bom to (healthy) mothers who are on a 
reduced schedule of prenatal visits are just as healthy as those bom to mothers on a more 
traditional schedule are.
Prenatal care indices have been criticized by some since they do not accurately 
reflect the content of care provided nor the barriers to care (Mahan, 1996). Alexander 
and Kotelchuck (1996) shed some light on the different types and usefulness of prenatal 
care indices found in the literature. Each one of these indices is defined in Table 3. In 
general, they find that each index employs a different approach to utilization, and are 
thus, incomparable. While they don't recommend any one as the "standard”, they make 
suggestions on how each can best be used.
The Kessner or Institute of Medicine (IOM) index was the first prenatal care index 
developed and as a result, is the most widely used index. This index takes into account 
the onset of prenatal care, the number of visits obtained, and whether the infant was 
delivered by a private obstetric service. Both the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology (ACOG) and the Public Health Service's Expert Panel on Prenatal Care 
suggest guidelines for an "adequate" schedule of prenatal care. Alexander and 
Kotelchuck (1996) argue that the Kessner Index does not appropriately take into account 
these guidelines and consequently classifies too many women as receiving adequate
34 According to ACOG and the Public Health Service.
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prenatal care. They recommend that this and similar indices should no longer be used. 
The OB-Rec Index modifies the Kessner Index by more accurately reflecting the ACOG 
recommendations. However this index does not measure intensive use of prenatal care. 
Women that utilize "a lot" of prenatal care tend to have poorer birth outcomes.
Therefore, the authors recommend that the OB-Rec Index should not be used in research 
that evaluates the relationship between prenatal care and birth outcomes.
Three additional indices are also discussed. The PHS-Rec is based on the Public 
Health Services’ recommendations for prenatal care. Recall from the earlier discussion 
that they recommend that prenatal care begin as early as during the pre-conception period. 
They also argue that the amount of prenatal care recommended should be a function of 
complication risk. Alexander and Kotelchuck are hesitant about using the PHS-Rec since 
the proposed pattern of visits is not widely recommended to patients in the U.S.
However, this index may be useful in comparative studies of proposed prenatal care 
practice standards (p. 414). The GINDEX uses similar categories to the Kessner Index 
but also includes categories for missing data, no prenatal care, and intensive prenatal care. 
This index also more accurately reflects the ACOG recommendations. The authors find 
this index useful for birth outcomes research and in monitoring intensive use of prenatal 
care. Finally, the APNCU Index uses similar categories to the GINDEX but is less 
restrictive about assigning women to the intensive use category. This index also 
separates the onset of prenatal care from compliance of visit recommendations. As a 
result, the authors find the APNCU Index useful in assessing prenatal care utilization 
especially after care is initiated.
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Based on this research, I use two measures of prenatal care: the onset {Onset) of 
prenatal care in weeks and the actual number of visits divided by the ACOG 
recommended number of visits (ACOGadj), controlling for gestation. The first measure 
is widely used within the context of the health production function framework 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982, 1983: Warner, 1995, 1998; Grossman and Joyce, 1990; 
Joyce and Grossman, 1990). The second measure not only takes into account the ACOG 
recommendations, but also reflects intensive prenatal care use. Appendix 1 provides the 
ACOG recommended number of prenatal care visits and the derivation of this measure of 
prenatal care. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the distribution o f the onset of prenatal care (in 
weeks) for white and black women. Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution for white and 
black women of the ACOG adjusted visit measure (i.e. the actual number of visits 
divided by the ACOG recommended number of visits, controlling for gestation). Means 
of other key variables stratified by prenatal care category can be found in Table 11. 
Discussion of CES-D as a measure of depression
Depression is measured by the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
(CES-D) Scale. This scale was developed in 1969 as part o f the Community Mental 
Health Assessment (CMHA) program that was conducted by the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies (CES), National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). It was 
developed to identify the presence and severity of depressive symptomatology in the 
general population. However, it was not intended to discriminate among different types 
of depression nor to distinguish primary depressive disorders from secondary depression 
(Radloff & Locke, 1986). This is the downside of using the CES-D to capture long-term 
and transitory depression.
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The CES-D scale is a self-reported survey consisting of 20 questions concerning 
depressed mood, feelings of guilt, worthlessness, helplessness, and hopelessness, 
psychomotor retardation, loss of appetite, and sleep disturbance. The specific questions 
asked appear in Table 12. The responses reflect the frequency of symptoms experienced 
by the respondent during the past week. Each response is scored from 0 to 3 based on the 
frequency of the occurrence, yielding a range of 0-60, with higher scores reflecting more 
depressive symptoms. Four questions regarding positive feelings and emotions are 
included to break tendencies toward negative feelings. The literature (Locke e t al., 1997; 
Zimmerman & Coryell, 1994; Radloff & Locke, 1986; Roberts & Vernon, 1983) has 
consistently used a score of 16 (and greater) as the cutoff to indicate depression. The 
CMHA found that these scores are correlated with the presence of clinical depression 
diagnosed by a psychologist (Radloff & Locke, 1986). Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the 
distribution of CES-D scores by race and the means of other key variables for depressed 
and non-depressed women are in Table 13.
The CES-D scale is only one of 30 symptom checklists (scales) that measure some 
aspect of depression and depressive symptoms (Snaith, 1993). It is one of the most 
frequently used instruments to identify cases in a community sample (Zimmerman & 
Coryell, 1994; Melchior, Huba, Brown, & Reback, 1993). Several studies have evaluated 
the validity of the CES-D scale with respect to more intensive clinical assessments of 
depression. In general, the research seems to suggest that symptom checklists should be 
used as an initial screening of patients. Roberts and Vernon (1983) summarize these 
studies of the CES-D scale. They find that the scale is internally consistent and has 
acceptable re-test stability. In addition, the scale has good construct validity in clinical
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and community samples and is reasonably good at screening out non-depressed patients. 
However, the CES-D scale suffers from a number of shortcomings. The first is that only 
a modest relationship exists between this scale and more clinical diagnoses such as the 
RDC (Research Diagnostic Criteria). Secondly, the scale is more sensitive to current 
symptoms rather than lifetime RDC diagnosis of depressive illness. Finally, the CES-D 
scale identifies diagnoses other than depression including psychological distress common 
to various types of psychiatric disorders. This may be due to the composition of 
questions in the instrument. Some argue that many of the items in the scale do not reflect 
the DSM-H[ (3rd edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) 
criteria for major depressive disorder (Zimmerman & Coryell 1994).
The shortcomings of this measure should not dissuade its use in this dissertation.
It is only used in this dissertation to roughly assess a woman's state of mental health and 
the incidence of depressive symptoms. However, in my data set, the timing of when the 
CES-D scale is assessed in a concern. On average, this measure was taken 17 months 
after the delivery. This means that not only is the scale capturing long-term depression, 
but it may also capture post-partum depression. Post-partum depression is not to be 
mistaken with the "baby blues"35. Post-partum depression (non-psychotic) occurs in 
10%-15% of all women, with the onset beginning 6 weeks to one year following birth and 
lasting for 6-8 weeks, on average (Downey, 1996). For some women, particularly ones 
whose interview was conducted less than one year following childbirth, the CES-D scale
35 At least 70% of women suffer from a short spell o f depression or indifference called the baby blues with 
the first month following childbirth. It usually lasts for only a few  days. Downey, J.I. (1996). Recognizing 
the range of mood disorders o f women. Medscape Women's Health. 1C8) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.medscape.com/Medscape/WomensHealth/joumaI/1996/v01.n08/wl59.downey/wl59.downey.ht 
ml#Pregnancy
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potentially captures post-partum depression. In general, the scale captures both the long­
term exogenous component and the transitory endogenous component (such as post­
partum) of depression. To better capture the long-term component of depression, the 
CES-D scale measure taken during the 1988 survey is augmented with a CES-D scale 
measure taken during a 1991 follow-up survey (the NMIHS, 1991) of the same women. 
There is some evidence that women who are depressed following childbirth maintain 
their symptoms even two years later (Small, Astbury, Brown, & Lumley, 1994).
Therefore, a simple average36 of the CES-D scores taken during the 1988 survey and the 
1991 survey are used as a better measure of long-term depression.37 A more ideal 
measure of long-term depression would be taken before the pregnancy began, but is not 
available in this data set.
The transitory component of depression is eliminated from the empirical model. 
This type of depression is more likely an output of the production (of infant health) 
process, rather than an input. The original intent behind incorporating depression into the 
framework was to evaluate its effect on prenatal care and infant health. As was just 
discussed, the transitory measure alone (CES-D1983) is not a good predictor of this. In 
addition, incorporation of the transitory component requires estimation of a depression 
equation since it is an endogenous variable. A depression equation is not estimated. The 
empirical model focuses on the long-term component. A more detailed discussion of this 
appears in the empirical model section.
36 C E S D I9 X  + C E S D m i
2
37 Using the 1991 measure alone may be problematic as well. If a woman became pregnant around 1991, 
then the 1991 depression measure may capture an episode of post-partum depression or some other type of 
transitory depression.
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Discussion o f birth weight measures38
Table 2 illustrates different measures of infant health found in the literature.
Birth weight is the most commonly used measure of infant health, especially in health 
production function studies (including Grossman & Joyce, 1990; Rosenzweig &  Schultz, 
1982, 1983; and others). While neonatal and infant mortality rates are another common 
output of the health production function (Corman, Joyce, & Grossman, 1987; Corman & 
Grossman, 1985) I choose not to use these measures for several reasons. Most studies 
that use these measures use aggregate measures of mortality expressed in deaths per 1000. 
Most micro-level data sets do not contain enough observations on infant deaths.
Although the NMIHS contains several thousand observations on infant deaths, it is 
unlikely that I could compare my results to similar studies (since they would not exist). 
Additionally, these are extreme measures of the lack of infant health. For these reasons, I 
rule out the use of mortality rates as sufficient measures of infant health.
Gestation is yet another measure of infant health used in similar studies (see 
Table 2). The problem with using gestation is that it suffers from measurement error 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1991). Gestation is the number of weeks that the pregnancy 
lasts. Computing this not only requires knowledge of the delivery date but also the date 
of conception. Often, it is difficult to pinpoint this date. Consistent with the literature, 
birth weight and birth weight controlled for gestation are used as two different measures 
of infant health.
Dichotomous measures of low birth weight (less than 2500 grams/5.51 lbs.), term 
low birth weight (less than 2500 grams but greater than 37 weeks gestation), very low
38 1 pound = 453.6 grams
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birth weight (less than 1500 grams/3.31 lbs.), and extremely low birth weight (less than 
750 grams) are measures of infant health also found in the literature (Joyce, 19 9739). It is 
well established that low birth weight is the primary determinant of infant mortality, 
especially in the neonatal40 period (McCormick, 1985). Rogowski (1998) finds that 
despite advances in neonatal technology, the treatment costs to keep an infant weighing 
less than 750 grams (at birth) alive until her first birthday are five times higher ($273,900 
v. S58,000) than one weighing 1250-1499 grams (at birth). The author states that any 
prenatal intervention that results in a normal birth weight can save thousands of dollars in 
medical costs. The model proposed in this dissertation is suitable to evaluate the 
contributors to very low birth weight. However, other studies argue that either little can 
be effectively done to prevent preterm birth, including increasing access to prenatal care, 
or that little is known about preterm delivery (Ray, Mitchel, & Piper, 1997; Piper,
Mitchel, Ray, 1996a; Collaborative Group on Preterm Birth Prevention, 1993).
Therefore, an economic model would not uncover any meaningful results. Since the 
research to date remains mixed, it seems reasonable to empirically evaluate the question. 
In addition to using health outcomes (such as birth weight) that apply to the more general 
population, a special study on low birth weight infants is conducted in this dissertation.
In my model, I use the following four different measures of birth weight: birth weight in 
grams, term birth weights, a dummy variable indicating low birth weight, and a dummy 
variable indicating term low birth weight. I actually define two different samples in the 
analysis: a sample including all births (where I use the birth weight and low birth weight 
measures) and a sample only using full term births or births of gestations greater than 37
39 Except less than 750 grams
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weeks (where I use the term birth weight and term low birth weight measures). Key 
variable means stratified by low birth weight and normal birth weight can be found in 
Table 14.
Descriptive Statistics Discussion
Table 11 illustrates the differences in means of important variables in the model, 
according to the time at which the woman first sought prenatal care. In genera], the 
health care industry encourages women to seek prenatal care as early as possible, or more 
generally during the first trimester (first 1/3 of the pregnancy). The results from this table 
indicate that, for both whites and blacks, women who began prenatal care during the first 
trimester (versus women who began later) have higher birth weight infants, a lower 
depression score, are more likely to have private insurance and less likely to have 
Medicaid, are older, more educated, and are far more likely to have been married at some 
point. In general, these results demonstrate that there are many factors that are correlated 
with seeking early prenatal care.
Table 13 reflects differences between women who are considered depressed 
(CES-D >= 16) and women who are considered not to be depressed (C-ESD < 16). The 
results indicate significant differences in the behavior of depressed and non-depressed 
women. Women who are depressed tend to seek prenatal care later, are younger, less 
likely to be married, and are less educated than non-depressed women. This is not a 
surprising result. Additionally, depressed women have lower birth weight infants than 
non-depressed women do. This provides some evidence that depressed women may pass 
on their depressed state, in some form, to their infants. Depressed women are also more
40 Neonatal is considered the time from birth to 27 days after birth.
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likely to participate in Medicaid and are less likely to have private insurance. One 
explanation for this is that depressed women may be less likely to secure employment, 
having less access to private insurance. In addition, it is possible that women who reveal 
that they are not depressed have been treated for depression. The higher incidence of 
non-depressed people with private insurance may indicate that private insurance is better 
at treating depression than Medicaid. All of these results hold true for both black and 
white women. The one difference is that depressed women who are white seek more 
visits while depressed women who are black seek significantly fewer visits. The 
explanation for seeking more visits may be due to a state of confusion or paranoia that 
may be associated with depressed. On the other hand, it seems just as likely that 
depressed women have difficulty seeking care since research has shown that depressed 
individuals have more difficulty functioning than non-depressed individuals. Thus, it is 
also likely that there are confounding effects at work here.
The most striking result in Table 14 is that both white and black women who 
have low birth weight infants seek over 40% more visits than women who have normal 
weight infants. Realize that these visits are adjusted for gestation. This result seems to 
indicate that women may be aware of pregnancy complications that result in either pre­
term delivery or a low birth weight infant. In addition, white women with low birth 
weight children seek prenatal care earlier than women with normal birth weight children. 
These results further support the explanation above. If a problematic pregnancy is 
expected, a woman seeks prenatal care early. However, black women behave in an 
opposite way. This suggests that pregnancy complications may have not been caught 
early enough (due to the later onset of care) and resulted in a low birth weight infant. The
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other results indicate that women with lower birth weight infants are younger, less 
educated, more depressed, less likely to be married, more likely to participate in 
Medicaid, and less likely to have private insurance.
Implementing the Empirical Model
Correcting for sample selection created by using the live birth sample
In implementing the empirical model I face a number of statistical hurdles.
Sample selection - one type of selectivity bias - is one common problem that researchers 
face when data on the endogenous variable is missing in a systematic manner (Maddala 
1985). Specifically, the sample that I use to estimate the model includes only women 
who experienced a live birth. This sample is not representative of all pregnant women. A 
sample of all pregnant women would include those who experience a variety of outcomes 
including live birth, fetal death, abortion, or infant death. According to Joyce and 
Grossman (1990) one might expect that the behavior of women in the former group might 
differ from those in the latter group. For example, women that experienced a live birth 
may be healthier or may have desired their child more, resulting in demanding more 
frequent and timely prenatal care, on average, than women who experienced an abortion 
or other fetal/infant death. This means that the onset of prenatal care in the live birth 
sample would be a misleading indicator of the onset of prenatal care by all pregnant
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women. Joyce and Grossman propose that in order to correct this sample selection issue, 
Heckman's two-step (Heckman 1979) procedure is employed41.
Following Greene (1993), suppose that prenatal visit demand (M) and the 
incidence of a live birth (B), have a bivariate distribution with correlation p, such that:
cov (M,B) l j r r>p  = ---------------- , p > 0  , <7, > 0  , i = M , B
If M and B are positively correlated (p > 0) the truncation of B (elimination of pregnant 
women who do not experience a live birth) should push the distribution of M to the right. 
What this means is that the mean and variance of M (number of prenatal visits) are 
unobserved; however, the mean and variance of M given that B > a (where B — I or that 
the woman experiences a live birth) is observed. Intuitively, this says that the truncated 
mean of M  given by E [M I B > a\ is pushed in the direction of the correlation - which is 
assumed to be positive. In addition, the truncated variance of M given by Var [.M I B >  a\ 
is heteroskedastic.
There are a number of solutions in the econometrics literature to correct for such 
sample selection. Following Joyce and Grossman (1990), I employ Heckman's two-step 
procedure. Greene (1993) describes this procedure in detail. The first step is to estimate 
a probit model on the probability that a woman experiences a live birth (i.e. prob (B = 1)). 
The second step requires using the parameter estimates, b, to construct an inverse Mills
41 The abortion literature is relevant here. Some research indicates that restricting the availability of 
abortion services reduces the average birth weight. Currie, Nixon, and Cole (1996) find that restricting the 
Medicaid funding o f abortion increases the probability o f a live birth among women who did not want the 
pregnancy. It is expected that these women are more likely to have adverse infant health outcomes since 
they did not want the pregnancy in the first place. Given this, it is necessary to control for this effect.
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ratio, X. The inverse Mills ratio is included as a regressor in subsequent equations of 
interest to account for the bias which results from sample selection.42 The inverse Mills 
ratio equals the probability density function divided by one minus the cumulative density 
function:
H t ' x )
J - O ( b ' x )
In order to perform this statistical procedure, it is necessary to have data on a 
sample of all pregnant women. From this, a variable can be created that weights the 
sample of women that experienced a live birth so that inferences can be made about the 
entire pregnant population. In reading the fine print in the data documentation of the 
NMIHS, it was discovered that this data set does not contain observations on all pregnant 
women. It contains observations on women that experienced a live birth, an infant death 
(i.e. death soon after birth), and fetal deaths that occurred more than 28 weeks into the 
pregnancy. Abortions are not included. Therefore, in order to perform Heckman's two- 
step procedure, abortion data needed to be collected.
Angrist and Krueger (1992, 1995) derive a two-sample instrumental variables (IV) 
approach that is applicable to Heckman’s two-step procedure but utilizes two different 
data sets. Two-sample IV was motivated by the fact that even large samples may not
42 The heteroskedasticity caused by self-selection is corrected by using White standard errors.
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always include an exhaustive set of important variables of interest. In order to conduct a 
two-sample, Heckman's two-step procedure, another data set that contained the exact 
same variables as the NMIHS but with data on all pregnancies had to be located. The 
NLS Y was chosen as this data source. Refer to the NLS Y as data set one and the NMIHS 
as data set two. The two-sample, two-step procedure is performed as follows:
Step One: Recall that in step one of the two-step procedure, a probit is estimated 
on the probability of experiencing a live birth. In the two-sample approach, the NLS Y 
data (represented by the subscript one) is used to estimate this probit. Next, the parameter 
estimates obtained from this probit are multiplied by the data (exact same variables) from 
the NMIHS (represented by subscript two). This creates a predicted value of the 
probability of experiencing a live birth using data from the NMIHS and the parameter 
estimates from the NLSY.
Step Two: Now, the inverse Mills ratio is computed using the formula:
A (V x ,)  = -
I -cp ( b , ' x : )
A
Finally, X is included as a regressor in all successive estimation procedures to correct for 
sample selection and bi'x2  can used to correct for heteroskedasticity.
Correcting for heteroskedasticity
It has been alluded to that heteroskedasticity is likely to persist throughout the 
treatment effects model. Generally any selection bias is likely to cause heteroskedasticity. 
In this model, there are multiple selection issues that must be taken into account including 
selecting into the live birth population and the Medicaid and private insurance
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populations. Additionally, cross-sectional data also presents the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity. Two alternative methods for appropriately dealing with 
heteroskedasticity is to either build it into the model using Generalized Least-Squares 
(GLS) or to adjust the standard errors. Since I suspect that one or more forms of 
heteroskedasticity may be present throughout the model, I adjust the standard errors for 
general heteroskedasticity in a manner similar to White (1980).
Endogenizing Medicaid and private insurance
Incorporating insurance into the framework presents another statistical, yet 
interesting issue. Clearly, insurance is a choice variable, particularly for pregnant 
women. (However, eligibility rules are assumed to be exogenous). On the one hand, if a 
woman expects to become pregnant, she is more likely to seek out adequate health 
insurance. This can be in the form of private insurance or Medicaid. In many cases, 
pregnant women are eligible to receive Medicaid. But, on the other hand, not all women 
that are eligible to receive Medicaid participate and some women that become Medicaid 
eligible drop their private insurance in lieu of Medicaid43.
This presents a classic case of an endogenous explanatory variable - a variable 
whose value is determined within the system. One way to statistically correct for this 
issue is to employ the instrumental variables approach. Conceptually, this means that 
insurance is regressed across all of the explanatory variables in the system, from which a 
predicted value of insurance is produced. This predicted probability of having insurance 
is then included as a regressor in subsequent equations of interest. While this approach is
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statistically sound, the downside of using this approach is that the predicted probability is 
a function of the latent variable, not the discrete one. A parameter estimate would only 
illustrate the effect of the predicted probability of having Medicaid or insurance on birth 
weight, for example. Ideally, one would prefer to know the direct effect of actually 
having private insurance or Medicaid on prenatal care and birth weight. In light of this, 
an alternative correction is used to mitigate the endogeneity problem. The approach used 
is called the treatment effects model.
According to Maddala (1983) one of the major uses of self-selection models is to 
evaluate the effect of a social program. The treatment effects model is one type of self­
selection model. This model presumes that individuals that participate in a social 
program, such as Medicaid, select into the program in anticipation of reaping benefits that 
they would otherwise not get. It is expected that the individuals that self select into the 
program will reap greater benefits from the program than a randomly assigned group that 
participates. This can also be applied to private insurance. Individuals who choose to 
have private insurance coverage do so since the expected benefit is greater than it would 
be for a randomly assigned group. This is called self-selection44. The theoretical 
framework models this self-selection by allowing a woman to choose the type of 
insurance coverage that maximizes her utility. The treatment effect model is 
econometrically appropriate, follows the theoretical model, and allows for the parameter 
estimates on Medicaid and insurance to be directly interpreted.
43 This is discussed in much greater detail in a later section.
44 Another common application o f  this model, discussed in Greene (1993), is used to describe the effect of a 
college education on earnings.
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Simply put, the treatment effects model is similar to Heckman's two-step 
procedure. A probit is estimated on whether or not a woman participates in Medicaid. 
From the predicted probability generated, an inverse Mills ratio is constructed and 
included as a regressor in subsequent equations of interest. However, in addition, the 
treatment effects model also includes the actual Medicaid dummy variable as a  regressor. 
Therefore, the final model would not only include fijX, the inverse Mills ratio, but it 
would also include /?-> Medicaid, the Medicaid dummy variable. Note though, that both a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of Medicaid and the Mills ratio must be included 
in the model in order to evaluate the individual effect of Medicaid45. The next section 
discusses in detail how these two equations are estimated.
Empirical model
The goal of this estimation procedure is to evaluate the interaction between 
depression, prenatal care and birth weight, paying close attention to the effect that private 
insurance and Medicaid have on this system. Conceptually, three stages of estimation 
take place, with reduced-form equations estimated in all stages except for the birth weight 
equation that is estimated structurally. Refer to Figure 8 for an overview of these three 
stages. The initial stage corrects for the sample selection bias that is caused by a sample 
of women that experience a live birth. The second stage corrects for the sample selection 
(or endogeneity) bias caused by participation in Medicaid or private insurance. These 
first two stages are necessary in order to produce consistent estimates in the final stage. 
The final stage estimates the model of interest. A structural-form birth weight equation
45 An identical process is conducted for private insurance.
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and a semi reduced-form prenatal care equation are estimated using a recursive treatment 
effects model. Although depression is included as an exogenous regressor in the model, a 
depression equation is not estimated for the reasons discussed below. Since many of the 
variables are expected to systematically differ by race, the entire analysis is stratified by 
race. White and black samples are carried through the analysis. The stages of estimation 
are discussed in similar order to the theoretical model.
Initial Stage
The purpose of this stage is solely to correct for the sample selection bi as that is
created by using a subset of the data. In stage one, a probit46 is estimated on the
probability that a woman experiences a live birth. The dependent variable, Live Birth is
a binary variable equal to one if the woman experienced a live birth and zero otherwise.
The reduced-form probit is defined as the following:
1. Live Birth = \{/1 + y/2 wanted + yr3age -hjfjncom e +\ffsblack +
\ff6white +  yr7high school + \ffscollege + \f/9marital + e UVE
One may notice that while this equation is a reduced-form equation, it is missing many of 
the exogenous variables in the system. This is a consequence of mapping the NLS Y data 
to the NMIHS data - the variables must be matched identically in the two data sets. The 
NLSY does not contain the full set of exogenous variables in the system. Only the
46 For the following reason, a probit is estimated when the dependent variable is binary - if ordinary Ieast- 
squares (OLS) is used, it is possible that the predicted probabilities may be either negative or greater than 
one. Logically, a probability must fall between zero and one. The probit model uses a  cumulative normal 
function that essentially smoothes out the regression line so that all o f the predicted probabilities fall 
between zero and one.
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variables that can be matched are used. Although Grossman and Joyce (1990) estimate a 
similar equation in their model, this initial stage is not of any great significance. The 
results show that none of the significance levels are changed when the inverse Mills ratio 
(the correction statistic) is not included.
Wanted reflects whether the woman wanted the pregnancy when she became 
pregnant. The question specifically asks the woman about her attitude toward pregnancy 
before becoming pregnant: therefore, this is a predetermined variable. Warner (1998) 
included this variable in his model in order to control for sample selection rather than 
estimating an equation similar to this one. A priori, one would expect that if a woman 
wanted to become pregnant then she is more likely to continue her pregnancy to full term, 
barring any unforeseen circumstances such as a spontaneous miscarriage.
Stage two of the treatment effects model
Recall back to the theoretical model that a woman chooses the type of insurance 
coverage that maximizes her utility. This can be shown by comparing her indirect utility 
functions (derived in the theoretical section):
27. V N0 (D LT , Z M , Z D ,P NO ,1) v. V ,yrc (DLT , Z H , Z °  , P MC, I ,  MCP,<t>)
28 . V no(Dlt, Z h , Z d, P so, I )  v. V PI(DLTi Z H, Z D, P pl, I ,prem,Y,PI )
29. V mc(Dlt, Z H, Z d, P mc,I,<P,MCP) v. V P1 (DLF, Z H , Z D, P pl , I ,prem,Y,PT)  
These equations illustrate that insurance choice is a function of all of the exogenous 
variables in the system. In addition, since insurance coverage is a choice, the decision to 
participate in Medicaid, purchase private insurance, or be uninsured is endogenous in the 
model. I suggested earlier that a treatment effects model is the superior model to use in
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order to evaluate the effect of insurance coverage on prenatal care and birth weight, while 
controlling for sample selection and endogeneity.
Two univariate probits are estimated on the probability of having insurance and 
the probability of participating in Medicaid. From these two probits, two inverse Mills 
ratios can be computed. Both the inverse Mills ratios (to correct for sample selection) 
and the actual binary variables (to capture the direct effect of that variable) are included in 
the prenatal care and birth weight equations.
The decision to estimate two univariate probit models rather than some alternative 
specification is due to the following reasoning. The decision to participate in Medicaid 
and private insurance can be estimated as two univariate probits, a multinomial logit, or 
jointly as a bivariate probit. Note that one category, in this case no insurance, must 
always be excluded. A multinomial logit allows for more than one choice category. 
According to Kennedy (1993), a multinomial logit is characterized by the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives. This means that each of the choices must be mutually exclusive 
and that what affects one will not affect the other. As well, if more choices are added or 
if any of the choices are taken away, the probability of choosing a particular option 
remains constant. While this seems like a reasonable model for estimating the presence 
of insurance, the data used in the estimation process do not satisfy the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives requirement, or the mutual exclusiveness requirement.
An alternative to the multinomial logit is the bivariate probit. A bivariate probit 
takes into account the mutual inclusiveness of choices similar to a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model. In this model, this presumes that a significant percentage of 
women choose to have both Medicaid and private insurance. This is not the case in the
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data set (NMEHS) nor is it theoretically logical to have two types of insurance at the same 
time. Therefore, this alternative is not chosen. Cutler and Gruber (1996) provide 
additional evidence that univariate probits should be estimated in this situation.
Two reduced-form47 univariate probits are estimated on the probability that a
woman participates in Medicaid or purchases private insurance. While these equations
are of interest themselves, they also generate the correction statistics that appear in the
prenatal care and birth weight equations to control for endogeneity:
2. Medicaid = yx -t- yzability -f- y3environmental + y^anthropometric + y5maternal + 
y6 fertility + y^demographic +  y%income + y9cohab + y l0CESDavg + y uXUVE + e MC
3. Insurance = a , -f- cc2ability +  oc3environmental + a Aanthropometric + a smaternal +- 
a 6 fertility + ^ demographic  + ccsincome + a9cohab + a wCESDavs + a uXUVE + s pr
Ability is defined by the mother’s and father's industry and occupation, the state Medicaid 
income eligibility level (in dollars), and the state unemployment rate. The industry and 
occupation in which the mother and father are employed reveal how easily it is to obtain 
private insurance and also may indicate the costliness of the insurance premium. The 
excluded category for industry is if either the mother or father (or both) are unemployed 
or if the father is not present. Unemployment is a good indicator of the job availability as 
well as of the job market environment in general. If someone in the household is 
gainfully employed, the probability of having private insurance is higher. Conversely, if 
no one in the household is employed, the probability of participating in Medicaid is 
higher.
47 These are pure reduced-form equations where only exogenous variables are included on the right-hand 
side.
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Medicaid eligibility is an important variable in the model. There are two ways 
that this variable can be included. The first way is to actually impute a woman's 
eligibility. If she is technically eligible, then eligibility is "turned on" and if she is not 
eligible it is "turned o ff . The problem with this measure is that it is endogenous and also 
may suffer from measurement error. Theoretically, a woman could reduce her income to 
the point that she becomes Medicaid eligible. If this measure is used, its endogeneity 
must be controlled for (not always an easy task). Cutler and Gruber (1996) suggest using 
an exogenous measure of eligibility. Using a complicated algorithm, their measure 
weights the income eligibility threshold (in dollars) by household size. I use the 1988 
federal poverty level incomes (Appendix 2) and the 1988 Medicaid eligibility guidelines 
(Table 24) to create a similar measure of eligibility that is also exogenous. This measure, 
a function of each woman’s household size and state of residence, is derived in Appendix 
348. It is expected that the higher the eligibility level (i.e. income of 520,000 is more 
generous than 510,000 since it allows a family to earn more and still be eligible) the 
greater the probability a woman participates in Medicaid. All other variables are 
explained in the next section.
Final stage of the structural-form treatment effects model
There is an important reason why depression is not entered endogenously, and is 
estimated as a separate equation in the empirical model. The original intent behind 
incorporating depression into the framework was to estimate its impact on insurance 
choice, prenatal care and infant health. It is assumed that a depressed mom may select 
into a sub-optimal type of insurance or demand a sub-optimal amount of prenatal care,
48 This is just a rough approximation o f a woman’s eligibility. Actual Medicaid eligibility is computed
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and that her depressed state may affect the health of her infant. However, it was realized 
that depression may not only be an exogenous input into the production proces s but it 
may also be an output. Post-partum depression is the most common example of this 
output. Among other things, post-partum depression is a direct result of giving birth to a 
child. In this context, depression is endogenous and must be estimated as a separate 
equation. Conceptually, this equation would explain the causes of post-partum or other 
types of transitory depression. Knowledge of these causes may be extremely useful in 
detecting depression and in prescribing a course of treatment for depression. But, the 
original intent of this dissertation was to understand the causes of infant health, not 
necessarily maternal health. While the framework proposed may provide some insight 
into understanding the causes of post-partum depression, this issue is not dealt with here. 
However, it would be an interesting extension of this dissertation for future research.
I develop a more accurate empirical measure of long-term (exogenous) depression 
to include in the model. Recall that the CES-D scale is measured for each woman an 
average of 17 months following childbirth. Using this measure alone as a predictor of 
maternal behavior before delivery is somewhat of a stretch. Since only one discrete 
measure of the scale is taken in the 1988 survey, it likely reflects a combination of long­
term and transitory (such as post-partum) depression. However, the 1991 follow-up of 
the NMIHS takes a second measure of the CES-D scale for each woman. Averaging the 
two measures (from the 1988 and 1991 surveys) should provide a more accurate picture 
of a woman's long-term mental health. For example, if the 1988 measure is truly a 
measure of post-partum depression then the effects of this should be partially canceled
using a very complicated algorithm that constandy changes over time.
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out by her "true" state of mental health measured in the 1991 survey. I assume that the
averaged CES-D (CES-Davg) is exogenous49 since it more likely reflects long-term
depression. Consequently, it is included as an explanatory variable in the prenatal care,
birth weight, and insurance equations.
The model in the final stage is estimated by two-stage least-squares (2SLS). It is a
recursive model since prenatal care is one input that enters into the infant health
production function (birth weight), but birth weight does not enter into prenatal care
demand. Recall from the theoretical modeP0 that prenatal care is a function of long-term
depression (DLT), factors that affect infant health {ZH), factors that affect transitory
depression (ZD), prices (P*0, / >MC, Ppi), income (/), Medicaid participation and the
welfare stigma (MCP and <f>) if a woman participates in Medicaid), and private insurance
participation OP/), its associated quality effect (y), and the private insurance premium
iprem) if a woman purchases private health insurance. Empirically, the semi-reduced-
fomP1, prenatal care equation is given by the following:
4. Prenatal care = <5, -t- 8environmental + S3anthropometric + 8Amaternal +
8S fertility + 8 demographies + 87income + S8c°hab 4- 89CESDays +
8l0Medicaid +- 8uinsurance + <5I2 A'wc + Sl3XPI -i-8 UXUVE + e PNC
Prenatal care is defined as the onset of care or52 the adjusted number of visits according 
to the ACOG guidelines.
49 Later I test for exogeneity and find that I cannot reject exogeneity.
50 Refer to theoretical equations 7, 15, and 23.
51 A "true" reduced-form prenatal care equation includes ALL of the exogenous variables in the system. 
Since this is a recursive treatment effects model, I include the actual Medicaid and insurance dummy 
variables and their sample-selection correction statistics, making this equation only semi-reduced-form. In 
some sense, the prenatal care equation is structural although it does not include any endogenous variables.
52 These measures are not used at the same time, although I did estimate the mode with both and found no 
significant results. Separate equations are run for the onset of care and the adjusted number of prenatal care 
visits.
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The price of prenatal care is proxied by the inclusion of environmental variables 
including the state population density per square mile (statepopulation density), a state 
health care price index (H-index), and whether the woman lives in an urban county 
(urban). I assume that as the price of a prenatal care visit increases, the number of visits 
obtained decrease, but I have no a priori assumption about how price affects the onset of 
care. A decrease in state population density (more rural) suggests that prenatal care may 
be sparser, increasing the delay in seeking care and reducing the number of visits. In 
terms of price, an increase in state population density (more urban) is associated with 
higher prices (urban areas are more expensive), reducing the number of visits but having 
an unknown affect on the onset of care. The H-indexs3 is a reasonable proxy of the price 
of a medical visit. It takes a weighted average of the prices of a hospital room, general 
medical and dental visit, and a bottle of aspirin. I assume that an increase in H-index 
reduces the frequency of visits. It is unclear what effect this has on the onset of care. 
Finally, urban is expected to be an even better measure of access to prenatal care since 
the variable is individual specific, not aggregate.
In order for the structural-form of the birth weight equation to be estimated, it 
must meet identifying restrictions so that the estimates obtained are meaningful. An 
identifying variable is an exogenous variable that is not correlated with one of the 
dependent variables. Since only two equations are estimated in the final stage, the 
prenatal care equation must include identifying variables that are correlated with prenatal 
care but not correlated with birth weight in order to identify the birth weight equation.
3J This index is comprised o f a  weighted average of the following: average cost per day for a semi-private 
hospital room (weight =  . 178); AMA's price of a general practitioner's routine exam on an established 
patient (weight = .356); ADA’s price of an adult dental cleaning and periodic oral exam (weight = .356); the
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Use of identifying variables ensures that the estimate of a structural parameter is an 
estimate of that parameter and not something else.
There is a variable in the NMIHS that identifies a variety of barriers that a woman 
is said to face in getting prenatal care. Specifically, the types of barriers identified are: 
financial barriers54, time barriers55, and emotional barriers56. Several studies57 have 
identified barriers in getting prenatal care including Financial barriers, language barrier, 
difficulty in scheduling prenatal appointments, unaware of the importance of prenatal 
care, lack of transportation, ambivalence about the pregnancy, stress, unaware of where to 
receive prenatal care, expectation of no pregnancy complications (Higgins & Burton,
1996; Harvey & Faber, 1993;). While this is an ideal variable to include in the prenatal 
care equation in order to identify birth weight, surprisingly very few women in the 
NMIHS sample reported facing any barriers at all38. Therefore, this variable cannot be 
used at all since it has little variation. The environmental variables described above as 
well as household income and cohabitation with the father (cohab) are used as
price of a 100 tablet bottle of Bayer aspirin (weight = .11).
34 This variable reflects any one of the following problems: insurance did not cover prenatal care; could not 
pay for prenatal care; problem with Medicaid; required cash deposit; no insurance; provider would not 
accept Medicaid; unspecified money/insurance problem; unclassifiable money/insurance problem.
35 This variable reflects any of the following problems: no transportation; no child care: could not miss 
work/school; no doctor/clinic near; did not know where to go; could not get appointment; had to wait too 
long; hours not convenient; unspecified appointment/work/transportation problem; unclassifiable 
appointment/work/transportation problem.
36 This variable reflects any of the following problems: afraid of tests; did not like MD/nurse attitude; did 
not know pregnant; did not want anyone else to know; had too many other problems; did not want to be 
pregnant; unspecified provider problem; unclassifiable provider problem; unspecified other problem: 
unclassifiable other problem.
57 Harvey, S.M. and K.S. Faber, “Obstacles to Prenatal Care Following Implementation o f a Community- 
Based Program to Reduce Financial Incentives”, Family Planning Perspectives, 25(1): 32-37, 1993. 
Barriers to prenatal care were studied in a  group of women in rural Oregon bettween 1988 and 1990. 
Despite the establishment of a program to provide prenatal care to low-income women, the reasons most 
frequently cited as barriers were difficulty in paying for prenatal care (70%), difficulty with medical 
insurance (55%), ambivalence or fear about the pregnancy (46%) and transportation problems (42%).
58 There were less than 20 women in the entire sample who reported having barriers to prenatal care.
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instruments and are included in the prenatal care equation but not in the birth weight 
equation.
Medicaid participation is given by Medicaid (and XMC) while private insurance 
participation is defined as Insurance (and XP!). Theory suggests that Medicaid 
participants obtain more prenatal visits than uninsured women but makes no a priori 
assumptions about its effect on the onset of prenatal care. Likewise, theory suggests that 
women with private insurance receive more prenatal visits but suggests nothing about the 
onset. Household income is expected to impact prenatal care in a favorable manner. It is 
expected that as income increases, more prenatal visits are demanded, but it is unclear 
what the effect is on onset.
Long-term depression (DLT) is defined as the CES-Dmg scale. This is an average 
of the CES-D scores from the 1988 NMIHS and the 1991 NMIHS. Several studies 
(including Wells et al., 1989; Hays et al., 1995) indicate that depressed individuals 
function physically and emotionally poorer and miss more days of work and school than 
non-depressed individuals. Therefore, I assume that depressed women obtain later and 
less frequent prenatal care.
In the theoretical model, the production of infant health is a function of prenatal 
care, M, long-term depression, DLT, and factors that affect infant health, ZH. The 
structural birth weight equation is given by the following:
5. Birthweight = + /32anthropometric + f33maternal + jS4fertility +
^demographies 4- {36CESDavs + /J7Medicaid + (3ginsurance + 
prenatal care + P10XMC + (3n Xpl + Pn XUVE + e BWT
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Factors that affect infant health (ZH) are defined as several different categories of 
variables. Anthropometric characteristics include the mom's height, mom's birth 
weight, and whether the child is male. As suggested by Warner (1995, 1998) 
anthropometric characteristics that control for the mother's physical structure are included 
since they are good predictors of birth weight. Male is also included in a simil ar spirit 
since boys are typically bom heavier than girls are.
Maternal behaviors are defined as smoking and drinking during the pregnancy. 
Fertility behaviors include parity (indicating whether the woman had any previous 
pregnancies), age, the wantedncss of the pregnancy, the prior number of fetal deaths 
experienced by the mother, and the number of the mother’s own children (living with 
her), kidcohab. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983) introduced the concept that 
parental behavior affects the choice of inputs that enter into the infant health production 
function. One of these behaviors is smoking. Numerous studies have shown that 
maternal smoking during pregnancy reduces birth weight and increases gestation. Some 
may argue that smoking is a choice or endogenous variable (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 
1982, 1983). However, in light of the fall of the tobacco industry in the past few years, it 
has been proven that smoking is addictive. Becker (1988) formalizes the concept of 
addictive behavior in his model of rational addiction and explains the difficulty in 
curtailing addictive behavior. If a woman wants to become pregnant and recognizes the 
harmful effects of smoking, she is likely to devote time and resources toward quitting 
before conception. If a woman becomes unexpectedly pregnant, she is less likely to 
continue the pregnancy. This effect is controlled for by the initial stage of estimation. 
Unless a woman began smoking during her pregnancy, her smoking behavior is
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predetermined and thus exogenous. Several studies include smoking as an exogenous 
variable (Warner, 1995, 1998). Since prenatal care, Medicaid, and private insurance are 
challenging to identify, smoking is left exogenous.
The fertility variables are included since they are also expected to impact a 
woman's behavior concerning the pregnancy. Parity, an indicator of whether the woman 
had any previous pregnancies, reflects the mother's fertility. Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982, 1983) find that parity has a significant effect on both birth weight and (decreasing) 
gestation. Fetal deaths and lcidcohab are expected to explain a woman’s previous fertility 
behaviors and should help to explain birth outcomes. Age is also argued to reflect 
fertility behavior since a woman's fertility varies with her age. Rosenzweig and Schultz 
find that the mother's age at childbirth significantly affects birth weight in a non-linear 
way. For this reason, age2 and age3 are included to capture the non-linearity. Finally, 
wanted is assumed to impact a woman's fertility behavior as well.
Demographic variables including education and whether the woman was never 
married are included to control for individual effects. Recall that the entire analysis 
(Stage Two and the Final Stage) is stratified by race yielding distinct white and black 
samples. Therefore, race cannot be included as a regressor. Education is defined as the 
number of years of education. I assume that women with more years of education are 
better able to understand the importance of adequate prenatal care and demand more 
frequent and earlier care. In addition, I assume that higher educational attainment is 
expected to increase birth weight since women with more knowledge are likely to better 
understand the necessity of healthy behaviors. Since Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982,
1983) find that education enters into the birth weight production function non-linearly, I
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include edu2 and edu3 as well. Marital status is defined by whether the woman has never 
been married. I expect that not having ever been married reflects less responsible 
behavior on the mother's part and is associated with later and less frequent prenatal care 
and worse health outcomes.
Depression (long-term) is measured by the CES-D™8 scale. I expect that long­
term depression or CES-D™8 reduces birth weight. Several studies discussed earlier 
indicate that depressed mothers pass on their depressed condition to their infants in the 
form of reduced left frontal brain activity. The expectation here is that depressed mothers 
bear unhealthy infants. Timely and more frequent prenatal care is expected to increase 
birth weight.
Recall that the treatment effects model allows for the actual Medicaid and 
Insurance variables to be included. Consistent with the theoretical model discussion. I 
expect that Medicaid participants bear lower birth weight infants while women that 
participate in private insurance bear heavier infants. Finally, the three inverse Mills 
ratios: 2l ic, )Sl, and XUVE are included to control for sample selection. Along the lines of 
previous discussions, I expect that XMC reduces birth weight while XPI and XUVE increase 
birth weight.
Results59
Private Insurance and Medicaid
39 All standard errors have been corrected for general heteroskedasticity with the assistance of Bill Greene 
and Limdep. Recall again that since it is likely that several forms of heteroskedasticity exist it is most 
appropriate to adjust the standard errors using a method similar to White (1980).
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Results from the private insurance and Medicaid equations can be foun d in Table 
15. The private insurance and Medicaid univariate probits are both stratified by race and 
by all births and term births. Only the full sample is reported here since the term births 
yield similar results. In all but the white private insurance equation, eligibility is 
significant and of the right sign. The inclusion of Medicaid dollar eligibility is to gauge 
whether a woman is likely to be eligible to receive Medicaid or to gauge how easily it is 
to get Medicaid. In both the black and white Medicaid equations, the higher the dollar 
eligibility threshold, the more likely a woman participates in Medicaid. This provides 
some initial evidence that an effective policy tool at increasing insurance coverage is to 
increase the dollar eligibility threshold. On the other hand, both the white and black 
private insurance equations reveal some evidence of crowding out, although this is only 
statistically significant in the black equation. As the dollar eligibility threshold increases, 
there is a decrease in private insurance participation. A much more detailed discussion of 
the relationship between eligibility and Medicaid appears in Chapter IV.
The results on the unemployment rate are interesting. The unemployment rate 
can be a reasonable gauge at how easily it is to obtain private insurance through one's job. 
A negative and significant coefficient in the white private insurance equation suggests 
that it is more difficult to obtain employment with benefits as the state’s unemployment 
rises. However, a negative and significant coefficient in the black Medicaid equation 
suggests something different. Perhaps this reflects a state’s ability to provide Medicaid. 
One possible story is that as a state’s unemployment rate rises, the economic conditions 
worsen, and the state cannot afford to provide good access to Medicaid. Maybe they can
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offer Medicaid, but perhaps cannot offer the adequate outreach programs or maintain the 
necessary welfare staff to get people enrolled.
While the industry and occupation results are not reported in Table 15, there are a 
handful of significant results. In large part, the coefficients in the Medicaid equations are 
negative and as expected, insignificant. One would assume that the majority o f people 
who participate in Medicaid are not gainfully employed. Therefore, the generosity of an 
industry’s or occupation’s benefits package would not affect those not in the industry or 
occupation. On the other hand, many of the coefficients in the private insurance 
equations are positive, and several are significant, but more so in the black equation and 
for the woman’s own industry. Industries typically associated with strong labor unions, 
the construction and manufacturing industries, have significant and positive coefficients 
in the black equations. This suggests that unions are able to help provide private 
insurance. However, the coefficient on construction in the white equation is negative and 
significant. These results may suggest some discrimination again whites in the 
construction industry or that unions fight harder for black workers. Or simply this could 
mean that blacks and white have different jobs within the industry. These same results 
appear in the retail industry as well.
Depression is significant in all equations but the white, private insurance. This 
suggests the importance of including depression in this type of a framework. In both 
Medicaid equations, the coefficient is positive. Depressed women are more likely than 
other women to participate in Medicaid. One explanation is that depressed women are in 
greater need of medical care and may be receiving treatment for depression. On the other 
hand, the coefficient in the black, private insurance equation is negative. But this result is
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not without explanation. Literature suggests that depressed individuals have difficulty 
performing every day tasks and miss more days of work than non-depressed individuals. 
Therefore, it is rational to argue that depressed women are less able to maintain gainful 
employment, and thus, are less likely to obtain private insurance.
The state health care price index measures the costliness of health care in the 
state. This coefficient is negative and significant in the white, private insurance equation. 
This may suggest that employers are either less likely to offer insurance or offer insurance 
at higher premiums in states where the cost of health care is higher. Reducing the cost of 
care in a state may provide greater access to private insurance. In addition, women who 
live in more urban states are also more likely to have private insurance, but less likely to 
participate in Medicaid. Generally, urban areas provide more opportunities for gainful 
employment since businesses tend to migrate toward urban areas. This result illustrates a 
type of reverse crowding out where urbanization encourages greater participation in 
private insurance and less participation in Medicaid.
One might expect that women who plan and want a pregnancy are more likely to 
wait until they are privately insured to become pregnant. The wantedness of the 
pregnancy is significant, but only in the white equations. Women who wanted the 
pregnancy are more likely to be privately insured and less likely to have Medicaid. It is 
possible that participation in Medicaid is an afterthought or a result of getting pregnant, 
rather than a result of wanting to become pregnant. The coefficient on women with their 
own children living in the household is significant in every equation but in the white, 
Medicaid equation. In both private insurance equations, the coefficients are negative. 
These results are validated in the black equations. This may suggest that the more
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children a woman has, the more expensive private insurance becomes or the less likely it 
is affordable, particularly for large families. This result is somewhat counterintuitive 
since one might expect economies-of-scale in health insurance. For this reason, having 
more children should increase the likelihood of having private insurance.
There are several other variables that are significant in the Medicaid and private 
insurance equations. Both the cohabitation with father and income variables are 
significant in all equations, positive in the private insurance equations and negative in the 
Medicaid. These results are expected. Cohabitation suggests greater ability and access to 
insurance. A single mother may have less access, and therefore participate in Medicaid. 
Higher incomes are also associated with greater participation in private insurance and less 
in Medicaid. Smoking reflects adverse selection in Medicaid but positive selection in 
private insurance. That is, smoking is significant and negative in the private insurance 
equations but significant and positive in the Medicaid equations. This suggests that 
women with healthier lifestyles (who do not smoke) select into private insurance while 
women with poor health habits select into Medicaid. These results, while mostly not 
significant, are also shown with drinking. Finally, all three specifications of age are 
significant in most of the equations. The sign pattern indicates a significant non-linear 
effect such that getting older increases the probability of participating in Medicaid and 
decreases the probability of having private insurance. Over time, this effect reverses for 
middle-aged women (in the sample which may be in the thirties) then returns to the initial 
pattern for oldest women (in their forties).
Prenatal care
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There are four prenatal care equations estimated in the TEM where prenatal care 
is defined by the onset of care and the ACOG adjusted number of visits. Each equation is 
stratified by race. The equations are not very robust across the different specifications 
and the most action occurs for white women in the ACOG adjusted visits equation. 
However results from the term birth equations are similar to their full sample 
counterparts. Results for till births appear in Table 16.
Discussion from the theoretical model suggests that a woman with private 
insurance receives the most adequate and timely prenatal care since having insurance 
permits easier access to care. In the empirical model, the excluded category (or base 
case) is self-paying or having no insurance. Therefore, a positive coefficient (on private 
insurance or Medicaid) suggests better access to care (or perhaps a positive quality effect) 
than self-paying and a negative coefficient suggests poorer access to care (or negative 
quality) than the self-pay case. In all but the black, ACOG equation, the coefficient on 
private insurance is significant and positive in visits and significant and negative in 
onset60. Having private insurance decreases the onset of care and increases the number of 
adjusted visits. Recall that these are both favorable results since earlier onset and more 
visits are desired. Furthermore, this indicates that private insurance provides better 
access to care than having no insurance (the base case). Participating in Medicaid also 
suggests better access although the results are only significant in the white, visits 
equation61. Overall, these results may suggest that both private insurance and Medicaid 
provide higher quality care than self-payment. However, it is unclear whether earlier and
60 Recall though that a negative coefficient in the onset equation is a favorable result since earlier onset is 
better.
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more frequent care reflects higher quality care. They may just reflect better access to 
care. The results from the birth weight equations should provide better evidence of 
quality effects since higher birth weights do tend to reflect higher quality. Nonetheless, 
having some form of health insurance seems to provide better access to care than having 
no insurance at all.
I assume that the variables that affect access and availability to prenatal care 
should matter most. Both the number of own children in the household and the number 
of drinks consumed during pregnancy decrease the number of visits. The latter, however, 
is only significant for whites. Having children in the household can be a constraint on 
time, energy and resources. Additionally, drinking may affect one's ability to act 
rationally. Both of these variables act as barriers to prenatal care and should be expected 
to reduce the number of visits obtained and delay the onset of care. On the other hand, 
few of the variables that reflect the state climate (state population density, urban, and the 
state health care price index) are significant. Two of these three variables are state level 
or aggregate variables and may not be good indicators of access to care since they are not 
specific to the woman. However, for white women, the more urban the county of 
residence or the more densely populated the state, the earlier she started care. This result 
is expected since the proximity to a prenatal care provider is closer and there is a greater 
availability of transportation. Finally, cohabitation with the father of the child is negative 
and significant in the black, onset equation. Living with the father allows a woman to 
seek prenatal care earlier and also increases the ability to get to a prenatal visit by his 
assistance with transportation and child care.
61 It is possible that women who participate in Medicaid substitute quantity for quality by demanding more 
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It was explained earlier that the wantedness of the pregnancy might be a  good 
predictor of sample selection. However, since the live birth selection statistic is included 
in the model along with wantedness, the wantedness measure may be capturing less of the 
sample selection and more of the true wantedness of the pregnancy. Results iadicate that 
the more the woman wanted the pregnancy, the earlier she sought prenatal care.
Generally, women of childbearing age are equipped with information from their providers 
and even the media that the early onset of prenatal care is important (although my results 
do not support this argument). Therefore, it is rational to assume that women who want a 
pregnancy are likely to receive care earlier than those who do not want the pregnancy. In 
addition, results indicate that the more prior fetal deaths the woman had, the more visits 
she makes. If a woman has a poor pregnancy history, she is likely to be concerned about 
this pregnancy. One means of addressing this concern is to seek frequent prenatal care.
The mother’s age is included as a squared and a cubed term in order to detect any 
non-linearity in prenatal care use according to age. The results indicate that all three age 
variables are significant in the white, ACOG adjusted visits equation and are almost 
significant in the onset equation (but of the reverse sign). As one might expect, the sign 
pattern switches from plus to minus back to plus. This indicates that prenatal care use 
increases at younger ages, then decreases or at least flattens at an intermediate age, then 
increases once again as the woman ages even further. This is consistent with previous 
literature that concludes young women and older women use more prenatal care that the 
average age mother. Younger women are more uncertain about the pregnancy since they 
are still maturing themselves, and older mothers are at higher risk. By evaluating the
frequent, lower quality visits.
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derivative of the cubic (i.e. age + age2 + age3) equal to zero, one can evaluate the slope of 
the function and determine the specific ages that the slope equals zero. Prenatal care use 
increases from age 15 to age 25, then decreases after age 25 until age 34, than finally 
increases again after age 34 until age 45 (the maximum age in the sample).
Results from the live birth correction statistic indicate that no significant selection 
effect exists. Finally, the results on the depression variable are of some interest although 
most of the coefficients are not statistically significant52. In all four equations in the full 
sample model the coefficient on depression is positive. This suggests that depressed 
women receive later prenatal care but more visits, although this is significant only in the 
white, visits equation. These results begin to suggest that policies should be targeted at 
reducing depressive symptoms in pregnant women. Later results found in the birth 
weight equations and in the policy simulations further support such a policy.
Birth weight
Results from the birth weight equations are moderately robust across the different 
specifications of birth weight (i.e., birth weight and term birth weight), with a few 
important differences between black and white births. The treatment effects model is 
estimated eight times, with birth weight (in grams) and term birth weight (where the 
sample is limited to gestations of at least 37 weeks) as the dependent variables, prenatal 
care measured in weeks of onset and by the ACOG adjusted number of visits, and each of 
these equations are stratified by race. Results from both the full sample and term birth 
weight sample models can be found in Tables 17 and 18
62 Insignificant results here suggest that one avenue for depression to affect birth weight is shut down.
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The coefficients on a woman’s anthropometric characteristics (mother’s  own birth 
weight, mother’s height, and child’s sex) are positive and significant in every birth weight 
equation. Warner’s (1995,1998) argument for including these characteristics is right on 
the mark. I argue that these strong results suggest two things. The first is that there is an 
intergenerational transfer of anthropometry from mother to child that is consistent with 
medical research that says genetics play a  large role in determining one’s health.
However, the second is that if genetics do play a large role in determining birth weight, 
there is less for the economist to say. While the economist is equipped with the proper 
tools to explain how income and insurance play a role, the economist is not well equipped 
in understanding the bio mechanics that explain how anthropometric characteristics are 
passed on. But, these findings are important in that they may signal medical researchers 
to continue genetics research. Additionally, the importance of improving current infant 
health (or birth weight) is heightened in light of the intergenerational transfer.
A related characteristic to anthropometry is the number of prior fetal deaths that 
the women had. Unfortunately, the data do not indicate whether the death was voluntary 
(i.e. abortion) or involuntary (i.e. miscarriage). It is therefore assumed that these deaths 
are a mixture of the two. In both the white and black birth weight equations with onset as 
the measure of prenatal care and in the black birth weight equation with the ACOG 
adjusted visits as prenatal care measure) the coefficient on the number of fetal deaths is 
negative and significant. If the fetal deaths were miscarriages, then these results indicate 
an underlying health problem. That is, i f  a woman had a previous miscarriage, and her 
child in this sample is bom at a lower birth weight, then it is reasonable to conclude that 
the woman must face some underlying health problem. She reveals a history of poorer
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birth outcomes. On the other hand, if the fetal deaths were abortions, then this becomes a 
selectivity issue. If this woman previously aborted her fetus, then on some level, she may 
value the pregnancy less and may be less likely to properly care for herself during the 
pregnancy. The result is a lower birth weight infant. However, wantedness is controlled 
for here. The only wrinkle to this story is that the coefficient on fetal deaths is positive 
and significant in the white, term birth weight equation (with onset as the prenatal care 
measure). An alternative story may be that a woman who experienced a prior fetal death 
is so aware of the adverse outcomes associated with pregnancy, that she takes extremely 
good care of herself during the pregnancy which results in a higher birth weight infant. If 
this is true, then this provides some evidence that maternal behavior may affect infant 
health.
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of 
maternal depression on birth weight. While studies (Field, 1998; Jones et al., 1997; 
Dawson et al., 1997a; Dawson et al., 1997b; Locke et al., 1997) have shown that 
depressed mothers can pass their depressed state to their infants in the form of reduced 
brain activity, no study has evaluated its impact on birth weight. In all of the black 
equations the greater the depression scale measure, the lower the birth weight. While 
depression is not significant in the white equations, it is negative throughout. One 
explanation for significant results in the black equations (but not in the white equations) 
is that there is a much higher prevalence of depression in black women. This is evident 
in the key variable means discussed earlier. A higher prevalence of depression may 
increase the significance of the standard errors although it should have no effect on the
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sign or magnitude of the coefficients. The policy implications are women of childbearing 
age should be targeted for a mental health assessment at their prenatal care visits.
The coefficient on parity is positive and significant in black and white term birth 
weight with onset and black term birth weight with ACOG adjusted visits equations. This 
seems to indicate that having had a previous pregnancy increases the birth weight of 
future bom children. This is not to say that a first bom child is not healthy, but is appears 
as though subsequent children are even more healthy.
Consistent across every birth weight equation is that neither specification of 
prenatal care is significant. These results are disappointing but not surprising, and may be 
due to several different factors. The first is a lack of poor instruments. The second is that 
many of factors aside from medical care influence one’s health. This hypothesis is argued 
in the Field model of health determinants (Blum, 1981). Blum’s paper illustrates force- 
field and well-being paradigms of health where heredity, the environment, life styles, and 
medical care all influence one’s health and well being. Therefore, medical care is only 
one piece of the puzzle and may not significantly impact health alone. A third reason 
some argue (for example, Mahan, 1996) is that the type of services provided at a prenatal 
care visit that matter rather than the visit itself. The data used in this analysis may not be 
rich enough to unravel the specific type of services offered. Nonetheless, evaluating what 
is offered at a prenatal care visit rather than quantifying prenatal care proves to be a 
valuable path of future research. A natural link to this is to further evaluate enhanced 
prenatal services, particularly ones provided by Medicaid.
The number of cigarettes smoked during the pregnancy is negative and 
significant in all birth weight equations. This is consistent with prior research and
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illustrates that maternal behavior can affect infant health. Not only does smoking reduce 
birth weight, but it also slows fetal growth. The rationale for this conclusion is the 
following. The difference between birth weight and term birth weight is that gestation is 
controlled for. If babies are bom at a lower birth weight because they are bom at a 
shorter gestation, then it cannot be deduced that the ferns is growing slower than normal. 
However, if a baby is bom at a lower birth weight but is of normal gestation, then it must 
be the case that the rate of fetal growth is slower than normal. Therefore, one can 
conclude that smoking may not necessarily reduce gestation but rather may slow down 
fetal growth. A weaker result can be found with drinking. The coefficient on drinking is 
negative and significant in only the black, term birth equations.
One of the hypotheses suggested in the theoretical model is that the quality of care 
provided under Medicaid is inferior to that of private insurance and the self-payment 
provides the lowest quality of care (due to bad debt). One way to address quality effects 
is to evaluate the effect of Medicaid and private insurance on birth weight6^ . Recall that 
self-payment is the excluded category or base case. This means that a positive coefficient 
on Medicaid or private insurance suggests lower quality care than self-payment while a 
positive coefficient indicates higher quality care. In the white birth weight equation with 
onset and in both of the black, term birth weight equations, the coefficient on Medicaid is 
negative and significant (but also negative in the white, ACOG equation). This indicates 
that the quality of care under Medicaid is inferior to the self-pay case, ceteris paribus. 
Since any selectivity bias due to participation in Medicaid is controlled for by employing 
the treatment effects model, these results should be signaling quality rather than selection.
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However, it is possible that this result is also picking up income since income does not 
appear in the birth weight equation. The policy implications of this result are important 
and the policy simulations can shed more light on this. None of the coefficients on 
private insurance are significant. This suggests that the quality of care under private 
insurance is equivalent to the self-pay case.
Finally, a discussion of the inverse Mills ratios is warranted. Though the three 
inverse Mills ratios used are included to control for sample selection, they are not 
typically significant. However, the Medicaid Mills ratio is significant (for black term 
births) suggesting a selection effect with Medicaid. However, it is their insignificance 
that has implications, particularly the live birth inverse Mills ratio. This is included to 
correct for the sample selection due to only evaluating women who experienced a live 
birth (versus all births including fetal deaths and abortions). This variable is not 
significant in any equation, although it is closer to being significant in some of the black 
equations. Grossman and Joyce (1990) find a similar pattern. I estimated all of these 
same models without the selection term, but none of the results changed significantly.
This suggests that it is not necessary to control for this type of sample selection when 
including the wanted variable. This is precisely what Warner (1998) argued. While all of 
my results can be reported without the selection correction, I choose to report those that 
include it.
Alternative models
Five alternative models are estimated in order to test further hypotheses and to 
make additional comparisons. The first two models extend the treatment effects model
63 The policy simulation more thoroughly evaluates both the direct and indirect effects of Medicaid on
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by a) addressing the exogeneity of depression and by b) including two insurance/onset 
interaction terms. The remaining three models are alternative models to the treatment 
effects model. These models include an instrumental variables model, a model that treats 
all previously defined endogenous variables as exogenous, and a pure reduced-form 
model. All five models use onset as the measure of prenatal care and birth weight as the 
measure of infant health. Additionally, separate models for blacks and whites are 
estimated.
The endogeneity of depression is also explored in the treatment effects model. A 
Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis that depression is exogenous. The procedure 
to conduct this test is rather simple. Prenatal care and birth weight equations are 
estimated with both the actual value of CESDavg and a predicted value of CESDavs. The 
predicted value is obtained from a separate OLS equation. Drug use variables are used as 
identifiers in the depression equation. The high insignificance of the predicted value of 
depression along with the significance of the actual variable is one means of determining 
that depression is not endogenous. However, a simple chi-squared statistic fails to reject 
exogeneity.
In order to further evaluate the effects of Medicaid, private insurance, and prenatal 
care in the treatment effect model interaction terms:
A  A
Medicaid * Onset and Private insurance * Onset
are included as regressors in the birth weight equation. The first interaction term reflects 
the onset of care as a function of Medicaid participation while the second reflects onset as 
a function of private insurance. These interaction terms reflect the productivity of onset
infant health
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as a function of the type of insurance participation. For example, if Medicaid provides 
lower quality care than private insurance than the productivity of onset for wornen with 
Medicaid is less productive or has less of an impact, than the productivity of onset for 
women with private insurance coverage. Results indicate that none of the interaction 
terms are statistically significant but all are of the negative sign. This suggests that the 
effect of the early onset of care is similar regardless of the type of insurance coverage, 
although self-pay may be less productive.
This dissertation employs a treatment effects model (TEM) to evaluate the direct 
effect of private insurance and Medicaid on birth weight. The TEM is chosen over an 
alternative model since it allows for the direct effect of having insurance to be captured 
while controlling for the self-selection or endogeneity of insurance. However, some 
studies capture the effect of insurance or program participation with an instrumental 
variables (IV) model. In this case, an IV model estimates the predicted probability of 
having private insurance and Medicaid and include that as the regressor in the birth 
weight equation, rather than the variable itself. Inverse mills ratios are not included in the 
IV model. For comparison, I also estimate the birth weight equation using the IV 
approach. Results can be found in Table 19.
The results are fairly robust across the TEM and IV models, with a few major 
differences. The most important difference is that Medicaid is significant in the TEM but 
not significant in the TV model. It appears as though the IV approach does not capture the 
true effect of having Medicaid. It is only capable of capturing the effect of the predicted 
probability of having Medicaid rather than actually having Medicaid. This result alone 
gives some evidence that the TEM may be a superior means of estimating the effect of
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insurance or participation in a public program on health outcomes. Alternatively, the 
ACOG number of adjusted visits is significant in one specification of the IV model, but is 
not significant in any specification of the TEM.
I also estimate the birth weight equations treating prenatal care, Medicaid, and 
private insurance exogenously. These results are found in Table 20. If the results change 
significantly across the two specifications (endogenous and exogenous models) then this 
may suggest simultaneity bias64 and that it is necessary to endogenize these variables.
Two examples (although there are more) of simultaneity bias are adverse and positive 
selection. If women who expect problem pregnancies begin care earlier then adverse 
selection exists. If women with healthy behaviors begin care earlier then positive 
selection exists. Results show that ACOG65 is significant in the exogenous model, 
suggesting the existence of simultaneity bias. In this case, it is possible that simultaneity 
bias may over inflate the true effect of an endogenous variable. Medicaid is no longer 
significant in the black equations. This suggests that self-selection may be canceling out 
quality effects. Depression continues to be significant and is reasonably robust.
Although the significance and sign patterns of many of the variables are robust across 
models, a few of the key variables (like prenatal care and Medicaid) are different. This 
suggests that it may be appropriate to include these variables are endogenous.
Finally, pure reduced-form birth weight equations are estimated for whites and 
blacks. The results of these can be found in Table 21. These equations are estimated in 
part to compare to the results found in Currie and Gruber (1996b). Currie and Gruber use 
aggregate data to evaluate the impact of Medicaid eligibility on the incidence of low birth
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weight and infant mortality. They estimate reduced-form models where eligibility enters 
directly into the infant health equations. They find that an increase in Medicaid eligibility 
lowers the incidence of low birth weight. Results from my model indicate that eligibility 
does not have a statistically significant effect on birth weight for either blacks or whites.
In support of my results, I argue that eligibility enters into the model in complex and non­
linear ways and that is the reason that the treatment effects model is estimated. By 
entering eligibility directly into an infant health equation, one can only capture the linear 
effect of eligibility on birth weight. A further discussion of these results can be found in 
the next chapter.
Special study: Poor birth outcomes
There is currently a great deal of interest in understanding the correlates of low 
birth weight (less than 2500 grams/5.51 lbs.) infants as well as pre-term (less than 37 
weeks gestation) deliveries. I estimate the treatment effects model twice more (actually 
eight times more stratifying by race and using both prenatal care measures) with low birth 
weight (a dummy variable indicating the incidence of low birth weight) and term low 
birth weight (a dummy variable indicating low birth weight in pregnancies where the 
gestation is greater than 37 weeks) as the dependent variables in the birth weight 
equation.
The results of low birth weight and term low birth weight can be found in Tables 
22 and 23. Overall, the results do not differ significantly from the birth weight and term 
birth weight models. Surprisingly, neither specification of prenatal care is significant in
64 Simultaneity bias occurs when the variable is correlated with the error of the dependent variable.
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any of the models. However, the coefficients (except one) are all of the expected sign. 
The earlier the onset and the greater the number of visits, the lower the probability of 
having a low birth weight infant. While one might suspect that prenatal care does not 
matter for healthy women, it was expected that it may matter for women with adverse 
health outcomes (i.e. low birth weight children). One explanation mentioned before is 
that the instruments included in the prenatal care equations are less than ideal. The lack 
of poor instruments may be driving the result. Another explanation may be that other 
factors such as a woman's anthropometric characteristics, prior pregnancy history, and 
behaviors such as smoking may explain most of the variation in birth weight.
Depression also does not have a significant impact on either low birth weight or 
on term low birth weight. However, in 7 of 8 equations, depression has a positive effect 
on the incidence of low birth weight. This means that the greater depression score 
increases the probability of low birth weight. The consistency of these results indicates 
that depression may have a systematic effect on infant health. These results, although 
insignificant, yield some evidence that the link between depression and infant health 
should be investigated further.
Another important result is that Medicaid participation seems to impart a low 
quality effect by increasing the incidence of low birth weight (for whites) and by reducing 
overall birth weights. These results are unlikely due to selection since the treatment 
effects model controls for selection. One possible explanation discussed earlier is that 
since Medicaid providers see such a large volume of patients they may more likely 
misdiagnose a pregnancy complication which may result in lower birth weight children.
65 This model is also estimated with ACOG as an alternative measure o f prenatal care.
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The purpose of evaluating the incidence of low birth weight is to determine not 
only the correlates of low birth weight, but to test whether those variables expected to 
impact infant health but are not significant in the birth weight specification, do 
significantly impact the incidence of low birth weight. The expectation is that there may 
be more that can be done for preventing low birth weight infants. However, the results 
show little difference between the correlates of birth weight, in general, and the incidence 
of low birth weight.
Conclusion
There are several interesting findings in the treatment effects model. One of the 
most important contributions of this dissertation is that depression is modeled into the 
production of infant health framework. This is the first study to recognize a woman's 
state of mental health in this context. Depression is found to significantly affect 
Medicaid and private insurance participation, the number of visits obtained during the 
pregnancy, but most importantly, birth weight. Results show that a higher depression 
score reduces birth weight, although this effect is not always significant. While other 
studies have shown that depressed mothers may pass on their depressed state in the form 
of reduced brain activity to their newborns, this is the first study to show some evidence 
that depression may also affect birth weight. In light of these findings, a depression 
simulation is conducted in the following chapter with the purpose of further exploring 
these findings. Evidence from the simulations supports these findings.
Depression has effects as early as the prenatal care and health insurance stage. 
Depressed women are more likely to have Medicaid and less likely to have private
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Depression has effects as early as the prenatal care and health insurance stage. 
Depressed women are more likely to have Medicaid and less likely to have private 
insurance. These results suggest two things. The first is that depressed women may have 
a more difficult time securing private insurance through employment. If depressed 
women are treated for depression, then they may be more likely to secure empl oyment 
with benefits. Alternatively, it may be the case that privately insured women receive 
better treatment for depression. Perhaps some of the women who responded as not being 
depressed had been depressed previously but had already been treated.
My results consistently show that prenatal care does not have a significant effect 
on infant health. This result is not entirely inconsistent with other results found in the 
literature, although some studies do find that prenatal care, in one form or another, has a 
significant effect on birth weight. However, the Field model of health determinants 
explains that medical care is only one factor in a set of several important factors that 
affect health. It may be that prenatal care along with health behaviors, a healthy 
environment, and good genetics all contribute to good health. My results indicate that 
smoking and to a lesser extent drinking are found to reduce birth weight and increase the 
incidence of low birth weight. This result, unlike the results from prenatal care, show that 
a woman’s lifestyle and behaviors can affect infant health. Another important result is 
that almost across the board, a woman's anthropometric characteristics affect birth weight. 
Much can be determined about the birth weight of a child from a woman's own birth 
weight and her own height. This is a reasonable conclusion. These results all indicate 
that some aspects of infant health cannot be directly affected by policy (anthropometry
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matters), while other aspects may be affected, but in a different matter than we may have 
thought.




One of the most important policy issues of the past decade has been to develop an 
efficient policy tool that alleviates the number of uninsured people in the United States. 
Policymakers believe that greater access to health care coverage leads to more 
appropriate utilization of health care services and thus, more favorable health outcomes. 
In the context of this dissertation, this tenet suggests that greater access to prenatal care 
brings about increased demand for prenatal care and produces healthier infants. This 
tenet does not go without factual evidence. There is some weak evidence that indicates 
that adequate prenatal care does produce healthier infants (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982, 
1983; Grossman & Joyce, 1990; Warner 1995, 1998). This contrasts to my finding that 
prenatal care has no impact on health outcomes. In addition, some studies have shown 
that one of the primary reasons that women demand less than adequate prenatal care is 
because they cannot afford it (Torres & Kenney, 1989). One way that Congress 
responded to this issue was by expanding the eligibility requirements for Medicaid. In 
the mid-1980’s most states provided Medicaid only to the poorest pregnant women and 
children with incomes far below the federal poverty level (FPL). Today, the federal 
Medicaid income eligibility floor is set at 185% of the FPL with some states extending 
eligibility as high as 400% of the FPL.
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Despite studies like Torres and Kenney (1989), expanding eligibility requirements 
alone may not ensure better health outcomes if newly eligible women do not actually 
participate. While states are allocating additional resources toward Medicaid outreach 
programs and toward simplifying programmatic enrollment, not all women that are 
eligible participate66. On the other hand, some individuals shift away from the ir private 
insurance coverage into Medicaid upon becoming eligible. The policy simulation finds 
some evidence of this.
This dissertation seeks to evaluate the impact of expanding Medicaid income 
eligibility requirements on prenatal care demand and birth weight. Using the recursive 
treatment effects model of prenatal care onset and birth weight, I conduct a policy 
simulation that evaluates the impact of expanding Medicaid from the 1988 income 
eligibility levels to the 1997 levels. This policy simulation is an improvement over other 
studies in the literature since it takes into account all of the different channels that a 
change in eligibility may have on birth weight. A change in eligibility may affect the 
probability of having Medicaid or private insurance. The change in these probabilities 
may then directly affect birth weight and may indirectly effect birth weight through its 
effect on prenatal care. The simulation captures all of these channels. In addition, another 
favorable aspect of this method is that Medicaid participation is not forced upon an 
individual. I estimate the predicted probability that a woman participates in Medicaid and 
private insurance rather than haphazardly assigning some women to Medicaid and others 
to private insurance. Evidence has shown that not all women who are Medicaid eligible 
participate. Keeping this in mind, I also estimate Medicaid take-up rates (the rate at
66 See Table 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
which eligible women participate) of the women in the NMEHS sample, stratifying the 
analysis by race. Finally, simulating the effects of a change in eligibility allows for 
making a gross estimate of crowding out. Both the take-up rate and the rate of crowding 
out are compared to results found in the literature.
This study is not without caveats. Studies such as Guyer (1990) suggest that 
unless women are given a more comprehensive set of prenatal care services, reducing the 
financial barriers alone by expanding Medicaid eligibility will most likely not affect birth 
outcomes. Gold, Singh, and Frost (1993) indicate that the majority of states have 
introduced new Medicaid prenatal care programs that offer enhanced prenatal services. 
Specifically, they report that in 1992, thirty-eight states financially covered at least one 
augmented prenatal service to Medicaid recipients. There are seven services67 that fall 
under the enhanced prenatal services category: 1) care coordination and case 
management, 2) psychosocial risk assessment, 3) nutrition counseling, 4) health 
education, 5) psychosocial counseling, 6) home visiting and 7) transportation to a prenatal 
care provider. Unfortunately, the NMIHS are not rich enough to evaluate the type of 
enhanced services that may be offered. I only mention these programs to make the reader 
aware that other policies, aside from the income eligibility expansions, have changed over 
time.
A second caveat to the validity of these simulations is that they do not account for 
the widespread shift of Medicaid into managed care. The entire Medicaid climate has 
changed in the past decade. It is estimated (in 1998) that 54% of the Medicaid population
67 Gold, R.B., Singh, S. and J. Frost, “The Medicaid Eligibility Expansions for Pregnant Women:
Evaluating the Strength of State Implementation Efforts”, Family Planning Perspectives, 25(5): 196-207, 
1993.
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in enrolled in some type of managed care (HCFA, 1999). The transition into managed 
care not only by the privately insured but particularly by Medicaid clients during this time 
period (1988-1997) is a natural experiment in itself. Several studies that were discussed 
earlier (Felt-Lisk & St. Peter, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1997; Welch & Wade, 1995) indicate 
that the higher quality and different scope of coverage provided to Medicaid clients is due 
to the transition into managed care. However, Rosenbaum (1997) indicates that many 
clients are transitioning into "dual" coverage that may actually be less comprehensive. In 
reality, changes in prenatal care use and health outcomes may be attributed to the 
transition into managed care rather than to the eligibility expansions themselves. I must 
stress that this simulation only evaluates the impact of a change in eligibility and nothing 
else. Nonetheless, this policy simulation sheds light on whether Congress' intent to 
improve health outcomes via this policy tool can be successful.
As previously mentioned, my results indicate that prenatal care does not impact 
birth weight. However, depression is shown to have a significant effect on birth weight 
such that women with a greater number of depressive symptoms bear infants of lower 
birth weight. This finding may suggest that one effective policy tool for addressing the 
incidence of low birth weight is to reduce maternal depressive symptoms. In light of this 
finding, I conduct policy simulations that illustrate the effect of treating depression. 
Literature has shown that a CES-D score greater than 16 indicates depressive symptoms. 
Therefore by censoring all CES-D scores that are greater than 16 to only 16 in essence 
treats women who are depressed. Using the treatment effects model, the policy 
simulation evaluates the effect of "treating depression" or censoring all CES-D scores to 
16 or less on the predicted probability of Medicaid and private insurance, and on the
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predicted values on prenatal care and birth weight. The only real difference between the 
depression simulation and the eligibility expansions simulation is that the depression 
variable changes rather than the eligibility variable.
Federal legislation on the Medicaid program and eligibility68
Medicaid, established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, is a federal- 
state matching entitlement program that provides medical care for needy individuals and 
low-income families. While the federal government establishes broad guidelines for 
Medicaid, each state establishes its own eligibility guidelines, determines the scope of 
services, sets the rate of payment for services and administers its own program (US 
DHHS 1997). Since Medicaid is administered by states, Medicaid programs can vary 
considerably across states. In some instances, an individual who is eligible to receive 
Medicaid in one state may not be eligible in another state. This is one reason why 
considerable attention is paid to evaluating the Medicaid program on a state by state basis 
rather than as a federal program. Nonetheless, several significant changes in federal 
legislation have taken place in the past two decades that have influenced Medicaid 
expansions at the state level.
The Medicaid program was initially created as a supplementary medical program 
to the cash assistance programs for the poor - particularly for children and their mothers. 
Early legislation forged a strong link between eligibility levels for the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Medicaid programs. However, over the course 
of the past two decades, eligibility has been expanded in two major ways. The first class
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of expansions extend eligibility to several groups of non-AFDC individuals, including the 
medically needy and Medicare beneficiaries, that were not eligible under the initial rules. 
The second class of expansions increased income eligibility thresholds such that many 
pregnant women and children under age 19 with incomes above the federal poverty level 
are now eligible69.
The first set of Medicaid expansions in the early- to mid-1980s focused on 
expanding Medicaid to include additional groups of women. Under the initial program 
rules, only single mothers with children70 were eligible. In 1984, Medicaid was expanded 
to include low-income women pregnant women with their first child (i.e. not yet mothers) 
as well as to married pregnant women whose husbands were unemployed. The 1984 
expansions were extended even further in 1985 when Medicaid was open to all low- 
income pregnant women regardless of family structure. While these additional groups of 
women became eligible in the early- to mid-1980s, the income eligibility requirements 
were still quite stringent. For example, up until 1986, states such as Alabama required 
that a family's income was restricted to 15.5% of the FPL. This means that for a family of 
three to be eligible for Medicaid in Alabama in 1986, their income was restricted to 
$1,414.
68 This summary was taken from a variety of papers including Howell, E.M. and Ellwood, M.R. (1991). 
Medicaid and pregnancy: Issues in expanding eligibility. Family Planning Perspectives. 23(31. 123-128.
69 Since many of the Medicaid eligibility rules are based on a family's income as a percentage of the federal 
poverty level (FPL), a brief discussion of this is necessary. The FPL or poverty guidelines used for
administrative purposes are issued each year in the Federal Register by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services. While the 48 contiguous states use the same FPL, Alaska and Hawaii each have their own 
FPL. In addition, not only does the dollar value of the FPL increase each year, the FPL varies by the 
number of individuals in a household. For example, in 1988, the FPL for a family o f three living in one of 
the 48 contiguous states was 59,690; in Alaska it was 512,110 and 511,150 in Hawaii (Federal Register 
1988). In 1998. for a family of three, the FPLs are 513,650. S17.070 and 515,700, respectively. For a 
family o f 8, the FPLs are 527,650, S34.570 and S31,800, respectively. A complete list o f the FPLs for all 
50 states from 1986-1998 can be found in Appendix 2.
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The first major income eligibility expansion occurred in 1986. The Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 gave states the option to cover all pregnant 
women up to 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL). For that same family o f  three in 
Alabama, they could earn up to $9,120 and be eligible for Medicaid. One year later in 
1987, states had the option of extending eligibility up to 185% of the FPL for pregnant 
women and for women up to 60 days post-partum. By 1990, a federal eligibility floor 
was established such that states were required to cover all pregnant women with incomes 
up to 133% of the FPL. A complete list of state by state Medicaid eligibility guidelines 
since 1986 can be found in Table 24.
During the mid-1980s and early 1990's there were a few significant income- 
related expansion policies that were implemented as part of the Medicaid program. Until 
this time, a family's assets were counted as income used in determining eligibility. One 
policy change that took place was that assets were no longer included in determining 
eligibility. In essence, this policy raised the income eligibility threshold for families. A 
second income-related policy was the establishment of the "continuous eligibility" rule. 
This rule permits a participant to remain on Medicaid for a certain period of time beyond 
which she is eligible for when her income rises above the eligibility threshold. This 
means that if a woman participated in Medicaid and her income increased (at a future 
date) beyond the income eligibility threshold, she would still be eligible for Medicaid for 
a short period of time thereafter. This rule essentially establishes a pseudo grace period. 
However, it is applied in only three specific situations. The first is that Medicaid covers a 
woman's entire pregnancy regardless of her change in income (Gold et al. 1993). The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
second [and a more recent policy established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
Medicaid Provisions] is that an individual under the age of 19 is guaranteed 12 months of 
continuous Medicaid eligibility once she is determined eligible. Finally, infants are 
covered for one year beyond the time that the mother is eligible. A third rule that was 
passed is called presumptive eligibility. This allows a woman easier access to prenatal 
care. She automatically qualifies for Medicaid covered prenatal care on the spot if she 
seems likely to qualify. While these expansions are important and have real implications, 
my analysis only fully captures a change in income eligibility and may not capture these 
other changes.
Recent waivers
During this era of Medicaid expansions, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) introduced two types of waivers: the Section 1115 waiver or 
Research and Development waiver and the Section 1915(b) waiver or the Freedom of 
Choice waiver. The Section 1115 waiver allows states to design budget-neutral, 
innovative approaches to containing increasing costs as well as expanding Medicaid to 
the uninsured. The Section 1915(b) waiver permits states to implement Medicaid 
managed care to the extent that they find it cost-effective, efficient, and not inconsistent 
with the Social Security Act. The 1915(b) waiver also requires that states must arrange 
for an independent evaluation (by a state university, etc.) of their managed care program.
70 With certain exceptions, low-income children under the age o f 19 are eligible for Medicaid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
As of June 1998,17 states have at least one Section 1115 waiver (i.e. some states have 
multiple programs) and 36 states have at least one Section 1915(b) waiver71.
The result of these waivers is that Medicaid has been transformed into the 
managed care climate. As of June 1998, 54% or 16.6 million Medicaid recipients are 
enrolled in some form of managed care. The Medicaid managed care population has 
almost quadrupled in numbers since 1993. While some states have over 90% o f their 
Medicaid population in managed care (CO, IA, MT, TN, UT, WA), other states have less 
than 6% in managed care (AK, LA, SC, WY)72. These numbers reinforce the importance 
of analyzing Medicaid data by state. The hope is that the move to managed care offers 
the opportunity for states to improve access to and provide higher quality care in 
established provider networks, as well as contain costs ((Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans, & 
Rangarajan, 1998). But some are skeptical of an improvement in care and continuity due 
to dual coverage and carve-outs. That is, managed care organizations (MCOs) may not 
cover a comprehensive set of services that is equivalent to traditional Medicaid coverage. 
Therefore, many Medicaid managed care recipients are dually covered. They receive 
basic coverage from the MCO, but residual services from the state plan. Rosenbaum 
(1997) argues that this type of dual coverage may be confusing to clients, resulting in 
clients going without some benefits. While many aspects of Medicaid are changing due 
to the introduction into managed care, these aspects are not captured in this dissertation.
71 States with 1115 waivers are: AL,AZ,CA,DE,DC.HI,KT,MD,MA,MN,NY,OH,OK,OR,RI,TN,VT.
States with 1915(b) waivers are:
AL,AR,CA,CO,CT,DC,FL,GA,ID,IN,IO,KS,KT,LA,ME,MI,MN,MS,MO,MT,NE,NJ.NM.NY,NC,ND,OR. 
PA,SC,TX,UT,VA,WA,WY,WI,WY. Health Care Financing Administration (1999, May 10.) National 
summary of state Medicaid managed care programs as of June 30, 1998. Health Care Financing 
Administration [Online], Available: http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/nstoc98.htm 
7" Various locations at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/
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My data is from 1988 when many of these changes had not yet taken place. Besides, the 
NMIHS merely indicates whether a woman has Medicaid or not. There would be no way 
to fully account for any shift toward managed care that may have occurred by L988. With 
a richer and more current data set, perhaps these very interesting issues could be 
addressed.
Federal and state outreach efforts
Along with these tremendous changes in Medicaid, federal Medicaid legislation 
has focused on improving "real" Medicaid access to women73. During the wave of 
Medicaid expansions, Congress granted states the right to directly enroll eligible women 
(recipients) in the Medicaid program (Gold, Singh, & Frost 1993). Prior to this policy 
called outstationing, women were restricted to enroll in the Medicaid program at a state 
welfare office. While it may not be apparent how this policy increases access to 
Medicaid, from a pragmatic perspective, it allows an uninsured woman the opportunity to 
gain access to insurance just by seeking a visit at a health care facility such as a 
community health center or hospital. While women that participate in AFDC/TANF will 
already be familiar with Medicaid, many other women may not be aware of their 
eligibility and would never think that a trip to the state welfare office can provide them 
with health insurance.
Many states have embraced the opportunity to provide outstationing and other 
Medicaid outreach programs in order to increase Medicaid caseloads. Table 5 illustrates 
these states efforts. By 1992, 36 states engaged in some type of media outreach program 
while 48 states posted Medicaid eligibility and enrollment information in at least one
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location. For the most part, outreach programs entail posting flyers in various locations 
throughout the state such as churches, hospitals and stores as well as public service 
announcements on radio and television detailing information on eligibility and ease of 
enrollment. The goal of these programs is to inform the public that, unbeknownst to 
them, they may already be eligible to receive Medicaid.
Medicaid eligibility v. take-up rate
One of the primary goals of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact o f 
expanding Medicaid income eligibility on prenatal care and birth weight. However, as 
several studies have shown, eligibility is not necessarily synonymous with participation. 
Even if a woman is eligible to receive Medicaid, it does not mean that she participates. In 
response to this dilemma, the federal government has taken several measures (discussed 
previously) to reform the Medicaid program so that more women have "real" access. 
Nonetheless, the problem still persists.
Prior to embarking upon the more rigorous policy simulation, a gross estimate of 
the Medicaid take-up rate is measured. Recall that the take-up rate is the percent of all 
Medicaid eligible women who actually participate. If the take-up rate is 100%, then all 
women who are eligible participate. If the take-up rate is 50%, then only half of all 
women who are eligible participate. The latter percentage paints a more realistic picture 
of estimated take-up rates found in the literature.
Using data from the 1988 NMIHS, I calculate the Medicaid take-up (participation) 
rate for samples of white and black of pregnant women that experienced a live birth. This
73 However, none of these programs were really in place by 1988 - the year that the NMIHS was conducted.
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analysis requires several steps of calculations74. First, women are stratified by state of 
residence and household size. These are the two primary criteria (along with household 
income) in determining Medicaid eligibility75. Second, each woman's household income 
is compared to the Medicaid income eligibility level of that household size and state. If a 
woman's income is no greater than the eligibility threshold, then she is considered to be 
Medicaid eligible. From these calculations, the percentage of women in the sample that 
are eligible to receive Medicaid is determined. Finally, for the women that are deemed 
eligible, it is determined whether or not they participated in Medicaid during their 
pregnancy. The greater the number of women that were eligible and participated, the 
higher the take-up rate. Results of these calculations can be found in Table 25.
11.5%76 of white women surveyed in the NMIHS are income eligible to receive 
Medicaid. Of those who are eligible, 51.4% participate. This means that roughly half of 
all white women who are eligible to receive Medicaid participate. This rate falls within 
the scope of other estimates in the literature [see Table 4]. For black women, 40.6% are 
eligible to receive Medicaid. Of those who are eligible, 72.1 % actually participate. 
Proportionally, not only are more black women Medicaid eligible, they are also more 
likely to participate in the Medicaid program. The first result is not too surprising since 
black women tend to have lower household incomes than white women do. There are 
several potential explanations that may explain the second result. One hypothesis is that
74 See Appendix 4 for an example of this calculation.
72 This estimate is not without error. Another requirement that has been relaxed considerably but still exists 
to some extent is the assets test. In some cases, a household's assets including an automobile may be used in 
determining eligibility. The estimate calculated here assumes the assets test away. Additionally, the 
eligibility guidelines used to calculate this estimate are taken from April 1987 to January 1999. It is 
plausible that the guidelines used here underestimate eligibility since many of the guidelines are taken from 
1987 but eligibility is determined using 1988 data. Cutler and Gruber (1996) also impute Medicaid 
eligibility and acknowledge the difficulty in doing so without substantial measurement error.
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black women may have greater knowledge of the Medicaid program since they 
traditionally have had a greater propensity to live in low-income households. Another 
hypothesis may be that black women tend to view the welfare stigma in a different way 
that white women do. Nonetheless, the take-up rate results indicate that expanding 
Medicaid eligibility can be an effective means at insuring the uninsured.
Policy simulation I: Expanding Medicaid income eligibility
I conduct a policy simulation to determine whether Medicaid eligibility 
expansions improve prenatal care utilization and more importantly, infant health 
outcomes. I utilize the parameter estimates already obtained from the treatment effects 
model, with birth weight as the infant health measure and onset as the measure of prenatal 
care, to predict the effect of “turning on” Medicaid eligibility for a newly eligible group 
of women. Both the black and white models are used. In 1988, the average state 
Medicaid program covered pregnant women and children whose household incomes did 
not exceed 100% of the FPL. I expand the eligibility requirements to the 1997 levels (see 
Table 24 or Appendix 3) and simulate the effects on prenatal care demand and birth 
weight. By “turning on” Medicaid eligibility for this new group of women one can 
compare the moments and distributions of the predicted outcome measures before and 
after the policy change in order to predict the success of the policy.
One important element to note is that expanding Medicaid eligibility to a new 
group of women does not directly translate into participation by these women. We see 
this by the less than 100% Medicaid take-up rate. An important feature of the policy
76 This number suggests that the percent of eligible women is underestimated.
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simulation (and a contribution to the literature) is that it does not impose participation on 
an individual. The simulation only estimates the probability that a woman wilL participate 
given more lenient eligibility standards. That is, using the parameter estimates already 
obtained from previous estimations, the model uses a woman's characteristics to predict 
the probability is she participates upon becoming eligible. Technically, the model 
predicts whether a woman participates under the 1988 rules and the 1997 mles, then 
compares the results in terms of their impact on prenatal care and birth weight.
Recognize that the only data that I actually have (and use) from 1997 is the dollar 
eligibility amount. All of the woman's characteristics are taken from 1988. Below are the 
series of steps used to conduct the policy simulation. Since the simulation requires many 
steps, each major step is sectioned off according to the insurance, prenatal care, and birth 
weight equations. (Note that each step is conducted for both blacks and whites). 
Computing the predicted probability of Medicaid and Insurance
The predicted probabilities of Medicaid and insurance illustrate how likely it is 
that a woman participates in the program, given a vector of her own personal as well as 
state level characteristics. The simulation here is that one of the state level characteristics 
is allowed to change over time. Specifically, the dollar income eligibility threshold for 
Medicaid changes from 1988 (the sample period) to 1997. For example, for a household 
of three in New Jersey, income eligibility rises from $9,690 in 1988 to S24,661 in 1997. 
The policy simulation simulates the effect of this increase on the predicted probability 
that a woman participates in Medicaid or private insurance. It is expected that as income 
eligibility rises, a woman is more likely to participate in Medicaid but is less likely to 
participate in private insurance. Results from Chapter III confirm this. If in fact overall
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Medicaid participation rises while private insurance participation falls, then crowding out 
occurs.
The first step is to obtain the predicted or fitted values of Medicaid and private 
insurance from the Stage Two equations of the treatment effects model:
A  A
Medicaidms, Insurance19SS
In order to compute the predicted probability of Medicaid and insurance in 1988 (the 
variables shown above are only the predicted values), the standard normal distribution 
must be evaluated:
X ) = Pr(Medicaidi9ss =1),  PI X ) = Pr(Insurancel9SS =1)
Note that the /3s differ between Medicaid and insurance. To compute these probabilities 
for Medicaid and insurance in 1997, 1988 eligibility must be subtracted from the 
predicted value, while the 1997 eligibility must be added to the predicted value:
A A A  A
P mc -*-1997 =  P \tc •t i988 ~ P m\ eligibilityiggg + P i eligibility W91
A A A  A
P p i  •*•1997 P p i  •*•1988 P p i  e l i g i b i l i t y P  p i  eligibilityl9 9 7  
Finally, the standard normal distribution of the above can be evaluated and the following 
obtained:
X 97) = Pr(Medicaidi99- =1),  0 ( /3 ’Pl X „ ) = Pr(Insurance1997 =1)  
Results77 from the white model indicate the following:
77 Note that these probabilities are on the high side. While it is not entirely clear why, one explanation may 
be that women who are predicted to have Medicaid may have a very high probability (like 0.9) while 
women who are not predicted to have Medicaid may have a reasonably high probability o f (like 0.4). If a 
cutoff of 0.5 (where probabilities of less than 0.5 are a assigned a 0, probabilities of greater than 0.5 are 
assigned a 1), then this estimate will be high as seen by my estimates.
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Pr(Medicaid wss = 1) =  .5290, Px(Medicaid 1997 = 1) =  .6975
A  A
Pr(Insurancewss = 1) = .7653, Pr(Insurance\wi = 1) = .7132 
The probability of participating in Medicaid increased from 52.90% in 1988 to 69.75% in 
1997, with an increase of 16.85%. All of the simulation results can be found in Table 26. 
The eligibility expansions are predicted to have a huge effect on increasing participation 
in Medicaid. Recognize that the expansions are targeted at low-income individuals who 
are not currently insured. If women who were previously uninsured accounted for the full 
16.85% increase, then increasing eligibility is the appropriate policy tool to use in order to 
alleviate uninsurance in the US. However, at the same time that Medicaid rose, the 
probability of having private insurance fell from 76.53% in 1988 to 71.32% in 1997, or a 
decrease of 5.21%. This result reveals that part of the increase in Medicaid may be due to 
a decrease in private insurance. This is crowding out. Specifically, 30.92%78 of the 
increase in Medicaid may be due to crowding out. In a sample from the March Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) from 1988-1993, Cutler and Gruber (1996) estimate the rate of 
crowding out to be 31%. This rate is identical to the rate computed here. In a related 
paper using the CPS as well, Dubay and Kenney's (1997a) estimate of crowding out is 
45%. While my estimate is quite similar to both of these papers, my estimate is only for a 
sample of white women whereas both of theirs include a mix of races.
Results from the black model are the following:
Pr( Medicaid ms = 1) =  .6645, Pr( Medicaid 1997 = 1) = .8020
A  A
Pr(Insurancem& = 1) = .6031, Pr(Insurancew97 = 1) = .5343
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These results indicate that, in general, a greater percentage of black women (than white 
women) are likely to participate in Medicaid, while a greater percentage of white women 
are likely to have private insurance. Possible hypotheses discussed earlier were that 
demographics such as income, education, and industry may account for much o f the 
difference. Also, the welfare stigma may be regarded as a different cost to black women 
than white women or black women may be more aware of welfare programs, increasing 
the probability of Medicaid participation. Medicaid participation is predicted to rise from 
66.45% in 1988 to 80.20% in 1997, with an increase of 13.75%. The probability of 
having private insurance fell from 60.31% in 1988 to 53.43% in 1997, with a decrease of 
6 .88%.
These estimates indicate that 50.03% of the increase in Medicaid participation 
may be due to a decrease in private insurance participation. This illustrates that the 
crowding out rate is larger for blacks than for whites. Such a large rate of crowding out 
signals a few different possibilities. Stratifying the sample by race may be very revealing. 
When the white and black rates of crowding out are simply averaged, the overall 
crowding out rate is 40.48%. This estimate falls in between the one found by Cutler and 
Gruber (1996) and the one computed by Dubay and Kenney (1997a). Therefore, it is 
possible that the rates computed here are on par with others in the literature. But why are 
blacks much more likely to drop their private insurance than whites? For one thing, these 
are only rough estimates of crowding out using only the most simplistic of eligibility 
rules. It is possible that a more detailed account of the eligibility rules would yield 
different results. However, it is plausible that blacks, in general, are in lower paying
78 This percentage is computed by the following: 5.21/16.85 = 30.92.
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industries and occupations, where the private insurance plans offered are less generous 
than in higher paying industries. This suggests that policies should be targeted at lower- 
income workers who are marginally accessible to private insurance. One example of a 
policy might be to increase the incentives to this population to maintain a private 
insurance plan. The state Medicaid program could partially subsidize private insurance 
premiums. For example, if Medicaid expects to spend S500 per year on each client, then 
the Medicaid program may be willing to subsidize insurance premiums by $100 per 
"potential'' client in order to keep caseloads down.
Computing the predicted values for the onset of prenatal care
This next phase of the policy simulation is to predict the onset of prenatal care 
under the 1988 and 1997 eligibility rules and compare their predictions. Differences 
between the two predictions may be attributed to the indirect effect from the change in 
eligibility on the predicted probabilities of Medicaid and private insurance.
The first step in this section of the simulation is to obtain the predicted value of 




This value can be obtained from the following equation:
A A A  A  A  A
Onset1988 = Onset m s— f iol M edicaid— P Q2 insurance- (3 Q3 XMC -  0 O4 XPI +
A A A  A
/301 Pr(Medicaid) im + j3oz Pr(Insurance) l9S8 
In order to account for the predicted probabilities of Medicaid and private insurance that 
were previously constructed, the actual values of Medicaid and private insurance along
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with their associated inverse Mills ratios must be subtracted from the predicted value of 
the onset of care while the new predicted values are added. Notice that the coefficients 
on the predicted probabilities of Medicaid and insurance are the same coefficients as the 
ones on the actual Medicaid and insurance variables. The original coefficients are used 
so that the model is not re-estimated. Similarly, the predicted value of onset in 1997 can 
be computed replacing the 1988 predicted values with the 1997 predicted values:
A A A  A  A  A
O n s e t s  =O nseti988— p ol M edicaid— f tQ2 insurance— f toz XMC — j30i Xpl +
A A A  A
P 0l Pv(Medicaid) 1997 +  /3G2 Pr(Insurance) l997
The white results from this stage of the policy simulation reveal the following:
A  A
Onsetiggs =8.3734, Onsetmi =8.4309 
The predicted value of onset increased from 8.37 weeks in 1988 to 8.43 weeks in 1997, 
with an overall increase of less than half of a day. While an increase in the onset of care 
is an adverse outcome, there is no "real" increase here. The difference suggested here is 
about a dramatic as having an afternoon appointment rather than a morning appointment. 
The results shown thus far suggest that as eligibility becomes more generous and moves 
more women into Medicaid and fewer women into private insurance, the onset of prenatal 
care begins at relatively the same time. Increasing eligibility to whites has no real effect 
on the onset of prenatal care.
The black results are as follows:
Onsetms = 9 .7840 ,  O n s e t s  = 9.4979 
The predicted value of onset decreased from 9.78 weeks in 1988 to 9.50 weeks in 1997, 
with an overall decrease of roughly 2 days. It is clear that the impact of eligibility is
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greater for blacks than whites and is of some limited policy significance. Whil e a 
decrease of two days suggests that a woman may seek care earlier in the week rather than 
later in the week, this result may also suggest that more generous eligibility expansions 
may reduce the onset of care further for blacks. Most interesting to note is that blacks 
begin prenatal care almost an entire week later than whites, on average. Therefore, an 
increase in eligibility seems to level the playing field a bit for blacks. This is certainly a 
result of policy interest. It would be interesting to track this statistic as eligibility expands 
over time.
Computing the predicted values for birth weight
The final phase of the policy simulation is to compare the predicted values of birth 
weight before and after the eligibility expansion. The difference in the predicted birth 
weight may be attributed not only to the predicted probabilities of Medicaid and 
insurance but also to the new predicted time of onset. This is the primary reason for 
conducting the simulation (or advancement over simply dropping in eligibility into a birth 
weight equation) - to capture both the direct and indirect means at which a change in 
eligibility may effect birth weight.
A similar procedure (to the onset procedure) is used to predict the 1988 and 1997 
values of birth weight. The only real addition to this section (versus the computation of 
predicted onset) is that the actual onset of prenatal care must be subtracted and the 
predicted value of onset must be added to birth weight. The computation of predicted
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birth weight in 1988 is given below:
i M CBirthweight 1988 =  Birthweigfc 1988— /3gl M edicaid—f iB1 insurance— (3B3X*
A  A  A  A  A  A
-  f lB4 XPI +  (3m Medicaid19s8+ (3B2 Insurance™*- p  BS onset
A  A
+  j3 BS onset™*
Similarly, the predicted value of birth weight in 1997 can be computed by the following:
A  A  A  A  A
Birthweight 1997 =  Birthweight 198g-  (5B1 M edicaid— (3B2 insurance— (3B3 X^
A  A  A  A  A  A
-  (3 B4 XPI +  (3bx Medicaidl997+  (3B2 Insurance1997-  (3BS onset
A  A
+  j3 BS onset™i
The white results from the final stage of the policy simulation reveal the following:
Birthweight 19g8 = 3001. 8175 , Birthweight 1997 = 2951.3537
The predicted value of birth weight decreased from 3001.82 in 1988 to 2951.35 in 1997, 
with an overall decrease of 50.47 grams. While this result seems shocking at first since 
birth weight actually declines, it is not so shocking in light of the fact that other results in 
this dissertation have shown that Medicaid participation seems to lead to adverse 
outcomes. Favorable results, however, are indicated by an increase in birth weight in the 
black population. The black results are the following:
Birthw eigh l9g8 =2867.6499, Birthweigft 1997 =2888.7561
For blacks, the predicted birth weight increased by 21.11 grams. This means that an 
increase in Medicaid eligibility leads to an increase in black birth weights.
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The results generated thus far in the policy simulations are quite interes ting.
While an increase in Medicaid eligibility reduces the onset of care and increases birth 
weight for blacks, both favorable outcomes, the results are essentially opposite for whites. 
Congress’ intent to improve care and health outcomes via Medicaid eligibility expansions 
seem to be reflected in the black population but not the white population. This could be 
due to crowding out.
Policy simulation results according to eligibility status in 1988 and in 1997
The results so far indicate that expanding Medicaid eligibility leads to more 
favorable outcomes for blacks but less favorable outcomes for whites. Since this result is 
a bit difficult to explain, results from the eligibility policy simulations are broken down 
further according to several key groups.
This first set of results is stratified according to a woman’s Medicaid eligibility 
status in 1988 and in 1997. Specifically, three groups of women are identified: women 
who were eligible to receive Medicaid in 1988, women who were eligible to receive 
Medicaid in 1997 but were not eligible in 1988, and women who were not eligible in 
1997. The results are summarized in Table 26. The following results are for white 
women. 11.48% of women fall into the first group, 17.25% fall into the second group, 
and the remaining 71.27% of women fall into the third group, respectively. The 
simulation results are of greatest interest for the second group since this is the group most 
affected by the eligibility expansion. Recall that this group of women was not eligible in 
1988 but became eligible in 1997. Results indicate that the onset of care decreased from 
9.11 weeks to 8.99 weeks (i.e. less than 1 day) from 1988 to 1997, but that birth weight 
declined from 2982.11 to 2955.01 grams (or 27.1 grams). The eligibility expansion
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seemed to have a favorable effect on the onset of care, although quite a modest effect, but 
an adverse effect on birth weight.
Axe the expansions predicted to have had any effect on those who were already 
eligible in 1988? The answer is an overwhelming yes. Not only is Medicaid 
participation predicted to increase by over 13 percentage points, but also the onset of care 
fell by over 2 days and birth weight increased by over 21 grams. A possible explanation 
here is that the increase in expansions made women who were already eligible for 
Medicaid aware of their eligibility and that the Medicaid expansions seem to most 
favorably affect lower-income women. This result is further supported by results from 
the third group of women: women who were not eligible in 1997. The expansions are 
predicted to increase the onset of care and reduce birth weight for this group of women, 
both adverse outcomes. The overall policy simulation results discussed earlier (that 
indicate that the expansions have little or even an adverse effect on white women) are not 
revealing the true effect of the expansions. The expansion effects on lower-income (first 
group) and higher-income (third group) women most likely cancelled each other out.
These results are consistent and likely reveal that the Medicaid expansions do favorably 
affect low-income women. The policy implications here are that a) the expansions are 
targeting and affecting the population that Medicaid was meant for and b) Medicaid is 
improving prenatal care utilization and health outcomes for this targeted population, but 
c) due to crowd-out, there may be some adverse outcomes in upper income groups.
The favorable results shown for white women are enhanced even further for black 
women. 40.60%, 23.69%, and 35.71% of black women fall into the first, second, and 
third group (defined earlier), respectively. Proportionally, there is a much larger group of
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black women eligible to receive Medicaid. In some sense, this makes black women a 
more targeted group since they are more likely to be living in low-income households. 
Both the first and second eligibility groups are predicted to experience a modest decrease 
in the onset of care and an increase in birth weight. Specifically, for the first group, the 
simulation predicts a decrease in the onset of care by over 3 and half days and an increase 
in birth weight by over 71 grams. For the second group, onset is reduced by over 2 and a 
half days and birth weight increases by over 30 grams. Adverse outcomes are shown for 
the third (highest-income) group.
Expanding Medicaid income eligibility seems to improve prenatal care utilization 
and infant health outcomes for low-income white women and low/moderate-income black 
women. The expansions have an adverse effect on women who are not Medicaid eligible. 
It would be interesting to know whether all ineligible women experience adverse health 
outcomes or if it is only the women who are marginally ineligible. Roughly 5% of whites 
and 10% of blacks in the highest-income group (third group) are predicted to drop their 
private insurance coverage from 1988 to 1997.
Medicaid eligibility policy simulation results stratified by low birth weight
This next set of policy simulation results is stratified by whether a woman had a 
low birth weight or a normal birth weight infant. Recall that low birth weight is defined 
as an infant weighing less than 2500 grams or 5.5 pounds. Generally, the results indicate 
that for black women with both low and normal birth weight infants that the eligibility 
expansions reduced the onset of care and increased birth weight. The results are opposite 
for white women. Since the eligibility expansions seem to affect low and normal birth 
weights in the same way, there is no real result to discuss here. These results, however,
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do provide further evidence that black women are more favorably affected by the 
expansions than white women are.
Pure reduced-form birth weight computations
The policy simulations are conducted in order to capture both the direct and 
indirect effects of a policy change. Currie and Gruber (1996b) take a different approach 
at evaluating Medicaid eligibility policy. Using aggregate data, they estimate reduced- 
form models that evaluate the effect of Medicaid eligibility on the incidence o f low birth 
weight and infant mortality. They construct eligibility in three different ways. First, they 
simulate eligibility for all women in 1979. Second, they simulate eligibility for women 
who were eligible in 1992 but not eligible in 1979. Third, they simulate eligibility for 
women who were not eligible in 1986 but who became eligible in 1992, using Medicaid 
rules rather than AFDC rules that are more restrictive. Recall that the results from their 
models indicate that expanding eligibility decreased the incidence of low birth weight. 
These results are most significant when eligibility is defined in the second way.
Recall that in the previous chapter, I also estimate a pure reduced-form birth
weight equation. The regression results from this model are discussed in the previous
chapter. However, this model can also be used to generate policy simulations, albeit in a
more simplistic manner. Since eligibility enters directly into the birth weight equation the
gross effect of a change in eligibility can be captured and compared to Currie and
Gruber’s results. The pure reduced-form equation includes only all of the exogenous
variables in the system and is defined by the following:
6. Birthweight =  /J, +  (inability +  /?3environmental +  (3Aanthropometric +
j3smatemal +  /J6 fertility +  j3 demographies +  /3sincome +  f39cohab +  f3wCESDavg + e rfBWT
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Recall that eligibility is embedded within the ability grouping of variables. In order to 
simulate the effect of an eligibility expansion, the predicted values of birth weight must 
be compared before and after the simulation. The predicted value of birth weight in 1988 
can be predicted directly from the equation above. However, in order to predict birth 
weight in 1997, 1988 eligibility must be subtracted and 1997 eligibility must be added to 
the predicted value of birth weight. The following equation computes the predicted value 
of birth weight in 1997:
A  A  A  A
Birthweigft 1997 = Birthweigft 1988 — /3 B1 eligibility l9SS + /3 B1 eligibility 1997
The white and black birth weight predicted values for 1988 and 1997 are the following:
A  A
Whites: Birthweigft 1988 =3X31.4176, Birthweigft l997 =3194.5206
A  A
Blacks: Birthweigft 198g =2953.1026, Birthweigft I997 =2960.6296
Somewhat consistent (although not entirely) to the results generated by the treatment 
effects model, both white and black birth weights rose as a result of an increase in 
eligibility. White birth weight is predicted to increase by 63.10 grams while black birth 
weight is predicted to increase by a more modest 7.53 grams. Recall that results from the 
treatment effects model illustrated that overall only black birth weights increased. 
However, for low-income white women, the eligibility expansion also led to an increase 
in birth weight. The results shown here are a direct result of the increase in eligibility 
since no other variable changed. Taken as a whole, the Medicaid eligibility policy 
simulations do provide fairly robust evidence that an eligibility expansion may lead to an 
increase in birth weights. This result is somewhat consistent with Currie and Gruber
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(1996b). However, my model is an improvement over theirs since it takes into account 
all of the different channels in which eligibility may affect outcomes. In doing so, it 
allows for both linear and non-linear effects to be captured.
Policy simulation II: Treating depression
One of the findings in this dissertation is that depressed black women have lower 
birth weight infants, ceteris paribus. Taken one step further, a policy recommendation 
may be to suggest that reducing the incidence of depression may yield more effective 
prenatal care utilization and better health outcomes. However, this finding is not 
consistent across all of the models presented. Yet it does inspire additional research to 
address the question in another way. Consequently, I conduct a policy simulation that 
essentially “treats” depressed women of their depressed symptoms and then simulates that 
impact on Medicaid and private insurance participation, the onset of prenatal care, and 
most importantly birth weight.
Technically, an identical process to that of the Medicaid eligibility simulation is 
conducted for the depression simulation. Very generally recall that in the eligibility 
simulation the 1997 eligibility rules were simulated on the sample of women. Means of 
the key variables were then compared across the 1988 rules and the 1997 rules. Whereas 
the eligibility simulation used 1997 eligibility rules, the depression simulation creates a 
variable to represent the “ 1997 state of the world” for each women. That is, if a woman’s 
CES-D score is 1988 was less than or equal to 16 (i.e. suppose CES-DWoman i = 7), her 
1997 CES-D score is the same as it was in 1988 (i.e. CES-DWOman i = 7). If a woman’s 
CES-D score in 1988 was greater than 16 (i.e. CES-DWOman2 = 25), her 1997 CES-D score
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is censored (or equals) 16 (i.e. CES-Dwoman2 = 16). This censoring is what I consider 
treatment for depression.
Treatment of depression policy simulation results
Results from the depression simulation can be found in Table 27. 14.83% of 
white women and 28.30% of black women were “treated” in 1997. That is, these 
women’s CES-D scores were greater than 16 in 1988 and censored to equal 16 in 1997. 
Keep in mind, though, that this is only a mechanical process and that these women are not 
actually cured. By treating these women of their depressed symptoms, the mean CES-D 
score for whites fell from 8.79 in 1988 to 7.75 in 1997. For blacks, the mean CES-D 
score fell more substantially from 12.84 in 1988 to 10.60 in 1997. The question that the 
simulation attempts to address is whether treating these women lead to the earlier onset of 
prenatal care and to higher birth weight infants. The simulation also reveals the relative 
participation in Medicaid and private insurance over the sample time period. Only the 
results pertaining to the treated population (with CES-D scores greater than 16), a subset 
of the white and black samples, are discussed.
The results for white women suggest first that treating depression yields an 
opposite effect on insurance/Medicaid participation than increasing Medicaid eligibility. 
The depression simulation reveals that Medicaid participation is predicted to decrease 
from 0.59 in 1988 to 0.54 in 1997 while private insurance coverage slightly increased by 
one percentage point from 0.68 in 1988 to 0.69 in 1997. The relative change in both 
Medicaid and private insurance coverage is somewhat negligible though. The remainder 
of the results indicates that both the onset of care and birth weight increase as a result of 
treating depression. Specifically, the onset of care increases by about 1 day from 9.17
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weeks in 1988 to 9.32 weeks in 1997. Remember that this is an adverse result. One 
would have hypothesized that onset would decrease as a result of treating depression.
This is shown in the regression results. One possible explanation is that women may 
perceive prenatal care as just another type of medical care. It’s plausible to imagine that a 
depressed woman might seek depression treatment from a prenatal care provider, 
particularly if she did not have a relationship with a primary care physician. Therefore, if 
she "instantaneously" becomes cured of her depressive symptoms then she may not feel 
the urgency to seek prenatal care early. An alternative explanation is that the effect of 
Medicaid is confounding the effect of treating depression. Remember that the simulation 
captures all of the channels in which treating depression can affect birth weight. Since 
the regression results indicate that Medicaid adversely affects outcomes, it is possible that 
the presence of Medicaid here is causing depression treatment to be ineffective in terms 
of reducing the onset of care. The depression simulation also reveals a modest increase in 
birth weight from 2877.92 grams in 1988 to 2882.45 grams in 1997 (a 4.5 gram increase).
While the white results are mixed in terms of improving outcomes, black women 
seem to reap greater benefits from being treating for depressive symptoms. The onset of 
prenatal care is predicted to decrease from 10.38 weeks in 1988 to 10.17 weeks in 1997, a 
decline of approximately a day and a half. Intuitively, this result makes sense. Literature 
has shown that depressed individuals have difficulty performing simple daily tasks. 
Therefore, one might expect that the "state of depression" would act as a barrier to 
seeking prenatal care. If that barrier is removed, one might expect that earlier and 
adequate care would become more viable. While a reasonable hypothesis can be 
formulated to explain both earlier and later prenatal care, it is difficult to explain why
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
treated white women seek later care and why treated black women seek earlier care. 
Easier to explain is the increase in birth weight from 2805.27 grams to 2868.52 grams or 
an increase of 63.25 grams. This seems to indicate that treating depression in both white 
and particularly in black women improves infant health outcomes. To date, no other 
research has found this result. This research is consistent with findings that depressed 
women can pass along depressed symptoms in terms of reduced brain activity to their 
infants. Not only is this one of the most important findings in this dissertation, it is a 
promising avenue for future research and suggests certain policy recommendations. It 
may be that one way to reduce the incidence of lower birth weight is to assess a  woman's 
mental health status at the time of her first prenatal visit and consequently treat any 
depressed women before they give birth.
Treatment of depression policy simulation results stratified bv low birth weight
The depression policy simulation results are also stratified by whether the woman 
had a low birth weight or normal birth weight infant. Overall the results indicate that for 
white women, the onset of care slightly increased and birth weights increased for the low 
birth weight population but decreased for the normal birth weight population. This seems 
to indicate that the policy simulation is more effective in the low birth weight sample.
For black women, the onset of care declines and birth weights rose. These results suggest 
that stratifying by low and normal birth weight does add some new information. 
Additionally, black women tend to reap greater benefits from being treated for depression 
than white women.
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Conclusion
The primary reason for conducting policy simulations is to capture both, the direct 
and indirect effects of a policy change. This technique is a nice complement to 
regression-based techniques when complex relationships are modeled since it captures all 
of the different ways that a policy can affect an outcome. The overall findings from the 
eligibility simulations suggest that an expansion in Medicaid eligibility reduces the onset 
of prenatal care for low-income whites and low- to middle- income blacks and that birth 
weights are predicted to rise for these same demographic groups. In general, the 
magnitude of the effects appears to be larger on average for black than for whites. The 
depression simulation reveals that treating depression leads to an increase in the onset of 
care for whites but a decrease in the onset of care for blacks. Birth weight is predicted to 
rise for both treated white women and black women, with the magnitude again larger for 
blacks. When the eligibility and depression simulation results are stratified by low birth 
weight, the depression simulation reveals that birth weights are predicted to increase for 
white women who have low birth weight infants. Otherwise, this breakdown adds no 
new information. Reduced-form eligibility simulations reveal that the eligibility’ 
expansion favorably affects black and white women. Finally, the crowding out of private 
insurance by Medicaid is evident in both the white and black populations.
The policy simulation contributes several different findings to the literature. The 
first is that separate crowding out estimates are obtained for both white and black samples 
of women. For whites, crowding out is estimated to be 30.92% and for blacks it is 
estimated at 50.04%. While these estimates fall with the range of other estimates in the 
literature, it appears as though blacks crowd out at a higher rate than whites. Medicaid
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take-up rates computed in this dissertation also reveal that blacks have a greater tendency 
to take-up Medicaid upon becoming eligible. One possible hypothesis that may explain 
why blacks are more likely to participate in Medicaid than whites is that they are more 
likely to live in low-income households. This can be seen in the NMIHS sample where 
the mean income of whites is almost twice as high as it is for blacks. As a result, blacks 
may be more aware of the Medicaid eligibility guidelines. Another potential hypothesis 
may be that black women regard the welfare stigma as a relatively low cost associated 
with participating in a welfare program. These are only two suggested hypotheses. 
Unfortunately, the data do not provide any additional guidance in interpreting these 
results.
The next finding from this policy simulation reveals that expanding Medicaid 
eligibility leads to favorable health outcomes for poorer- to middle- income women but 
leads to adverse health outcomes for higher-income women. Since the Medicaid program 
is designed to target and assist women and children who live lower-income households, 
one might say that the expansions were successful at improving outcomes. It should not 
necessarily be expected that expanding Medicaid eligibility would improve health 
outcomes for higher-income women. However, it is surprising that the expansions lead to 
adverse outcomes for higher-income women. One explanation may be that this is a result 
of crowding out.
Overall, both the eligibility and depression simulations reveal more favorable 
outcomes for blacks, albeit in certain circumstances, white women also experienced 
favorable outcomes. While it is unclear why black women respond more favorably to the 
eligibility expansions and to depression treatment, there are several policy implications
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that arise. Particularly for blacks, there is evidence of an intergenerational tran sfer of 
depressive symptoms from mother to child. Consequently, women should be given a 
mental health assessment at their first prenatal care visit. Upon diagnosing depressive 
symptoms, women should be given immediate treatment as part of her prenatal care 
program in order to reduce the adverse effects that may be passed on to her infant.
Results from the eligibility expansions seem to suggest that enrolling lower-income 
women, particularly black women, in the Medicaid program leads to more favorable 
outcomes. This seems to suggest that outreach programs should be continued and 
perhaps even expanded. Outreach efforts should not neglect to reach low - to middle - 
income women. Though such efforts may lead to crowd-out and thus worsen outcomes 
for higher-income women.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation seeks to answer several questions regarding the correlates of 
infant health such as prenatal care, Medicaid, private insurance, and depression. In doing 
so, two major contributions are made. The first major contribution highlights the 
importance of including Medicaid and private insurance into the health production 
function framework. Medicaid and private insurance are treated as endogenous or choice 
inputs in the production of infant health. I assume that a woman chooses the type of 
insurance coverage that maximizes her own utility and infant health. By including 
insurance type directly into the infant health production function the quality effects that 
Medicaid and private insurance have on infant health can be directly captured. In 
addition, the effects of the Medicaid eligibility rules on both kinds of coverage are 
considered since it is expected that these rules influence the type of insurance coverage 
demanded. Policy simulations that evaluate the effect of the Medicaid expansions on 
insurance choice, prenatal care, and infant health further illustrate the necessary role that 
Medicaid and private insurance coverage have within the health production function 
framework. The second major contribution highlights the importance of including 
maternal depression as an input in the health production process. Recent depression 
studies within the health and epidemiological literature reveal that a) depressed
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individuals experience poorer day-to-day functioning and well-being than non- depressed 
individuals and that b) there is evidence of an intergenerational transfer of depressive 
symptoms from mother to infant. In light of these studies, the question of whether a 
depressed woman may demand a sub-optimal quantity of prenatal care or level of 
insurance coverage, either of which may affect infant health is explored. In addition, by 
entering depression directly into the health production function, one can explore whether 
there is an intergenerational transfer of depressive symptoms from mother to child as 
measured by reduced birth weight. Finally, whether treating depression improves 
outcomes is also explored. The effects of “mechanically” reducing depressive symptoms 
(by reducing a woman’s depression score) are simulated on insurance choice, prenatal 
care, and birth weight.
The effects of Medicaid and private insurance on prenatal care and infant health 
are seen throughout the theoretical and empirical models and in the policy simulations. In 
the theoretical model of health production, I assume that the woman's type of health 
insurance coverage affects her overall utility, indirectly through the budget constraint and 
directly through welfare stigma and through quality effects. Since three different types of 
insurance coverage are considered here, no insurance/self-pay, Medicaid, and private 
insurance, three utility maximization problems are derived. For simplicity, in the 
theoretical model, all women are assumed to be Medicaid eligible and women can choose 
to be privately insured, participate in Medicaid, or be uninsured. However, in the 
empirical model, Medicaid dollar income eligibility is considered exogenous. While I 
assume that women can adjust their income to become Medicaid eligible or seek a job 
that provides private insurance, women cannot affect state level Medicaid eligibility.
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The empirical treatment effects model evaluates the direct effects that Medicaid and 
private insurance have on birth weight while at the same time controlling for self- 
selection. By including Medicaid and private insurance as inputs directly into the health 
production function the relative quality effects can be captured. The policy simulations 
further predict the effects of Medicaid on the key variables. Using the parameters 
estimated from the treatments effects model (with my original 1988 data), I simulate the 
effects of expanding Medicaid eligibility according to the 1997 rules.
The Field model of health determinants suggests that several different factors 
including genetics, the environment, medical care, the population, and lifestyle all affect 
health. My results consistently show that early and frequent prenatal care do not have a 
statistically significant impact on infant health in terms of birth weight or the incidence of 
low birth weight. In light of the Field model, this result is not too surprising, although a 
bit disappointing. However, results indicate that women with Medicaid have lower birth 
weight infants. This may suggest that Medicaid provides inferior quality care than either 
private insurance or self-payment. Across the board a woman’s anthropometric 
characteristics strongly affect birth weight. In addition, indicators of a woman’s lifestyle 
including smoking also affect birth weight. This suggests that much can be determined 
about the birth weight of an infant from a woman's own physical structure (such as her 
own birth weight and her own height) as well as from her lifestyle and behaviors. These 
results all indicate that some aspects of infant health cannot be directly affected by policy 
(anthropometry matters), while other aspects may be affected, but in a different manner 
than we may have thought.
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While the treatment effects model evaluates the direct effect of Medicaid and 
private insurance on birth weight, the policy simulations predict the effect of a temporal 
change in Medicaid eligibility on birth weight. The overall findings from the eligibility 
simulations suggest that an expansion in Medicaid eligibility reduces the onset of prenatal 
care for low-income whites and low- to middle- income blacks and that birth weights are 
predicted to rise for these same demographic groups. In general, the magnitude of the 
effects appears to be larger on average for blacks than for whites. One explanation for 
this is that black women are more likely to comprise the population that is targeted by the 
eligibility expansions (i.e. low income single women with children). Reduced-form 
eligibility simulations also reveal that the eligibility expansion is predicted to increase 
birth weights for both blacks and whites. Finally, the crowding out of private insurance 
by Medicaid is evident in both the white and black populations. This may suggest some 
evidence that Medicaid is of lower quality than private insurance.
The effects of depression on Medicaid and private insurance participation, 
prenatal care, and infant health can also be seen throughout the models and policy 
simulations developed in this dissertation. The original intent behind incorporating 
depression into the framework was to estimate its impact on insurance choice, prenatal 
care and infant health. It is assumed that a depressed mom may select into a sub-optimal 
type of insurance or demand a sub-optimal amount of prenatal care, and that her 
depressed state may affect the health of her infant. However, it was realized that 
depression may not only be an exogenous input into the production process but it may 
also be an output. Post-partum depression is the most common example of this output.
In light of this, I consider the exogenous type of depression to reflect a woman’s longer-
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term mental health state while the endogenous component reflects transitory depression.
In the theoretical model, depression is modeled as both an input in prenatal care demand 
and in health production and as a output of a production process. However, due to data 
constraints, only the exogenous component of depression is reflected in the empirical 
model. While the effects of depression on the key variables are captured in the treatment 
effects model, the predicted effects of “treating” depression or reducing depressive 
symptoms in women are captured in the policy simulation.
This is the first study to recognize a woman’s state of mental health in the context 
of the health production function. Depression is found to significantly affect Medicaid 
and private insurance participation, the number of visits obtained during the pregnancy, 
but most importantly, birth weight in some of the model specifications. Results suggest 
that a higher depression score may lead to a reduction in birth weight. While other 
studies have shown that an intergenerational transfer of depressive symptoms, in the form 
of reduced brain activity, from mother to newbom, this is the first study to suggest that 
depression may also affect birth weight. The depression simulation reveals that treating 
depression leads to an increase in the onset of care for whites but a decrease in the onset 
of care for blacks. Birth weight is predicted to rise for both treated white women and 
black women, with the magnitude again larger for blacks.
In general, this dissertation makes a relatively substantial contribution to the 
economics literature by illustrating the importance of including depression and expanding 
the role that Medicaid plays in the health production function framework. Results 
suggest that different types of health insurance including Medicaid, private insurance, and 
having no insurance, exhibit quality differences in the key outcomes. The eligibility
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simulation shows that there is room for policy in improving health outcomes particularly 
for lower-income women. Additionally, depression is found to have effects throughout 
the treatment effects model. The depression simulation also reveals the potential for 
policy to affect the key outcomes, most importantly, infant health.
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Table 2. Measures of infant health or birth weight found in the literature
Actual birth weight in grams Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983) 
Grossman and Joyce (1990) 




Birth weight adjusted for fetal growth and gestation: 
actual birtkweight
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983)
birthweight = p a — j3l {weeks) + 0 ,  (weeks)2 — (weeks)3
Gestation in weeks Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1991)
Dichotomous measure (0,1) o f low birth weight (LBW) 
which is defined as birth weight < 2500 grams
Joyce (1997)
Dichotomous measure (0,1) of very low birth weight 
(VLBW) which is defined as birth weight < 1500 grams
Jo y ce(1997)
Dichotomous measure (0,1) of term low birth weight 
(termLBW) which is defined as birth weight < 2500 grams 
and gestation > 37 weeks
Joyce (1997)
Neonatal mortality rate Corman and Grossman (1985) 
Corman, Joyce, and Grossman (1987)
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Table 3. Measures of prenatal care found in the literature
Delay (since conception) in seeking prenatal care (in months, 
days)
Rosenzweig and Schultz C1982, 
1983)
Grossman and Joyce (1990) 
Joyce and Grossman (1990) 
Warner (1995, 1998)
Liu (1998)
S tandardized num ber of prenatal visits, adjusted for gestation:
j  ^  actual # o f  prena ta l visits
ACOG recommended # o f  prenatal visits adjusted f o r  gestation
Warner (1995, 1998)
Interaction  term  that measures the degree o f substitution or 
complementarity between delay and the number of visits: 
adjusted # o f prenatal visits 
delay
Warner (1995. 1998)
K essner (IOM ) Index: Simultaneously adjusts for gestation and 
a) month that prenatal care began, b) number of visits, c) type of 
obstetric service - whether delivery was by a private obstetric 
service.
Prenatal care classified as
Adequate (care began in 1st trimester, 9 visits for full-term, and 
delivery by private obstetric service.)
Intermediate (either care began after 1st trimester or less than 70% 
of visits were made)
Inadequate (care began after Ist trimester and less than 50% visits 
were made)
Alexander & Kotelchuck (1996)
M odified Kessner (M-IOM) Index: Doesn't take into account 
whether delivery was by a private obstetric service
Joyce (1994)
Alexander & Kotelchuck (1996)
OB-REC: Modifies the Kessner Index by adjusting for the actual 
number o f ACOG recommended visits which is 13 for a full-term 
pregnancy
Alexander & Kotelchuck (1996)
GINDEX: Modifies the Kessner Index even further by adding 3 
additional categories (6 in total)
No care (woman received no prenatal care)
Missing (prenatal care data was missing on this individual) 
Intensive (unexpectedly large number of visits - used to indicate 
high risk pregnancy)
Alexander & Kotelchuck (1996)
APNCU (Adequacy of prenatal care) Index: Separate 
assessments o f the a) month that prenatal care began and b) 
number o f visits.
Uses an observed-to-recommended ratio combined with onset of 
care to create index. An additional category:
Adequate plus (ratio of observed-to-ACOG-recommended 
number o f visits >= 110% - indicates intensive care)
Alexander & Kotelchuck (1996)
PHS (Public Health Service)/EPPC (Expert Panel on Prenatal 
Care) or PHS-REC: Alternative schedules emphasizing a) earlier 
care and b) the number of visits vary by parity - to control for 
risk. Promotes more comprehensive care and less recommended 
visits than ACOG for women at low risk.
Alexander &  Kotelchuck (1996) 
Witwer (1990)
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Table 4. Summary of public assistance program take-up rates in the literature
Dubay and Kenney (1997) 1988-1993 Pregnant women Medicaid 44%
Dubay and Kenney (1997) 1988-1993 Children Medicaid 69%
Cutler and Gruber (1996) 1988-1993 Children Medicaid 24%
Blank and Ruggles (1993) 1985-1989 Single mothers AFDC 62% -
72%
Blank and Ruggles (1993) 1985-1989 Single mothers Food Stamps 54% -
66%
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Table 5. State outreach efforts
# of Types 
of Media
# of Types of 
Sites Where
# of Types 
of Media






Used Was Posted Used Was Posted
Alabama 3 7 Montana 3 6
Alaska 1 6 Nebraska 0 5
Arizona 3 6 Nevada 1 7
Arkansas 4 6 New Hampshire 4 5
California 5 7 New Jersey 5 7
Colorado 5 6 New Mexico 0 3
Connecticut 0 6 New York 6 7
Delaware 0 5 North Carolina 6 7
District of Columbia 5 5 North Dakota 0 5
Florida 3 3 Ohio 4 7
Georgia 3 7 Oklahoma 0 7
Hawaii 6 6 Oregon 0 3
Idaho 5 6 Pennsylvania 0 6
Illinois 5 7 Rhode Island 1 4
Indiana 6 7 South Carolina 0 5
Iowa 3 5 South Dakota 0 7
Kansas 0 0 Tennessee 1 0
Kentucky 4 6 Texas 4 6
Louisiana 0 6 Utah 6 7
Maine 0 0 Vermont 4 4
Maryland 6 6 Virginia 2 4
Massachusetts 4 6 Washington 3 7
Michigan 4 6 West Virginia 0 6
Minnesota 4 7 Wisconsin 6 7
Mississippi 4 6 Wyoming 1 5
Missouri 0 6 jTotariOS? JSiiSVh:-- %
Source: Gold, R.B., Singh, S., & Frost, J. (1993). The Medicaid eligibility expansions for pregnant 
women: evaluating the strength of state implementation efforts. Family Planning Perspectives. 25151. 
198.













Table 6. Medical Outcome Study: Comparison of measures of well being and functioning 
among depressed patients, patients with chronic illness and general population'
mmm
■ ■ ■ mm
Wells el al. (1989)
No chronic condition 85.4 87.0 91.7 0.75 73,9 73.4
Depressive disorder 81.3 74.6 83.3 1.12 54.3 63.4
Depressive symptoms 80.1 77.5 84.1 1.23 58,9 63.8
11 ays et at, (1995)
Subthreshold depression 71/71* 57/61 78/76 62/66 65/67 51/52 54/57 68/68
M ajor depression 73/72 49/50 70/73 41/62 59/65 51/56 56/56 64/61
Dysthymin 64/68 38/35 60/66 64/42 52/54 44/48 50/47 59/58
Double depression 67/75 51/57 56/72 32/46 43/54 38/46 45/55 60/68
Hypertension 80/78 69/72 91/91 81/84 80/81 61/64 64/64 75/77
Congestive heart failure 64/63 53/50 84/84 81/78 83/82 52/51 52/49 71/72
Myocardial infarction 79/82 66/73 91/92 77/84 77/79 59/61 63/64 79/84
Type 1 diabetes 89/80 86/62 93/88 96/93 88/81 64/75 62/56 74/67
Type II diabetes 77/75 70/66 87/85 83/80 80/78 60/58 59/58 74/75
General population 76 72 81 79 75 59 67 71
^A ll sc o re s  ran g e  from  0 -1 0 0  (w h ere  100 in d ica tes the best function ing  and  0  in d ica tes  th e  p oorest fu n c tio n in g ) excep t
fo r bed  d ay s  w h ere  a h ig h e r n u m b er in d ica te s  po o rer function ing .
“ P h ysica l fu n c tio n in g  -  lim ita tio n s  du e  to h ea lth  in a c tiv itie s  such  a s  sports, c lim b in g  sta irs, w alking , d re ss in g  a n d  
b a th in g
h R o le  fu n c tio n in g  -  ex ten t to  w hich  p h y s ic a l  o r  m en ta l h ea lth  in te rfe res w ith  w ork, h o u se w o rk  o r  s c h o o l work.
‘ S o c ia l fu n c tio n in g  -  ex ten t to w h ich  h ea lth  in terferes w ith  so c ia l a c tiv ities  such  a s  vis iting  fr ie n d s  o r  re la tive s
'' R ed  d a y s  -  n u m b e r  o f  d a ys  in b e d  d u e  to h ea lth  in p a s t 3 0  da ys
r E m o tio n a l w e ll-being  -  a ssesses  g e n e ra l m o o d  includ ing  dep ress ive  sym p tom s, a n x ie ty  a n d  p o s itiv e  w e ll-being  
1 E n e rg y  -  a sse sse s  p e r c e iv e d  e n erg y  leve l
* C u rren t h ea lth  -  p e rc e p tio n s  o f  cu rren t hea lth , such  a s  fe e lin g  w ell o r  ill 
h F ree o f  p a in  -  ex ten t o f  b o d ily  p a in  in the  p a s t m on th
*Tlie tw o  sco res in H ays cl al. (i.e . Hill) reflec t the long itud inal n a tu re  o f  the data . T h e  lirst n u m b er is the  o rig in a l m easu rem en t and




Table 7. Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) Study* and National 
Comorbidity (NC) Study**: Incidence of major depression among the population
Men (all ages) 10% 12.7%
Women (all ages) 39% 21.3%
White 27% 13.5% (male) 22.3%
Black - 7.2% (male) 15.5%
Hispanic -- 11.7% (male) 23.9%
Non-white 22% -
Age 15/18-44 28% 12.9% (male) 21.3%
Age 45-54/59 10% 11.8% (male) 21.8%
*Broadhead, W.E., Blazer. D.G., George, L.K., & Tse, C.K. (1990). Depression, Disability Days, and Days Lost 
From Work in a Prospective Epidemiologic Survey. Journal of the American Medical Association. 264(19). 2524- 
2528. “ Blazer, D.G., Kessner, R.C., McGonagle, K.A., & Swartz, M.S. (1994). The Prevalence and Distribution 
of Major Depression in a national Community Sample: The National Comorbidity Survey. American Journal of 
Psychiatry. 151(7). 979-986.
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Table 8. Variable descriptions
V ariab le  N am e V a r ia b le  D escrip tion
Zive .Bi'rtfi Whether woman’s pregnancy ended in a live birth
fitrt/i weight Birth weight of child in grams
Term birth weight Sample restricted to full term births (where gestation > 37 weeks) only.
This is also a measure of birth weight in grams.
5/5
V Low birth weight dummy Whether infant is bom at a birth weight less than 2500 grams.
. 2 Term low birth weight Sample restricted to full term births (where gestation > 37 weeks) only.
> dummy Whether infant is bom at a birth weight less than 2500 grains.
vt3 Onset Number o f weeks into the pregnancy that prenatal care began
& ACOG adjusted number o f Number o f actual prenatal care visits made divided by the American
visits College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) number o f
e j recommended visits according to gestation.
Private insurance dummy Whether woman had private insurance during pregnancy or delivery.
Medicaid dummy Whether woman had Medicaid during pregnancy or delivery.
Vt CESD average Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. This variable is an
cL average of this score from the 1988 NMIHS and the 1991 NMIHS follow-‘J vt up.
O £? M om ’s birthweight Mother’s own birth weight in grams
M om ’s height Mother's own height in inches
<  2 Male dummy Whether infant is male
Smoking Number of cigarettes smoked per day during the pregnancy
Drinking Number o f drinks consumed per week during the pregnancy
Wanted dummy Whether woman wanted the pregnancy. The woman was to respond how
er she felt about the pregnancy before she became pregnant.
_ 2 Kidcohab Number of a woman’s own children living in the household
Parity dummy Whether woman experienced a previous pregnancy
,1> Fetal deaths Number of prior fetal deaths (both abortions and miscarriages)
= experienced by the woman
Age Woman's age at delivery
Age2 Age squared
Age3 Age cubed
State health care price Weighted average of the prices of a hospital room, general medical and
- index (H-index) dental visits, and a bottle of aspirin. This is an aggregate, state level
*> o variable.
iS B State population density Population density per square mile. This is an aggregate, state level
Urban dummy Whether woman lived in an urban county
Education Mother's years of education
V.'J Education2 Education squared
EducationJ Education cubed
Sfic Cohab dummy Whether woman lived with the child's father
2r> Never married dummy Whether woman was never married at the time of delivery
Income Annual household income in dollars
> v
Eligibility88 Medicaid dollar income eligibility threshold in 1988
Eligibility97 Medicaid dollar income eligibility threshold in 1997
cs State unemployment rate Percentage of state labor force which are unemployed. This is anc
vt
y aggregate, state level variable.
SA Mother & father’s Mother's and father’s occupation and industry
S>
2 occupation and industry
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Term birth weight N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
c/3













Term low birth  
weight dum m y













[2 AC O G  adjusted  










































.2 «  
2  ' 5





































G  e g  
e g  J S
<U









* 7 3  c/3 
*"*










53 ^  
3  'ZZE —
5  ofc- a  
is










c 5  ”5









continued on next page
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
White sample Black sample Diff-
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dum m y variables
D escrip tiv e  statistics available upon request
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White sample Black sample Diff-





































































•denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the I % level
test-statistic is derived from the following formula:
X  white X  black
I <?ZhtU . &btack 
\  ‘VwhM
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics for white and black samples (full-term births)
W hite sample 
N = 2084
























Low  birth weight 
dum m y
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Term low birth 


















A C O G  adjusted  
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White sample Black sample Diff-
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White sample Black sample Diff-













































































'denotes significance at the 10% level 
"denotes significance at the 5% level 
" 'd en o tes  significance at the I % level
test-statistic is derived from the following formula:
■t white X  black
I Z^tute j
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Table 11. Key variable means for women that began prenatal care during the
1st trimester and those that began later than the 1st trimester, stratified by race
White Black White BLack
(N=2325) (N=1637) (N=237) (N=469)
Birth weight (in grams) 3143.51 2961.10 3012.79 2925.19
CES-D score 8.49 12.47 11.70 14.13
Private insurance dummy 0.75 0.39 0.37 0.25
Medicaid dummy 0.10 0.44 0.38 0.55
Age 27.32 24.76 24.06 22.41
Education 13.53 12.68 12.14 12.01
Never married dummy 0.07 I 0.50 0.29 0.69
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Table 12. Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)
The respondent was asked how many times she felt this way during the past week. 
Key: Rarely or none o f  the time (less than I day) = 0
Some o f  a little o f  the time (1-2 days) = I  
Occasionally o r  a m oderate amount o f  time (3-4 days) = 2 
Most or all o f  the tim e (5-7 days) = 3 
Positive feelings are coded in the opposite way (5-7 days = 0, etc.)
Total score: 0-60 with higher score reflecting more depressed symptoms
Q uestion
I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.
I had crying spells. I felt lonely.
I felt depressed.
My sleep was restless.




I felt that everything I did was an effort.
I felt that I could not shake off the blues, even with help from my family or friends. 
I talked less than usual.
People were unfriendly.
I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
I thought my life has been a failure.
I felt that people disliked me.
I enjoyed life.
I felt hopeful about the future.
I was happy
I felt that I was just as good as other people.
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Table 13. Key variable means for women who are depressed (CES-D>=16)
and women who are not depressed (CES-D<16), stratified by race
White Black “White BLack
(N=2159) (N=1468) (N=403) (N=628)
Birth weight (in grams) 3155.92 2976.18 3000.14 2898.79
Onset 8.38 9.91 9.56 1L.01
ACOG adjusted visits 1.07 1.04 1.13 1.02
Private insurance dummy 0.75 0.41 0.55 0.23
Medicaid dummy 0.10 0.42 0.29 0.57
Age 27.45 24.76 24.72 23.00
Education 13.61 12.78 12.32 1L.95
Never married dummy 0.07 I 0.50 0.16 0.64
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Table 14. Key variable means for women with low birth weight infants
(<2500 grams) and normal birth weight infants (2500-6000 grams),
________________________ stratified by race _________________
White Black White Blade
(N=564) (N=1611) (N=1998) (N=1611)
CES-D score 10.02 13.61 8.44 12.60
Onset 8.52 10.48 8.58 f  10.16
ACOG adjusted visits 1.44 1.32 0.98 0.94
Private insurance dummy 0.66 0.34 0.73 0.36
Medicaid dummy 0.19 0.49 0.11 0.46
Age 26.87 24.14 27.07 24.26
Education 13.04 12.33 13.51 12.59
Never married dummy 0.12 0.59 0.08 f  0.53
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Table 15. Results from insurance and Medicaid equations (all births)












-1.95 -7.67 3.59 -2.76
Intercept (-0.60) (-1.74)* (0.87) (-0.67)
-0.00002 0.00005 -0.00003 0.00005>> Eligibility88 (-1.55) (3 22)*** (-2.09)** (4.22)****
JO -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.07
o State unemployment (-2.42)** (-1.62) (0.52) (-3.95)***
p rate
zn Mother & father’s
2 Occupation and Results available upon request
industry
-0.007 0.004 -0.0002 -0.003
State health care (-2.45)** (1-24) (-0.07) (-0.80)
price index
P 0.0003 -0.0002 0.00004 0.00005
o o State population (2.71)*** (-1.87)* (0.13) (1.60)
*> « density
c3 13 0.10 -0.06 0.005 -0.14
Urban dummy (1.32) (-0.60) (0.05) (-1.60)
-0.001 0.02 t o o 0.009
c. .2 CESD average (-0.23) (3.54)*** (-2.23)** (2.25)**
0.00003 0.00002 -0.0001 0.00006
GO
w  ^ 
w
Mom’s birthweight (0.61) (0.24) (-1.93)* (1.27)
o fc -0.24 -0.04 -0.007 0.01
f  | Mom’s height (-0.18) (-2.06)** (-0.60) (0.90)
?3C -C 0.03 0.08 -0.10 -0.03
Male dummy (0.50) (0.95) (-1.46) (-0.45)
•^2 -0.01 0.007 -0.03 0.023 2
H > Smoking
( _ 9 (1.34) (-3.65)*** (2.79)***
u 3 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.001
Drinking (-0.52) (2.04)** (0.36) (-0.06)
0.20 -0.32 0.05 -0.03
o
Wanted dummy (2.60)*** (-3.19)*** (0.62) (-0.36)
’ > -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.10
«D Kidcohab (-1.81)* (-0.67) (-1.96)** (2.18)**
-0.88 0.07 -0.002 0.15
s
Parity dummy (-0 .11) (0.63) (-0 .02) (1.91)*
EX, -0.002 0.14 0.04 -0.03
Fetal deaths (-0.04) (2.45)** (1.03) (0.79)
continued on next page
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•denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the 1 % level
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Table 16. Results from prenatal care equations (all births)
W hite sa m p le  Black sam p le
VARIABLES Onset
N=2562





ACO G  rec 












r s  CJ
Sta te  hea lth  care  
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W hite sam ple Black sampl e
VARIABLES Onset
N=2562






# of visits 
N=2106
0.06 -0.007 0.02 0.004
>% c  .rs o 
=  U
Age2 (1.60) (-2.10)** (0.56) (1-27)
Ll* cj -0.006 0.00008 -0.0001 -0.00005Age2 (-1-38) (2.03)** (-0.26) C-1.24)
0.92 0.08 -0.99 0.11
Education (1.48) (1.08) (-1.05) 0-45)
-0.06 -0.005 0.11 -0.006
Education2 (-1.38) (-0.81) (1-51) (-0.89)
EH 0.001 0.0001 -0.004 0.000100 S
c yd 53 Education3 (1-26) (0.64) (-1.95)* (0.58)
a; co
Q -55 -0.38 0.04 -0.99 0.04Cohab dummy (-0.80) (0.78) (-2.61)** (1.04)
-0.000007 -0.000001 -0.000005 0.0000004
Income (-1.23) (-1.78)* (-0.40) (0.33)
-0.09 -0.02 -0.33 0.04
XUVE (-0.57) (-1.21) (-1.15) (1-42)
^  S 0.67 -0.05 1.13 0.006£> *— 
e  s
Xp' (1.52) (-1.08) (1-61) (0.09)
>■
0.82 -0.07 0.61 -0.01
XMC (1.49) (-1-31) (0.78) (-0.18)
•denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the 1 % level
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Table 17. Results from different specifications of birth weight (prenatal care=onset)
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W hite sample Black sample
Birth Term birth Birth Term
VARIABLES weight weight weight birth
N=2562 N=2084 N=2106 weight
N=1677
-86.55 -107.03 -7.71 -66.51
Education (-0.63) (-0.49) (-0.04) (-0.91)
.2 3 8.40 11.55 -0.51 5.22
Cm C/3 Education2 (0.79) (0.75) (-0.04) (0.79)
so is  
°  2 -0.21 -0.32 0.06 -0.11C i-
ci »
O  7?
Education3 (-0.79) (-0.91) (0-15) (-0.60)
22.00 -11.54 -11.08 7.63
Never married 
dummy
(0.22) (-0.19) (-0.22) (0.22)
XUVE
-32.61 -26.24 -34.72 -7.20















102.85 -13.18 49.69 140.09
(1-12) (-0.22) (0.47) (2.03)
‘denotes significance at the 10% level 
“ denotes significance at the 5% level 
““ denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 18. Results from different specifications of birth weight (pnc=accgadj)














446.12 2129.40 -910.27 1488.00
Intercept (0.22) (1.244) (-0.51) (L.20)
t :
Onset — — — —
259.66 1084.80 366.38 -304.94
ACOG adjusted (0.33) (1.22) (0.53) (-0.53)
> number o f  visits
c/:
3 -107.84 -98.58 -102.24 -148.51
O Private insurance (-0.76) (-0.81) (-0.57) (-1-36)
0 0
o dummy
" 3 -372.10 -133.02 -112.75 -294.69
LZJ Medicaid dummy (-1-55) (-0.83) (-0.60) (-2.31)**
(D c -4.29 -2.23 -4.38 -2.52
cL .2 CESD average (-0.93) (-0.77) (-1.69)* (-1.68)*
Q  w
0.25 0.20 0.13 0.14
o> *3
M om’s birthweight (5.43)*** (7.47)*** (3.75)*** (6.57)***
29.24 31.76 31.11 23.12
C m
u -  C3
M om’s height (4.05)*** (5.83)*** (3.75)*** (5.30)***
C -C 147.09 129.27 97.07 95.62
< . w Male dummy (4.21)*** (4.34)*** (2.27)** (3.54)***
™™ V -16.06 -15.70 -14.46 -13.415 o 
S  >
Smoking (-5.47)*** (-6.11)*** (-3.46)*** (-4.24)***
S3 - C 4.87 19.15 -20.65 -25.43
Drinking (0.19) (1-26) (-1.50) (-1.77)*
27.20 -9.99 -43.41 25.88
Wanted dummy (0.63) (-0.27) (-0.80) (0.64)
192.89 113.01 72.29 17.85
Kidcohab (2 72)*** (2.50)** (2.01)** (1.16)
45.98 26.60 -35.40 57.75
> Parity dummy (0.70) (0.45) (-0.61) (1.80)*
"3 -58.67 13.98 -93.79 7.92
Fetal deaths (-1.54) (0.56) (-1.99)** (0.30)
44.29 -109.83 157.54 28.69
e2 Age (0.19) (-0.72) (0.95) (0.24)
-2.09 3.56 -4.99 -0.93
Age2 (-0.25) (0.64) (-0.79) (-0.20)
0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.01
Age3 (0.22) (-0.63) (0.63) (0.17)
continued on next page
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W hite sam ple Black sample
Birth Term birth Birth Term
VARIABLES Weight weight weight birth
N=2562 N=2084 N=2106 weight
N=1677
-129.23 -341.32 -35.34 -33.94
Education (-0.90) (-1.08) (-0.17) (-0.37)
11.05 27.46 0.35 3.47
.y s Education2 (1-02) (1.25) (0 .02 ) (0.52)
Cu Vi -0.26 -0.67 0.06 -0.08
ab 2  
§ =
Education3 (-0.96) (-1.34) (0.15) (-0.47)
S3
U  C3
Cohab dummy — — — —
23.42 15.90 3.97 -4.46
Never married 
dummy
(0.24) (0 .22) (0.07) (-0 .11)
l UVE
-26.32 -16.68 -43.59 -5.55

















110.25 42.50 43.75 155.19
(1-01) (0-45) (0.38) (2 .02)
•denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 19. Results from the instrumental variables (IV) approach
White sample_____________ Black sam ple
iS
•?* st if
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W hite sample ______   B lack samp le
U S  ' i t


































































•denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 20. Results from treating all variables as exogenous
W h ite  sam p le________________ B lack  s a m p le
m u a s 1  EWtJMeigl (NzM-tiaim - I















5 -oSQ C30 *c
1  ? a
ACOG adjusted 
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W hite sample_______________Black samp le
a U S  BiBJZsweigl I 1 I 1 m m g tT m zim m m m m
VARIABLES With onset With ACOG With onset With ACOG
0.05 0.09 0.03 0.005
Age3 (0.70) (1-48) (0.43) (0.08)
-106.20 -47.70 11.14 52.52
Education (-0.91) (-0.44) (0.07) (0.34)
10.14 6.39 -2.42 -4.61
.2 3
Education2 (1.10) (0.75) (-0.18) (-0.39)
C- « -0.25 -0.17 0.12 0.16
Education3 (-1-07) (-0.81) (0.35) (0.52)
Q € Cohab dummy - - -
Never married -31.86 -56.59 -12.82 -32.86
dummy (-0.46) (-0.81) (-0.30) (-0.80)
=  .2 -28.44 -41.63
1  5 l UVE (-0.83) (-1.27)
♦denotes significance at the 10% level 
♦♦denotes significance at the 5% level 
♦♦♦denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 21. Results from the reduced-form birth weight equation (all births)
W hite sam p le  B lack s a m p le
VARIABLES Birth weight Birth w eight
-323.37 -414.59
Intercept (-0 .22) (-0.27)
0.006 0.0007
>v Eligibility88 (0.99) (0 .12)
-DC3 0.92 -21.75t—O State unemployment (0.09) (2 .11)**
vsVUrn rate3
v s Mother & father’s




*3 C/3 State health care (1.48) (-1.43)
price index
-0.05 -0.002
o 3 State population (-1-09) (-0 .11)
> S density
c5 ~ -13.66 19.32
Urban dummy (-0.35) (0.41)
C/313




M om ’s birthweight (7.81)*** (4.54)***
5 fe 30.89 30.98
o 3^ i= 2 M om’s height (4.90)*** (5.26)***
149.92 90.87
Male dummy (4.60)*** (2 .68)***
-16.64 -15.75-  .2 
£ > Smoking (-6.64)*** (-4.24)***— 2 -0.51 -20.78
2  -o Drinking (-0.03) (-1.69)*
40.66 -15.04
u.o






Parity dummy (1.38) (-0.64)
£ -51.48 -80.99
Fetal deaths (-1.93)* (-2.98)***
continued on next page
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W hite sam ple________ B lack sam ple
VARIABLES Birth weight Birth weight
67.45 146.11








.2 3 Education2 (-0.82) (-0 .10)
-0.26 0.05
cb 3  o u Education3 (-1.07) (0.15)£2 S3
<U 144.01 0.69
Cohab dummy (2.09)** (0 .02)
-0.000002 0.001
Income (-0 .002) (0.87)
‘denotes significance at the 10% level 
“ denotes significance at the 5% level 
‘ “ denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 22. Results from low birth weight models (prenatal care=ons-et)











Te rm low 
birth weight 
N =1677
-0.90 -0.39 1.68 3.39
Intercept (-0.24) (-0.07) (0.45) (0.80)V5
-22 0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.04J3
.2 Onset (0.72) (-0.60) (0.79) (0.45)
C3> ACOG adjusted --- — --- ---C/53O number o f  visits
o 0.18 -0.29 0.09 0.03
c Private insurance (0.55) (-0.74) (0.25) (0.07)
dummy
0.67 0.54 0.08 0.37
Medicaid dummy (2.53)** (1.33) (0.24) (0.84)
0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.001
C. .2 CESD average (0 .68) (-0.31) (0.74) (0.17)
Q
-0.0003 -.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003COw °£> w M om ’s birthweight (-5.57)*** (-4.71)*** (_9 93)*** (-3.10)
5 fe -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
s i#- u* M om's height (-1.62) (-1.57) (-3.78)*** (-3.20)***
C — -0.14 -0.26 -0.06 -0.15<. Male dummy (-2.19)** (-2.62)*** (-0.92) (-1.71)*
— ^ 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
2  .2 2 *> Smoking (5.30)*** (5.84)*** (2.35)** (2.29)**2  2 0.005 -0.01 0.03 0.03
2  -c Drinking (0.13) (-0.30) (0.98) (0.73)
0.02 -0.100 0.13 -0.06
Wanted dummy (0.14) (-0.65) (0.80) (-0.33)
-0.28 -0.07 -0.12 -0.12
Kidcohab (-4.35)*** (-0.84) (-2.87)*** (-2 .20)**
-0.15 -0.28 0.07 -0.13
> Parity dummy (-1.91)* (-2.35)** (0.85) (-1-14)
0.10 -0.10 0.09 -0.03
>v Fetal deaths (2.30)** (-1.39) (2.22)** (-0.51)
-0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.38
c2 Age (-0 .10) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-1-10)
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.02
Age2 (0.27) (0 .21) (0.25) (1.21)
-0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.0002
Age3 (-0.32) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-1.22)
continued on next page
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♦denotes significance at the 10% level 
♦♦denotes significance at the 5% level 
♦♦♦denotes significance at the 1 % level
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Table 23. Results from low birth weight models (prenatal care=acogadi)
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W hite sam ple Black sampl e
Birth Term birth Birth Term birth
VARIABLES Weight weight Weight weight
N=2562 N=2084 N=2106 N=1677
0.46 2.01 0.12 0.30
Education (1.34) (1-44) (0.27) . (0.71)
•s ■ § -0.03 -0.14 -0.001 -0.02
o.a u Education2 (-1.28) (-1.45) (-0.04) (-0.57)
wo r?
9  ^  m  * 3s
Z J  *5
0.0007 0.003 -0.0002 0.0002
Education3 (1.14) (1.43) (-0.22) (0.30)
-0.17 -0.12 0.02 0.08
Never married 
dummy
(-0.89) (-0.37) (0.21) (0.56)
0.004 -0.02 0.07 0.02

























‘denotes significance at the 10% level 
••denotes significance at the 5% level 
•••denotes significance at the \% level
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Table 24. Major state-level Medicaid eligibility expansions since the mi<i-1980,s
December April 1987 - January October
State 1986* January 1989 1992+ 1997
AL 15.5% 100% 133% 133%
AK 77.9% 100% 133% 133%
AZ 36.3%* 100% 140% 140%
AR 34.0% 100% 185% 133% T200%1 ***
CA 108.6% * 185%** 200%
CO 55.4% * 133% 133%
CT 80.0% 185% 185% 185%
DE 40.8% 100% 160% 185%
DC 63.8% 100% 185% Not reported
FL 44.8% 100% 150% 185%
GA 45.0% 100% 133% 185%
HI 54.3% 100% 185%** 300%n
ID 40.0% 67% 133% 133%
IL 60.3% 100% 133% 133%
IN 33.7% 50% 150% 150%
IA 6 6 .8 % 150% 185% 185%
KS 60.5% 100% 150% 150%
KY 35.1% 125% 185% 185%
LA 33.9% 100% 133% 133%
ME 69.0% 185% 185% 185%
MD 53.8% 100% 185% 185%m
MA 86.5% 185% 185%** 185%
MI 68.5% 185% 185% 185%
MN 70.0% 185% 185% 275%m
MS 48.4% 185% 185% 185%
MO 36.7% 100% 133% 185%
MT 53.2% * 133% 133%
NE 59.2% 100% 133% 150%
NY 37.5% * 133% 133%
NH 61.4% * 133% 185%
NJ 71.2% 100% 185% 185%
NM 33.9% 100% 185% 185%
NY 80.0% * 185% 185%
NC 43.8% 100% 185% 185%
ND 57.2% * 133% 133%
OH 39.7% 100% 133% 133%
OK 54.8% 100% 133% 150%
OR 69.6% 100% 133% 133%
PA 55.9% 100% 133% 185%
RI 83.3% 185% 185%** 250%+++
continued on next page











AL 15.5% 100% 133% 133%
SC 50.0% 100% 185% 185%
SD 48.2% 100% 133% 133%
TN 27.3% 100% 185% 400%m
TX 35.1% 100% 185% 185%
UT 65.9% 100% 133% 133%
VT 80.0% 185% 185%** 200% T225%1***
VA 47.1% 100% 133% 133%
WA 72.6% 90% 185% 189% [200%1***
WV 38.1% 150% 150% 150%
WI 84.3% * 155% 185%
WY 47.4% 100% 133% 133%
Sources: Columns 1 and 3 - Gold, R.B., Singh. S., & Frost, J. (1993). The Medicaid eligibility expansions 
for pregnant women: evaluating the strength of state implementation efforts. Family Planning Perspectives. 
25(5). 198. Column 2 - Torres. A. & Kenney,A.M. (1989). Expanding Medicaid coverage for pregnant 
women: Estimates of the impact and cost. Family Planning Perspectives. 21(1). 20. Column 4 - National 
Governors’ Association,. (1998) How states can increase enrollment in the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program. In NGA Online, NGA Issue Briefs [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nga.ore/Pubs/IssueBriefs/l998/980511 IncreaseSCHIP.asp [1998. May 11]
Column 1 Comments
Income eligibility level is the percentage of the federal poverty level below which Medicaid covered the cost 
of pregnancy-related medical care.
’ Value shown is eligibility level for the medically needy (if state had program for medically needy) or Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children eligibility level (if it did not).
* Prior to 1988, Arizona operated a medical assistance program under a Section 1115 demonstration waiver. 
Column 2 Comments
Income eligibility level is for expanded coverage for pregnant women and infants as a percentage of the 
federal poverty level.
4= These states had not yet expanded eligibility from previous levels.
Column 3 Comments
T Value shown is eligibility level for the medically needy (if state had program tor medically needy) or Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children eligibility level (if it did not).
** State used its own funds to expand eligibility above 185%.
Column 4 Comments
Income eligibility level is for pregnant women and infants as a percentage of the federal poverty level.
*** Percentage NOT in brackets represents eligibility for pregnant women and percentage in brackets [ ] 
represents eligibility for infants.
n Hawaii's coverage of pregnant women and children is through Hawaii QUEST, a Section 1115 waiver 
managed care program. Some populations receive fully subsidized services and other pay premiums. The 
state is considering a change in income eligibility that would take effect in late 1997. Pregnant women and 
infants living in families with incomes up to 185% of poverty would be eligible for fully subsidized 
Medicaid; children below six living in families with incomes up to 133% of poverty would be eligible: and 
older children living in families with incomes below 100% of poverty would be eligible. 
m  Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island and Tennessee operate programs under Section 1115 waivers. Some 
populations receive fully subsidized Medicaid services. Other populations are required to pay a portion of 
the premium and may have a different benefits package.
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0.11 0.51 294 0.41 0.72 855
79 The take-up rate is the percentage o f  M edicaid eligible women that participated in the M edicaid program.












Table 26. Summary of results from eligibility simulation
Eligible 
in 1988
Eligible in 1997 ut 
not eligible in 1988
Not eligible 
in 1997
Low birth weight 
infant
































































































































































































































































Table 27. Summary o f results from depression simulation













Private insurance predicted value in 1988 0.68 0,55 0.65 0.55 0.70 0.55
(0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0,12)
Private insurance predicted value in 1997 0.69 0.55 0.65 0.55 0.70 0.55
(0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12)
Medicaid predicted value in 1988 0.59 0.72 0.63 0.73 0.57 0,71
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
Medicaid predicted value in 1997 0,54 0,67 0,58 0.68 0.52 0,67
(0.15) (0,17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0,18)
Onset predicted value in 1988 9.17 10,38 9.41 10.47 9,08 10.35
(1.45) (1.54) (1.53) (1.38) (1.41) (1.60)
Onset predicted value in 1997 9.32 10,17 9.46 10,24 9.27 10.15
(1.21) (1.42) (1.26) (1.28) (1.19) (1.47)
Birth w ight predicted value in 1988 2877.92 2805.27 2709.64 2756.60 2942.17 2821,35
(318.24) (221.34) (280.47) (240.31) (308.61) (212.55)
Birth w igh t predicted value in 1997 2882.45 2868.52 2732.70 2823.49 2939.63 2883,40
(305.65) (219.76) (268.85) (229,35) (299.86) (214,69)
Number o f  white censored observations: 380 o f2562 (15%)
Number o f  black censored observations: 596 o f2106 (28%)
Mean o f CESDavgfor whites (before censoring): 8.79
(after censoring): 7.75
Mean o f CESDavgfor blacks (before censoring): 12.84
(after censoring): 10.58 \
Standard deviations in parenthesis
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Figures 2 & 3. Distribution of the onset of prenatal care for 
white (N = 2562) and black women (N = 2106), respectively 
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Figures 4 & 5. Distribution of the ACOG adjusted number of visits for 
white (N = 2562) and black women (N = 2106), respectively
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Figures 6 & 7. Distribution of CES-D scores for 
white (N = 2562) and black women (N = 2106), respectively
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Figure 8. Overview of the three stages o f the empirical model
Initial stage: Purpose is to correct for sample selection caused by using only a subset of the data  on 
pregnant women - the sample of women that experienced a live birth. Heckman's 2-step is used to 
create the correction statistic, an inverse Mills ratio, that is included in all subsequent equations.
A. Estimate a reduced-form probability of birth equation using a probit:
Live Birth = 1 of live birth, 0 if infant/fetal death.
Live Birth =  f(X aU) where X^i is all of the exogenous variables in the system.
B. Using the parameter estimates obtained from A. create an inverse Mills ratio:
This new variable is included as a regressor in all equations that appear in the next two-stages.
C. Since the NMIHS does not include abortion data, the NLSY is used to estimate the probit in A. 
The parameter estimates obtained from the NLSY are multiplied times the variables in the 
NMIHS in order to create the inverse Mills ratio. This is called a two-sample approach.
Stage two: Purpose is to control for the endogeneity bias created by the presence of Medicaid and 
private insurance. This means that these are choice variables - women can choose the type of 
insurance (including no insurance) that maximizes her utility. Similar to the initial stage. Heckman's 
2-step is used to create inverse Mills ratios to correct for the endogeneity bias.
A. Estimate two reduced-form probability of insurance equations using two probits:
Medicaid = 1 if Medicaid pays for prenatal care, 0 otherwise.
Insurance = 1 if private insurance pays for prenatal care, 0 otherwise.
MC, PI = f(X an) where Xai! is all of the exogenous variables in the system.
B. Create 2 inverse Mills ratios as in the initial stage.
Final Stage: A treatment effects model simultaneously estimates prenatal care and birth weight (infant 
health) using two-stage Ieast-squares (2SLS). The treatment effects model not only includes the 
inverse Mills ratios from the initial stage and stage two in each equation but also includes the actual 
values (0 or 1) of Medicaid and private insurance. Since the structural equation for birth weight is 
estimated, the prenatal care equation includes variables that identify birth weight.
A. Simultaneously estimate prenatal care, depression, and birth weight using 2SLS:
Prenatal care = f(X, X,dendf,m, k ^ ,  kMO kPh MC, PI)
Birth weight =f(X, ,1 ^ ,  kMCs kPh MC, PI)
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A p p en d ix  1 
Derivation of standardized number of visits
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) recommends the 
following schedule of prenatal care visits:
A visit once a month during months 2-6 
Visits twice a month during months 7-8 
Visits weekly during the ninth month
I translated these rules into the recommended number of visits by day (rather than 
by month), according to the following schedule:
ACOG recommendation =
if308<=days of gestation<=315 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=18; 
if 301<=days of gestation<308 then ACOG recommended number o f visits—17; 
if294<=days of gestation<301 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=16; 
if287<= days of gestation<294 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=15; 
if280<—days of gestation<287 then ACOG recommended number o f visits—14; 
if273<—days of gestation<280 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits= 13; 
if266<—days of gestation<273 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=12; 
if259<=davs of gestation<266 then ACOG recommended number o fvisits= ll;  
if252<=days of gestation<259 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=JO; 
if245<=days of gestation<252 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=9; 
if230<=days of gestation<245 then ACOG recommended number of visits=8; 
if215<=days of gestation<230 then ACOG recommended number of visits=7; 
if200<=days of gestation<215 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=6; 
if 185<=days of gestation<200 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=5; 
if 155<=days of gestation<l85 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=4; 
if 125<=days of gestation<155 then ACOG recommended number ofvisits=3;
The variable used in the model is the ratio between the actual number of prenatal 
visits and the ACOG recommended number of visits or
. actual number o f  prenatal visitsACOGadj —------------------------------- --------------------------------
ACOG recommended number o f prenatal visits
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Appendix 2
Federal Poverty Guidelines80 for the 48 Contiguous States and D C
P o v e r t y  g u i d e l i n e s  b y  f a m i l y  s i z e
Year i 4 S
1986 $5,360 $7,240 $9,120 $11,000 $12,880 $14,760 $16,640 SI 8,520
1987 $5,500 S7.400 $9,300 $11,200 513.100 $15,000 $16,900 518.800
1988 $5,770 S7.730 $9,690 $11.650 S13.610 $15,570 $17,530 $19,490
1989 $5,980 S8.020 $10,060 $12,100 S14.140 $16,180 $18,220 $20,260
1990 $6,280 $8,420 $10,560 $12,700 $14,840 $16,980 $19,120 $21,260
1991 $6,620 $8,880 $11,140 $13,400 S15.660 $17,920 $20,180 $22,440
1992 $6,810 $9,190 SI 1.570 $13,950 S16.330 $18,710 $21,090 $23,470
1993 $6,970 $9,430 $11,890 $14,350 $16,810 $19,270 S21.730 S24.190
1994 $7,360 $9,840 SI 2.320 S14.800 $17,280 $19,760 $22,240 S24.720
1995 $7,470 $10,030 SI 2.590 $15,150 SI 7.710 $20,270 $22,830 $25,390
1996 S7.740 $10,360 $12,980 $15,600 $18,220 $20,840 S23.460 $26,080
1997 $7,890 S10.610 $13,330 $16,050 $18,770 $21,490 $24,210 $26,930
1998 $8,050 S 10.850 SI 3,650 $16,450 $19,250 $22,050 $24,850 $27,650
Federal Poverty Guidelines for Alaska
P o v e r t y  g u i d e l i n e s  b y  f a m i l y  s i z e  1
Year w k & m
1986 $6,700 S9.050 $11,400 $13,750 S16.100 $18,450 $20,800 S23.150 I
1987 $6,860 $9,240 $11,620 $14,000 S 15.380 $18,760 $21,140 £23,520 |
1988 S7.210 $9,660 SI2.I10 SI 4,560 $17,010 $19,460 $21,910 £24.360 8
1989 S7.480 $10,030 $12,580 $15,130 $17,680 $20,230 $22,780 £25.330 9
1990 S7.840 S 10.520 $13,200 $15,880 $18,560 $21,240 $23,920 £26.600 8
1991 $8,290 SI 1,110 $13,930 $16,750 $19,570 $22,390 $25,210 £28.030 |
1992 $8,500 $11,480 S 14.460 $17,440 $20,420 $23,400 S26.380 £29.360 S
1993 $8,700 $11,730 SI 4.860 $17,940 $21,020 S24.100 S27.180 £30.260 |
1994 $9,200 $12,300 S 15.400 $18,500 $21,600 S24.700 S27.800 £30,900 1
1995 S9.340 $12,540 $15,740 SI 8,940 $22,140 S25.340 S28.540 £31.740 8
1996 $9,660 SI 2,940 $16,220 $19,500 S22.780 S26.060 S29.340 £32.620 8
1997 $9,870 SI 3,270 $16,670 $20,070 S23.470 $26,870 S30.270 £33.670 1
1998 $10.07 $13,570 SI 7.070 $20,570 S24.070 $27,570 $31,070 £34,570 1
Federal Poverty Guidelines for Hawaii
1
Year
1986 SS6.170 $8,330 $10,490 $12,650 $14,810 $16,970 $19,130 $21,290 I
1987 $6,310 S8.500 $10,690 $12,880 $15,070 $17,260 SI 9,450 $21,640 1
1988 $6,650 $8,900 SI 1,150 $13,400 SI 5.650 SI 7.900 S20.150 $22,400 I
1989 $6,870 $9,220 $11,570 $13,920 $16,270 SI 8.620 $20,970 $23,320 |
1990 57,230 $9,690 $12,150 $14,610 $17,070 SI 9.530 $21,990 $24,450 8
1991 $7,610 $10,210 $12,810 $15,410 $18,010 S20.610 $23,210 $25,810
1992 $7,830 $10,570 $13,310 $16,050 $18,790 $21,530 $24,270 $27,010
1993 $8,040 $10,860 $13,680 $16,500 $19,320 $22,140 $24,960 $27,780 1
1994 $8,470 $11,320 $14,170 $17,020 $19,870 $22,720 $25,570 $28,420 8
1995 $8,610 $11,550 $14,490 $17,430 $20,370 $23,310 $26,250 $29,190
1996 $8,910 $11,920 $14,930 $17,940 $20,950 S23.960 $26,970 $29,980
1997 $9,070 $12,200 $15,330 SI 8,460 $21,590 $24,720 S27.850 $30,980
1998 $9,260 SI 2,480 S 15,700 $18,920 $22,140 S25.360 S28.580 $31,800
80 Source: Federal Register, Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, various years.
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Appendix 3
State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size 
 _______________ Family Size = 1___________________
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  a s  a In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  as a
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 198881 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $5,770 510,494 MT* $3,070 $10,494
AK $7,210 513,127 NE $5,770 511,835
AZ $5,770 $11,046 NV* 52,164 $10,494
AR $5,770 $10,494 [$15,780] NH* $3,543 $14,597
CA* $6,266 $15,780 NJ $5,770 $14,597
CO* $3,197 510,494 NM $5,770 $14,597
CT $10,675 514,597 NY* $4,616 $14,597
DE $5,770 514,597 NC $5,770 $14,597
DC $5,770 $14,597 ND* $3,300 $10,494
FL $5,770 $14,597 OH 55,770 510,494
GA $5,770 $14,597 OK 55,770 511,835
HI $6,650 $27,210 OR $5,770 $10,494
ID 53,866 510,494 PA $5,770 $14,597
LL 55,770 510,494 R l $10,675 519,725
IN 52,885 $11,835 SC 55,770 $14,597
IA 58,655 $14,597 SD S5,770 $10,494
KS $5,770 $11,835 TN $5,770 531,560
KY $7,213 $14,597 TX $5,770 $14,597
LA 55,770 $10,494 UT $5,770 $10,494
ME 510,675 $14,597 VT $10,675 S15.780 [517,753]
MD $5,770 $14,597 VA $5,770 510,494
MA $10,675 514,597 WA $5,193 $14,597 [515,780]
MI $10,675 514,597 WV $8,655 $11,835
MN 510,675 521,698 WI* $4,864 $14,597
MS 510,675 $14,597 WY $5,770 $10,494
MO $5,770 $14,597
* Since these states had not yet undergone the 1988 expansions, eligibility levels are from December 1996.
81 The Medicaid eligibility levels used are based on data from April 1987-January 1989.
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 2
I n c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t i o n  o f  %  o f  P o v e r t y
1 i n c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
1 F u n c t i o n  o f  %  o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 [State 1988 1997
AL $7,730 $14,111 1 MT $4,112 $14,111
AK $9,660 $17,649 1 NE $7,730 515,915
AZ $7,730 $14,854 NY $2,899 $14,111
AR $7,730 $14,111 [21,220] NH 54,746 $19,629
CA $‘8,395 521,220 NJ 57,730 519,629
CO $4,282 $14,111 NM $7,730 519.629
CT $14,301 $19,629 NY $6,184 519,629
DE $7,730 $19,629 NC $7,730 519,629
DC $7,730 519,629 ND $4,422 514,111
FL $7,730 $19,629 OH $7,730 $14,111
GA $7,730 $19,629 OK 57,730 515,915
HI $8,900 $36,600 OR $7,730 514,111
ID $5,179 514,111 PA 57,730 519,629
IL $7,730 514,111 Rl $14,301 $26,525
IN $3,865 515,915 SC $7,730 $19,629
IA 511,595 $19,629 SD $7,730 $14,111
KS 57,730 515,915 TN $7,730 $42,440
KY $9,663 519,629 TX 57,730 $19,629
LA $7,730 $14,111 UT $7,730 514,111
ME 514,301 $19,629 VT 514,301 $21,220 [23,873]
MD $7,730 $19,629 VA $7,730 $14,111
MA $14,301 519,629 WA $6,957 $19,629 [21,220]
MI $14,301 519,629 WV $11,595 515,915
MN 514,301 $29,178 WI 56,516 519.629
MS $14,301 $19,629 WY $7,730 $14,111
MO 57,730 519,629 I
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 3
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
In c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $9,690 $17,729 MT $5,155* $17,729
AK $ 12,110 $22,171 NE $9,690 $19,995
AZ $9,690 $18,662 NV $3,634* $17,729
AR $9,690 $17,729 [26,660] NH $5,950* $24,661
CA $10,523* $26,660 NJ $9,690 524,661
CO $5,368* $17,729 NM $9,690 524,661
CT $17,927 $24,661 NY $7,752* 524,661
DE $9,690 $24,661 NC $9,690 524,661
DC $9,690 $24,661 ND $5,542* 517,729
FL $9,690 $24,661 OH $9,690 $17,729
GA $9,690 $24,661 OK $9,690 $19,995
HI $11,150 $45,990 OR $9,690 $17,729
ID $6,492 $17,729 PA $9,690 $24,661
IL $9,690 $17,729 RI 517,927 $33,325
IN $4,845 $19,995 SC $9,690 $24,661
IA $14,535 $24,661 SD $9,690 $17,729
KS $9,690 $19,995 TN 59,690 $53,320
KY $12,113 $24,661 TX 59,690 $24,661
LA $9,690 $17,729 UT $9,690 $17,729
ME $17,927 $24,661 VT $17,927 526,660 [29,993]
MD $9,690 $24,661 |  VA 59,690 $17,729
MA $17,927 $24,661 J WA S8,721 S24,661 [26,660]
MI $17,927 $24,661 WV 514,535 519,995
MN $17,929 $36,658 WI 58,169* $24,661
MS $17,927 $24,661 WY 59,690 $17,729
MO $9,690 $24,661
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 4
In c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
I n c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $11,650 $21,347 MT $6,198 $21 ,347
AK $14,560 $26,693 NE $11,650 $24 ,075
AZ $11,650 $22,470 NV $4,369 $21 ,347
AR $11,650 $21,347 [32,100] NH $7,153 $29,693
CA SI 2 ,652 $32,100 NJ $11,650 $29,693
CO $6,454 $21,347 NM SI 1.650 $29,693
CT $21,553 $29,693 NY $9,320 S29.693
DE $11,650 $29,693 NC $11,650 $29,693
DC $11,650 $29,693 ND $6,664 $21,347
FL $11,650 $29,693 OH $11,650 $21,347
GA $11,650 $29,693 OK $11,650 $24,075
HI $13,400 $55,380 OR SI 1,650 $21,347
ID $7,806 $21,347 PA SI 1,650 $29,693
IL $11,650 $21,347 RI S21,553 $40,125
IN $5,825 $24,075 SC 511,650 $29,693
IA $17,475 $29,693 SD 511,650 $21,347
KS $11,650 $24,075 TN 511,650 $64,200
KY $14,563 $29,693 TX 511,650 $29,693
LA $11,650 $21,347 |  U T $11,650 $21,347
ME $21,553 $29,693 j V T 521,553 $32,100 [36.113]
MD $11,650 $29,693 |  V A 516,050 $21,347
MA $21,553 $29,693 ] W A S 10,485 $29,693 [32,100]
MI $21,553 $29,693 1 WV SI 7,475 $24,075
MN $21,553 $44,138 WI $9,821 $29,693
MS $21,553 $29,693 WY 511,650 $21,347
MO $11,650 $29,693
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 5
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  a s  a 
Fu n c t io n  of  % o f  P o v e r t y
I n c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $13,610 $24,964 MT $7,241 $24,964
AK $17,010 $31,215 NE $13,610 $28,155
AZ $13,610 $26,278 NV $5,104 $24,964
AR $13,610 $24,964 [37,540] NH $8,357 $34,725
CA $14,780 $37,540 NJ $13,610 $34,725
CO $7,540 $24,964 NM $13,610 $34,725
CT $25,179 $34,725 NY $ 10,888 $34,725
DE $13,610 $34,725 NC $13,610 $34,725
DC $13,610 $34,725 ND $7,785 $24,964
FL $13,610 $34,725 OH $13,610 $24,964
GA $13,610 $34,725 OK $13,610 $28,155
HI $15,650 $64,770 OR $13,610 $24,964
ED $9,119 $24,964 PA $13,610 $34,725
IL $13,610 $24,964 RI $25,179 $46,925
IN $6,805 $28,155 SC $13,610 S34.725
IA $20,415 $34,725 SD $13,610 $24,964
KS $13,610 $28,155 TN $13,610 $75,080
KY $17,013 $34,725 TX $13,610 $34,725
LA $13,610 $24,964 UT $13,610 $24,964
ME $25,179 $34,725 VT $25,179 $37,540 [42,233]
MD $13,610 $34,725 YA $13,610 $24,964
MA $25,179 $34,725 WA $12,249 $34,725 [37,540]
MI $25,179 $34,725 WV $20,415 $28,155
MN $25,179 $34,725 WI $11,473 $34,725
MS $25,179 $34,725 WY $13,610 $24,964
MO $13,610 $24,964
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 6
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  as a 
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  of  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $15,570 $28,582 M T $8,283 $28 ,582
AK $19,460 $35,737 N E $15,570 $32,235
AZ $15,570 $30,086 N V $5,839 $28,582
AR $15,570 $28,582 N H $9,560 $39,757
CA $16,909 $42,980 N J $15,570 $39,757
CO $8,626 $28,582 ] N M $15,570 $3^,757
CT $28,805 $39,757 j N Y $12,456 $39,757
DE $15,570 $39,757 N C $15,570 $39,757
DC $15,570 $39,757 N D $8,906 $28,582
FL $15,570 $39,757 O H $15,570 $28,582
GA $15,570 $39,757 |  O K $15,570 $32,235
HI $17,900 $74,160 |  O R $15,570 $28,582
ID $10,432 $28,582 | P A $15,570 $39,757
IL $15,570 $28,582 R I $28,805 $53,725
IN $7,785 $32,235 SC $15,570 $39,757
IA S23,355 $39,757 SD $15,570 $28,582
KS $15,570 $32,235 T N $15,570 $85,960
KY $19,463 $39,757 T X $15,570 $39,757
LA $15,570 $28,582 U T $15,570 $28,582
ME $28,805 $39,757 V T $28,805 $42,980 [$48,353]
MD $15,570 $39,757 V A $15,570 528,582
MA $28,805 $39,757 W A $14,013 $39,757 [$42,980]
MI $28,805 $39,757 w v $23,355 $32,235
M N $28,805 $59,098 WI $13,126 $39,757
MS $28,805 $39,757 W Y $15,570 $28,582
MO $15,570 $39,757
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 7
In c o m e  E l ig ib il it y  L ev e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  Po v e r t y
I n c o m e  E l i g i b i l i t y  L e v e l s  a s  a  
F u n c t io n  o f  % o f  P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $17,530 532,199 MT $9,326 $32,199
AK $21,910 $40,259 NE $17,530 $24,210
AZ $17,530 $33,894 NV $6,521 $32,199
AR $17,530 532,199 |  NH $10,763 $44,789
CA 519,038 548,420 NJ $17,530 524,2 10
CO $9,712 532,199 NM 517,530 S24,2 10
CT $32,431 $44,789 NY 514,024 524,2 10
DE $17,530 $44,789 NC 517,530 524,210
DC 517,530 $44,789 ND $10,027 532,199
FL 517,530 S44,789 OH S 17,530 532,199
GA $17,530 544,789 OK 517,530 524,210
HI $20,150 583,550 OR 517,530 S32,199
ED $11,745 $32,199 PA $17,530 524,210
IL 517,530 $32,199 RI $32,431 S60,525
IN $8,765 $36,315 SC $17,530 544,789
IA $26,295 544,789 SD $17,530 532,199
KS $17,530 536,315 TN $17,530 $96,840
KY $21,913 $44,789 TX 517,530 544,789
LA 517,530 $32,199 UT 517,530 S32,199
ME 532,431 $44,789 VT $32,431 548,420 [54,473]
MD $17,530 544,789 VA 517,530 532,199
MA $32,431 544,789 WA $15,777 $45,757 [48,420]
MI $32,431 544,789 w v $26,295 $36,315
MN 532,431 $66,578 WI $14,778 $44,789
MS $32,431 $44,789 WY $17,530 $32,199
MO 517,530 $44,789
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State-Level Medicaid Eligibility (in Dollars) By Family Size
Family Size = 8
Incom e  E l ig ib il it y  L evels as a 
Functio n  o f  % o f  Poverty
In c o m e  E lig ibility  L e v e l s  a s  a 
F u n c tio n  o f  % of P o v e r t y
State 1988 1997 State 1988 1997
AL $19,490 $35,817 MT $10,369 $35,817
AK $24,360 $44,781 NE $19,490 $40,395
AZ $19,490 $37,702 NV $7,250 $35,817
AR $19,490 $35,817 NH $11,967 $49,82 1
CA $21166 $53,860 NJ $19,490 $49,82 I
CO $10797 $35,817 NM $19,490 $49,82 I
CT $36057 $49,821 NY $15,592 $49,82 1
DE $19,490 $49,821 NC $19,490 $49,82 1
DC $19,490 $49,821 ND $11,148 $35,817
FL $19,490 $49,821 OH $19,490 $35,817
GA $19,490 $49,821 OK $19,490 $40,395
HI $22,400 $92,940 OR $19,490 $35,817
ID $13058 $35,817 PA $19,490 $49,821
IL $19,490 $35,817 RI $36,057 $67,325
IN $9,745 $40,395 SC $19,490 $49,821
IA $29,235 $49,821 SD $19,490 $35,817
KS $19,490 $40,395 TN $19,490 $107,720
KY $24,363 $49,821 TX $19,490 $49,821
LA $19,490 $35,817 UT $19,490 $35,817
ME $36,057 $49,821 VT $36057 $53,860 [$60,593]
MD $19,490 $49,821 VA $19,490 $35,817
MA $36,057 $49,821 WA $17,541 $49,821 [$53,860]
MI $36,057 $49,821 w v $29,235 $40,395
MN $36,057 $74,058 ' WI $16,430 $49,821
MS $36,056 $49,821 WY $19,490 $35,817
MO $19,490 $49,821
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Appendix 4
Sample calculation of imputing a woman’s Medicaid eligibility in 1988
This calculation is a very rough estimate of whether a woman is considered Medicaid 
eligible. A more accurate estimate would require both comprehensive data on each woman 
and a detailed account of state-by-state eligibility rules.
Step One. Determine a woman’s household size. This is computed by summing the number 
of children living in the woman’s household and herself. Typically, a woman’s husband or 
boyfriend does not count in determining eligibility.
Eg. Woman has 3 children living in household, yielding a household size of four.
Step Two. Determine a woman’s state of residence.
Eg. Woman lives in Alabama.
Step Three. Determine the federal poverty level (FPL) income for a household size of four, 
living in Alabama, in 1988. Refer to Appendix 2 for a list of the FPLs.
Eg. The FPL for a household of four, living in Alabama, in 1988 is $11,650.
Step Four. Determine the Medicaid income eligibility level for Alabama in 1988. See 
Table 12 (or Appendix 3) for a list.
Eg. In Alabama, in 1988, the income eligibility level is 100% of the FPL.
Step Five. Multiply the percentage allowed by the FPL (i.e. Step 4 x Step 5). This gives the 
maximum allowable income in order to be Medicaid eligible.
Eg. 100% x $11,650 = 511,650.
Step Six. Compare a woman’s annual household income to the maximum allowable income. 
If she earns less than the maximum, she is Medicaid eligible. If she earns more, she is 
ineligible.
Eg. Woman income = $10,000 < SI 1,650. Therefore, she is Medicaid eligible.
In order to determine whether the woman participates in Medicaid (this measure in 
the aggregate is the Medicaid take-up rate):
Step Seven. If a woman is eligible and the Medicaid dummy variable = 1, then she 
participates. (Aggregating this across all eligible women determines the take-up rate).
Eg. Woman is eligible and Medicaid = 0, then she does not take-up Medicaid.
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